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PREFACE
Much has been written by eminent jurists about the
purpose and importance of Comparative Labour Law. For
ae the study of the law oi several countries aas proved
a considerable aid in the understanding of each of them.
The law of each of the three countries has been set
out separately under broad headings because I came to the
conclusion that smaller subdivisions might lead to
confusion. They would unduly emphasise the technical
differences, rather tnan point out the varying approaches,
shortcomings and advantages.
I do not go into detail as to why the law in the
three countries is as it is. This I leave to historians,
political scientists, economists anu sociologists.
I discuss whether the law in each country protects
the freedom of the individual to refrain fro a organising,
and, if so, how. Union security clauses and trade union
members' rights in ray view deserve a special study.
as freedom to organise is not of much use without
freedom to strike the law relating to the latter has also
been dealt with. In the American part I discuss the law
relating to strikes, picketing and boycott i ; more detail,
it appeared to me actually to form part- and parcel of
freedom to organise.
I encountered special difficulty when dealing with
the German part of the thesis. It is not that the law
is very complicated, but I found only a few books where
its provisions had been translated into English, and most
of this translation had been done at the beginning of the
i
I
century, and then not in full. In addition, only a few
interpretations of the law have been translated into
English, ana then generally only an outline is given, I
have translated from the German and tried to find equivalent
English legal terminology, but this was sometimes isapossibie
because of the different legal systems.
After the part of the thesis dealing with the law in
Great Britain was completed, the Trade Disputes Bill, 1965,
was passed by Parliament, The Act has the exact wording
of the Biii which is mentioned in the thesis. Since I
have considered the legal implications and significance
of the Bill (as it then was) I have not judged it necessary
to alter this part of the thesis.
One interesting decision recently given by the NLRJb
has cone too late to be incorporated in the main body of
the thesis. In J. P. Stevens and Co. Inc. & Industrial
Union Department Aih-JIO (157 NLhB No.90, 1966) the Board
uecidea that the conventional remedies to which I refer
on p.42 are insufficient in cases where "massive and
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FAET I
THB RIGHT TO ORGANISE AND TO STRIKE
Chapter 1
Freedom to Organise in Great Britain
la Great Britain freedom to organise was established
as far back as 1824.1 Employees are free to form and
to join trade unions; they do not commit an unlawful act
by doing so.
Since Parliament is all-powerful it uiay do anything
by a simple Act and it may certainly, if it wishes to do
so, impose restrictions upon the right to organise. It
is, however, very unlikely that Parliament would take
drastic steps in this respect without the backing of the
majority of the electorate.
The only employees upon whom restrictions are
imposed by statute are members of the police force. The
o
Police Act, 1919, passed as a result of the police strike
of the same year, prohibits members of the police force
3
from belonging to trade unions of any kind.
1. For further details see Combination Laws Repeal Acts
of 1824 and 1825, (5 Geo.4, c.95, & 6 Geo.4, eJ29
respectively)•
2. 9 & 10 Geo.5, c.46.
3. It is provided in s.2(l) of the Police Act, 1919 s
"
.... it shall not be lawful for a member of the
police force to become .... a member of any trade
union, or of any association having for its objects,
or one of its objects, to control or influence the pay,
pensions, or conditions of service of any police force;
and any member of a police force who contravenes this
provision shall be disqualified for continuing to be
a member of the force; and, if any member of a police
force continues to act as such after becoraing so
disqualified, he shall forfeit all pension rights and
be disqualified for being thereafter employed in any
police force.
The Act established a police Federation for members of
the police force.4 This Federation must be entirely
independent of and unassociated with any bodies or persons
5
outside the police service. Civil servants and other




5. Owing to the absence of "statutory objects" the
Feneration is not a trade union recognised by law.
For statutory objects see Trade Union. Act. 1913,
ss 1 and 2. See Citrine, Trade Union Law, second
ed., (I960), pp.300, 3ol. The Police Act", 1919,
also establishes a Police Federation for members of
the police force in Scotland and authorises the
Secretary for Scotland to adapt, the provisions of
the schedule to the Act to the circumstances of
Scotland.
6. Under the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act. 1927
it was made illegal for local or other public
authorities to make it a condition that any person
employed by the authority, should or should not be
a member of a trade union. This was not, however,
strictly speaking a restriction on the right to
organise; it was not aimed at trade union membership
as such but merely proscribed closed shop arrangements.
As a matter of fact it is the only piece of legislation
which was ever in force in Britain that protected
freedom of organisation. By the same Act members
of the civil service were prohibited from becoming
members of any unions with political objects and their
unions were denied the right of affiliation with any
other industrial or political organisation. The Act
was wholly repealed by tue Trade Disputes and Trade
Union Act, 1946.
- 2
Protection of Freedom to Organise
The law does not protect and safeguard the right
of employees to form and join trade unions* The right
to organise is not protected by law against infringement
by employers. In other words steps taken by an employer
to discourage union membership are not illegal* It goes
without saying that when by his activities an employer
commits a tort or a breach of contract an action can be
brought against him. But these are rights which every
person enjoys and have nothing to do with an employee's
right to organise.
The "yellow dog" document, a contract by which an
employee agrees, as a condition of employment, that he
will not join any union or continue to be a member of a
7
union during his tenure of employment, is not illegal.
An employer is permitted to discharge an employee because
of union Membership or activities as long as he keeps to
the terms of the contract regarding dismissal or complies
with the statutory requirements under the Contracts of
Smployiaent Act, 1963, whichever is applicable in the
8
specific case* There is no law proscribing the so-called
company union - a term used in a derisive sense to
g
indicate an employer-doainated union.
An employer engaged on Government contracts has
7. For "yellow dog" document see post, pp.201 f.
8* See post, pp. 198 f.
9. For company unions see post, pp.208 ff.
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to recognise the freedom of his employees to be members
of trade unions, and has to be responsible for the
observance of this by any sub-contractors who may be
employed in the execution of the contract.*C
In 1950 the United Kingdom ratified I.L.O.
Convention No. 98 but so far this has not been translated
into law.**
The right of the individual to refrain from
organizing is not protected toy law. Any type of union-
12
security agreement is allowed.
10. Fair Wages Resolution of the House of Commons of
14th October, 1946, No.4, 427 Hansard 619 f.
see Cmd 7225 p.289. For the effect of this Resolution
see post, pp.189 ff.
11. Convention No. 98 concerning the application of the
principles of the right to organise and to bargain
collectively. S66 post | p p • 20 6 j <203*
12. It was laid down in Keygolds v. shipping Federal log
[1924] 1 Ch.28 that a closed shop agreement as such
is not an actionable conspiracy. In Crofter Hand
Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veiled [1942J A.C.435
Lord Wright said that 100 per cent membership was
one of those "legitimate purposes" which justified
an agreement though it might inflict injury on others.
For civil conspiracy see post, pp.17 ff.
see also Faramns v. Film Artistes1 Assoc. [1964J
1 All.ii.iU £5 ii.L.
For "the right to refrain from organizing" in the
United states and in the Federal Republic of Germany
see post, pp.147 ff. and pp.171 ff. respectively.
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Chapter 2
Freedom to Strike and to Engage in other Types of ticonomic
Warfare in Great Britain
i The Eight to Strike
1. General Observations
In countries like Great Britain, where the law does
not protect the right of employees to form and to join
unions, it is even more essential than in other countries
where the law does so, that employees should have the right
to engage in economic warfare for mutual aid and protection.
The right to strike is not expressly laid down in a
statute but by virtue of the Conspiracy and Protection of
1 2
Property Act. 1875, the Trade Disputes Act. 1906, the
3
Trade Disputes Bill, 1965, (which will very soon become
4
law) and the Crofter case, one can safely say that
employees in Great Britain enjoy a right to strike. By
these Acts an immunity from liability for certain tortious
acts and certain criminal acts is conferred on persons
5
acting in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.
At tne outset it has to be pointed out that whether
a strike is official or unofficial, i.e. has union support
or not, noes not make any difference as far as criminal
or civil liability is concerned.
1. 38 & 39 Vict. c.86. See post, pp.6 f.
2. 6 sdw. 7, c.47. See post, pp.19 If.
3. The Bill will in a way reinstate the law as it had
been understood to exist before Uookes v. Barnard [l964j
2 i<.L.h,269. See post, p.21 footnote 11.
4. Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v, ye itch [1942 ]
A.C.135, generally referred to as the Crofter case.
See especially per Lord Wright on p.463.
5. For the meaning of "trade dispute" see post, pp.15 f.
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2. Criminal Liability
After 1825 the courts developed the law of criminal
conspiracy which made collective withdrawal of labour
punishable.
Criminal conspiracy has been defined as "an agreement
of two or more persons to do any unlawful act or to do a
lawful act by unlawful means". It embraces agreements
to commit all unlawful acts, and the word unlawful here
has a very wide meaning, besides criiainal acts it includes
not only merely tortious acts but also all kinds of acts
(not in themselves contrary to law) which the courts find
injurious to the public. It is not necessary that the
agreement should ever be put into effect. Willes J. said
ia Mulcahy v. K11 "The very plot is an act itself ....
and is punishable".
The Conspiracy and protection of property Act. 1875,
removes the threat of prosecution for conspiracy based on
mere combination in the case of strikes in furtherance of
a trade dispute. The Act provides that an agreement or
combination by two or more persons to do or to procure to
be done any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute will not be indictable as a conspiracy if such an
act, commit ted by one person would not be punishable as
p
a crime. It should be noted where the defendant cannot
1. (1868) L.h. 3 ii.L. 317.
2. See s.3 of the Act. The rule, however, does not
apply to any kind of conspiracy for which a punishment
has been laid down by statute nor to offences coming
under the law of riot, unlawful assembly, breach of
the peace, or sedition, or offences against the State
or sovereign.
show that his act was done in contemplation or furtherance
3
of a trade dispute the statutory protection does not
apply.
The Act of 1875 repealed a number of earlier statutes
under which breaches of contract of employment were
criminal offences.4 However, the Act makes such breaches
criminal in two cases. It is provided in s.4 that a
person employed in a gas or water supply concern who
wilfully and maliciously breaks his contract knowing that
his action, either alone or in combination with others,
will deprive the consumers of their supply, is liable to
prosecution. The provision was extended to electricity
concerns under the Electricity (supply) Act, 1919, The
Act of 1875 contains the further provision that a person
wilfully and maliciously breaking a contract of service
knowing that the probable consequences of so doing, either
alone or in combination with others, will be to endanger
human life or cause serious bodily injury, or expose
valuable property to destruction or serious injury, is liable
5
to be prosecuted.^
The Emergency powers Act, 1920 enables the Crown
to proclaim a "state of emergency" if it appears that
3. For the meaning of "trade dispute" see post, pp.15 f.
4. Among the measures repealed was the Master and Servant
Act, 1867.
5 • s • 5.
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essential public services are threatened by action or
intended action. Regulations may then be made by Order
in Council for securing the continuance of those services
7
and the safety of the public. It should be noted that
the right to strike and peacefully to persuade others to
do so is expressly preserved.
The law does not forbid civil servants (servants of
8
the Crown) and other public employees to strike.
Certain post office employees are somewhat restricted in
their right to strike, S.58 and s.59 of the post Office
Act, 1953, create offences in respect of endangering or
delaying the mail. Thus a "go slow" or a strike may
easily involve certain postal employees in criminal
liability. S.3 of the Police Act, 1919, makes criminal
any act likely to cause disaffection, breach of discipline,
9
or a withdrawal of services by members of the police force.
6. 10 & 11 Geo.5, c.55. The Proclamation of Emergency,
if it is not renewed, expires after a month.
See s.l(i) of the Act.
7. s.2(2) of the gmergeaey Powers Act. (1920) provides s
"Any regulations so made shall be laid before Parliament
as soon as may be after they are made, and shall not
continue in force after the expiration of seven days
from the time when they are so laid unless a resolution
is passed by both Houses providing for the continuance
thereof". Regulations were made during the Coal Strike
of 1921, the General Strike of 1926, the Docks Strike
of 1949 and the Railway Strike of 1955. During the
Docks strike of 1948 a proclamation was issued but no
regulations were made. See Citrine, Trade Union Law
(I960),pp.20f, p.513.
8. However, striking is a disciplinary offence on the part
of a civil servant. See li.M. Treasury, Staff Relations
in tue Civil Service, 1949, p.21. See also
K. W. euoerburu, The Law and Industrial Conflict in
Great Britain, in Labour Relations and the haw (19&15),
p.146, note 93.
9. By s.25 of the police (Scotland) Act, 1956 similar
provisions apply to Scotland.
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Tue Aliens iiestrict ion (Amendment) Act, 1919, provides j
"if an alien promotes or attempts to promote industrial
unrest in any industry in which he has not been bona fide
engaged for at least two years immediately preceding in
the United Kingdom, he shall be liable on summary conviction
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months."10
As Professor Kahn-Freund has pointed out, since 1875
the criminal law has ceased to play any decisive role in
11
British industrial relations.
10. 9 & 10 Geo.5, c.92. See s.3(2) of the Act.
The expression "alien" comprises all persons who are
neither British subjects nor British protected persons
nor citizens of Eire. For further details see the
British Nationality Act, 1948, (11 & 12 Geo.6, c.56)
and the Ireland Act, l!T49 (12 & 13 & 14 Geo.6, c.4l).
11. See The System of Industrial delations in Great Britain
(1956), Chapter II, p.104.
3» Civil Liability
(a) Tne Immunity of Trade Unions
A general immunity from liability for tortious acts
is conferred on trade unions, but this does not extend
to members individually. It is provided in s.4 of the
Trade Disputes Act. 1906, that an action against a trade
union, or against any members or officials thereof on
behalf of themselves and all other members of the trade
union in respect of any tortious act alleged to have been
committed by or on behalf of the trade union shall not be
entertained by any Court,*
Until recently it was generally believed that actions
for injunctions to restrain future torts are prohibited
under s.4. In boulting v. Association of Cinematograph
2
Television and Allied Technicians two Lord Justices
considered that an injunction to prevent an apprehended
3
injury could be granted against a union but in
4
hookes v. Barnard the Law Lords refer to the complete
immunity of the union itself under s.4. However,
deteraiination of this point was not necessary to the
decision in Eookes case.
1. This part of the section is not limited to tortious
acts committed in contemplation or furtherance of a
trade dispute. For further details see Citrine,
Trade Union Law, second ed. (I960) pp. 479 ff.
2. [1963j 2 Q• ii.606, at pp. 643, 649, per Upjohn and
Diplock L.Jd.
3. Cf» dare and be frovilie v. Motor Trade Association
L1921J 3 K.B.40 at p.75, per Lord Sorutton L. J. and
Camden exhibition and Display Ltd. v. Lynott jl965]
3 rt.L.M. 763 C.A,
4. See [1964] 2 W.L.E, pp.283, 302 and 308.
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(b) Inducing Breach of Contract
At coaaion law an action in tort will lie against
a person, who without justification, unlawfully and
knowingly procures another to commit an actionable
wrong against a third person, whereby the latter
suffers damage,1 Thus to induce a person to break a
contract is in general a wrong for which the party whose
contractual anticipations are disappointed may claim
damages. The rule is applicable to contracts of all
kinds and includes contracts of employment• In calling
out employees to strike, trade union officials often
induce inevitable breaches by the men of their contracts.
The operation of the rule is to a certain extent excluded
2
by s,3 of the Trade Disputes Aet» 1906*
In Crofter Hand woven Harris Tweed Co, Ltd. v. Veitch°
Lord Simon said j "If C has an existing contract with
A and 8 is aware of it and if fi persuades or Induces C
to break the contract with resulting damage to A, this is,
generally speaking, a tortious act for which B will be
A
liable to A, for the injury he has done him. In some
cases, however, 2 may be able to justify his procuring
of the breach of contract,"
1, Citrine, Trade Union Law, (second ed.) 1960, p.466,
2, See post, p.14.
3, [1942] A.C. 435 at p.442, A leading case in which
a detailed analysis was made of the law of conspiracy,
see post, pp.17 f.
4, A, may on principles of contract claim redress froa
C, on principles of tort redress from B, See Lualey
v, G^e (1853), 2 E & 8 216. ~
- 11 -
To be liable the defendant must have had knowledge
of the particular contract involved but where he has
deliberately shut his eyes the court may decide that
5
he has constructive knowledge of that contract. In
6
Strat ford v. Lindley the House of Lords made it clear
that there was no need for it to be proved that defendants
knew with exactitude ail the terms of the contract.
The inducement must be more than mere advice, but
if the advice is of such a nature that it is for all
practical purposes equivalent to persuasion it will suffice.
The fact that the party inducing the breach is not actuated
7
by malice is immaterial.
The interference must either be direct, or if indirect, -
i.e. inducing A to do some act which will interfere with
the performance of a contract between B and C - the act
which A is induced to do must in itself be unlawful or
8
wrongful. The breach must be a necessary consequence
if the procurement is indirect, but where the procurement
is direct the breach need be shown to be no more than
9
"a reasonable consequence" of the defendants act.
5. See D.C. Thomson Co. Ltd. v. Deakin [1952]
Ch. 646 at p.687.
6. See [1964] 3 W.L.H. 541 at p.554, per Lord Pearce.
7. See Allen v. Flood & Taylor [1898] A.C. 1 at p.154,
per Lord Macnaghten.
8. See d.C, Thomson v. beakin, supra, at pp.681 - 682.
9* Stratford v, Lindley [l964j, 3 W.L.h. 541 at p.555,
per Lord pearce.
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The conduct of the third party must have the result
that a breach of contract ensues or is continued. This
includes any breach of the contract of employment not
only leaving work without giving proper notice.1®
In an action for inducing breach of contract the
plaintiff must prove that he has suffered daiaage. If
the breach, which has been procured by the defendant, has
been such as must in the ordinary course of business
inflict damage upon the plaintiff it is unnecessary for
him to prove special damage.11 A declaration or
12
injunction may be obtained to prevent damage in the future.
dust as an employer may sue a third party who induces
his employee to break his contract of employment, so an
employee may sue a third party who procures the employer
13
to break such contract.
Defences
(i) Lawful justification is a defence. It is difficult
to define with precision what constitutes lawful
justification for inducing a breach of contract. It was
id. Even a breach of an implied condition, e.g. "slow
down" constitutes a breach of contract. Furthermore
it may be that obligations of a collective agreement
are incorporated into each contract of employment
e.g. a no strike clause. For the latter see
Kookes v. Barnard [1964], 2 W.L.K. 269.
11. See Goldsoll v. Goldman [1914] 2 Ch.6o3 at p.615.
12. See Boats Brewery Co. v. Hogan [1945] 2 All.E.E, 570
at p.579, and Stratfora v. Lindley [1964] 3 W.L.K.
pp.559, 560.
13. For example, if a third party induces an employer to




ueld la Glamorsaa Goal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation
that ia determining whether or not there was justification,
regard must he paid to the nature of the contract broken,
the position of the parties to the contract} the grounds
for the breach; the means employed to procure the breach,
the relation of the person procuring the breach to the
person who breaks the contract, and the object of the person
in procuring the breach.
(ii) In industrial disputes the defence sore often arises
by statute. It is provided by the Trade Disputes Act. 1906,
s.3 that i "An act done by a person in contemplation or
furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be actionable on
the ground only that It induces some other person to break
a contract of employment ...." If there Is some ground
of action other than the mere fact of interfering with
contractual relations s.3 does not afford protection. If
intimidation or other illegal means are used to induce the
breach the section gives uo protection, for there is some
other ground of action. In Kookes v. Barnard the House
of Lords held that the tort of intimidation comprehends
not only threats of criminal or tortious acts but threats
IS
of breaches of contract. J Thus in Eookes* case the House
of Lords considerably restricted the right to strike.
I g
There is now a Bill before Parliament in which it is
14. [1903] 2 ii.ii.545 at p.574, per Homer L« J. See also
Crimelow v. Cassoa [1924] 1 Ch. 302 and Camden Nominees
v* Forcey [1940 J CU. 352.
15. [1964] 2 W.L.E. at pp.279, 296, 307, 312, 336.
16. Trade disputesBill, 1965, see post, p.21 footnot e 11.
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provided that waere there is a trade dispute a threat
to break a contract does not amount to intimidation*
S.3 affords protection only where there is a trade
dispute* The Trade Disputes Act* 1906, s*5(3) provides :
"In this Act and in the Conspiracy and Protection of
Property Act, 1875, the expression 'trade dispute' means
any dispute between employers and workmen, or between
workmen and workmen, which is connected with the
employment or non-employment, of the terms of the
employment, or with the conditions of labour, of any
persons, and tue expression "workmen" means all persons
employed ia trade or industry, whether or not in the
employment of the employer with whom a trade dispute
arises *•*."
A workman must be a party to the dispute, either
individually or through his union. It should be noted
that the subsection does not cover a dispute between an
17
employer and an employers' association. The workman
must be employed in trade or industry. The dispute must
be in connection with the employment or non-employment,
or the terms of the employment, or with the conditions
of labour, of any person. disputes as to whether a
person shall become a trade unionist or join a particular
18
union may be trade disputes. Recognition disputes
17. See Larkin v. Long l1915j A.C. 814.
18. See White v. Riley [l92l] 1 Ch. 1.
- 15 -
between an employer and a trade union will normally be
19
trade disputes. Moreover sympathetic strikes and
secondary action are trade disputes within the meaning
oi s.5(3) of the Trade Disputes Act. 1906.
To constitute a dispute, a mere personal quarrel
20
will not suffice. In Huntley v. Thornton Barman J.
holding that there was no trade dispute said : "The
defendants were not asserting a trade right, for they
knew they could not procure the plaintiff's expulsion
from the union. The dispute, if it could be so called,
has become an internecine struggle between members of
the union and no interests of 'the trade' were involved.
It was a personal matter."
It is important to note that the statutory rules
set out a right to engage in concerted activities for all
employees, not only for those who are members of a union.
19. See Heet ham v. Trinidad Cement Ltd. [i960] 2 W.L.H.77.
However, in Stratford v. Lindley it was held that an
inter-union dispute about recognition is not a trade
dispute, see [1964J 3 vi.JL.E. at p.546, per Lord i eid.
20. [1957] 1 Ail.E.B, 234 at p.256. The facts in this
case were briefly as follows; The executive council
of the union rejected the recommendation of a district
committee that the plaintiff should be expelled for
refusing to join a one-day strike. The district
committee subsequently threatened to withdraw all
labour from employers who engaged him, although it had
no power to call a strike. In fact pressure by the




The tort of conspiracy was developed by the judges
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
TSie principle elements of the tort of conspiracy are:
(i) an agreement between two or more persons (ii) to
effect an unlawful purpose OR a lawful purpose by an
unlawful act or means (iii) resulting in damage to the
plaintiff.1
It should be noted that there is only a cause of
action where the conspirators do acts in pursuance of
2
their agreement to the damage of the plaintiff.
3
Where the act or means employed are tortious in
themselves, it will not usually be necessary to invoke
the law of conspiracy at all, for the defendants can
then be sued, jointly or severally, in respect of the
tort or torts they have committed.
But a combination may come within the law of
conspiracy, even though neither the act nor the means
are in theraselves either eriiainal or tortious, the purpose
of the combination snay merely be unlawful. here the
purpose is to damage a person in his trade, business or
employment and damage results, there is prima facie an
actionable conspiracy.
1. See Crofter hanu vioven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch [1942]
A.C. at p.440 per Viscount Simon L. C., at p.495 per
Lord porter.
2. See per Lord Wright in the Crofter case, supra, at
pp.461, 471. Conspiracy may be doth a crime and a
tort# But the crime is constituted by the mere
agreement, see ante, p.6.
3. For example to induce a breach of contract is an
unlawful act. However, if the inducement of the
breach was in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute s.3 affords protection, see ante, u.14.
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In the Crofter ease it was held : "What amounts
to an unlawful purpose in this context cannot be precisely
defined, but unless the real and predominant purpose is
to advance the defendant's lawful interests in a matter
where he honestly believes that those interests would
directly suffer if the action taken against the plaintiff
were not taken, a combination wilfully to damage a man
4
in his trade is unlawful." Thus, where the acts done
in combination are lawful acts, the determining factor
5
is the presence or absence of intention to injure, that
is to say, to cause wrongful harm and malevolence is not,
it seems an essential element of the tort of conspiracy.
4. See per Lord Simon L.C. at p.*46. before this
decision, great difficulty had been experienced in
explaining and reconciling dicta, in three House of
pords cases: Mogul steamship Co. v. McGregor Gow & Co.
[1892] A.C.495; Alien v. Flood [1898] A.C.l and
Quixm v. Leat ham [3L9ol ] A.C.495. The Croft er case
has resolved the problem presented by these cases,
and the interpretation of the ratio decidendi of them
given in the Crofter case is accepted as canonical.
5. Up to 1964 it was believed that a single individual
may act witn the purpose of injuring another, provided
he does nothing unlawful (see Mayor of Bradford v.
ricklcs [1895] A.C.587) but two or more persons may
not. But this seems doubtful after Hookes v. Barnard
Lord Devlin remarked in this case: "If one man albeit
by lawful means, interferes with another's right to
earn his living or dispose of his labour as he will
and does so maliciously that is, with intent to injure
without justification, he is, if there is such a tort,
liable in just the satae way as he would undoubtedly be
liable if he were acting in combination with others.
The combination aggravates but is not essential."
See [1964] 2 w.L.E* p.320. in kookes' ease they held
tuat tuere is "such a tort" see post, pp.23 f.
6. See Crofter case supra at p.471, per Lord Porter.
Defences
(i) It is a good Defence to show that the predominant
purpose of the defendants was to protect or further their
own interests e.g. interests of the union. Thus motive
is the test of legality. Lord Simon said in the Crofter
case : "The test is not what is the natural result to
the plaintiffs of such combined action, or what is the
resulting daaage, which the defendants realise, or should
realise will follow, but what is in truth the objects in
the mind of the combiners .... It is not consequence that
matters, but purpose .... If there is more than one motive
actuating tuem, liability must depend upon ascertaining
7
the predominant motive." Of course, if the defendants
contemplated or committed an unlawful act or employed
unlawful means this is not a defence.
(ii) Liability for the tort of conspiracy is qualified by
statute, where the acts are done in contemplation or
8
furtherance of a trade dispute. It is provided in s.l
of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, : "An act done in
pursuance of an agreement or combination of two or more
persons if done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute should not be actionable if the act without such
agreement or combination would not be actionable."
7. At p,445.
8. For "trace Dispute" see ante, pp.15 f.
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3.1 protects a conspiracy which has as unlawful
purpose i.e. where the purpose of the combination is to
injure the plaintiff*s trade, business or other interests.
A conspiracy which involves the commission of an unlawful
9
act in most cases will remain unprotected. In the latter
type of conspiracy the element of conspiracy Is usually
only of secondary importance since the unlawful act or
means are actionable in themselves.
In cases where the unlawfulness of the act lies in
the inducement of other persons to break a contract of
employment or in interference with some other person*s trade
or business or employnent, a further statutory immunity is
conferred if the act is done ia furtherance of a trade
dispute. 3.2 of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, provides :
"An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of
a trade dispute shall not be actionable on the ground oily
that it induces some other person to break a contract of
employment or that it is an interference with the trade,
business, or employment of some other person, or with the
right of some other person to dispose of his capital or his
9. For example a sit-down, stay down, or stay ia strike
is aa agreement or combination to do an act which is
itself actionable, namely trespass. In ^ookes v. Barnard
a rather narrow interpretation was given to this section.""
In this case Lord j eid saioi "This sect ion cannot
reasonably he held to mean that no action can be brought
unless the precise act complained of could have been
done toy an individual without combination. Tne section
requires us to find the nearest- equivalent act which
could have been so done and see whether it would be
actionable." See [196*J 2 «.L.H. p.282.
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labour as he wills. "lc
It should be noted that s.3 does not protect
inducement of breach of contract or interference with
trade, business or employment where they are brought
about by Intimidation or other illegal means,11
A combining party can be liable for conspiracy to
intimidate by threats to break contracts, even though he
did not himself have any contract to break. in ttookes
v* Barnard S. was a union organiser who had no contract
with b.O.A.C. he could therefore not be guilty of threatening
to break his own contract. He had done what union
officials often do in industrial disputes, he induced
others to break their contracts. The first part of s.3
of the Act clearly protected him from liability for actually
10. By s.3 it is no longer an actionable wrong, in
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, and
in an otherwise lawful manner merely to induce some
other person to break a contract of employment.
Consequently, if such inducing is done in combination,
s.3 preserves them from liability for their individual
torts, and s.l from liability for conspiracy. As
regards interference with business, trade or employment
the better view is still that this is not a wrong when
committed by an individual unless he employed unlawful
means# In the latter ease if such interference is
done in combination anu in contemplation or furtherance
of a trade dispute s.l affords protection.
11. In Mookes v. liarcard the house of Lords held that a
threat to break a contract amounts to intimidation.
Tne secona part of s.3 did not protect the union
officials because their interference with Kookes*
employment was brought about by intiaidation. When
the Trade Disputes Bill, 1965, becomes law there will
not be a cause of action in such cases. The Bill
proviues that an act done by a person la contemplation
or furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be
actionable in tort on the ground only that it consists
in his threatening - (a) that a contract of employment
(whether one to which he is a party or not) will be
broken or (b) tnat he will induce another to break a
contract of employment to which that other is a party.
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inducing breaches of these contracts. The question arose
whether there can be liability for threats when there
would be no liability for doing that which is threatened
to be done. The House of Lords held that he was liable
because he combined with others in the conspiracy to
intimidate.1^
12. This part of the judgement is certainly casuistic.
It is obvious that once the Trade Disputes bill (1965)
is passed by parliament an end will be made to this
paradoxical situation. See note 10, above.
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XI secondary Boycott
Secondary activity plays an important part in labour
relations; it is an important weapon of the unions.
The question arises bow far is this permissible in Great
Britain?
"In certain cases it is an actionable wrong to
intimidate other persons with the intent and effeet of
compelling them to act in a manner or to do acts which
they themselves have a legal right to do which cause loss
to a third party. For example the intimidation of the
third person's customers whereby they are compelled to
withdraw their custom from him. Intimidation of this
sort is actionable, as mentioned above, in certain classes
of cases; for it does not follow that, because a third
party's customers have a right to cease to deal with him
if they please, other persons have a right as against
the third party to compel his customers to do so. There
are at least two cases in which such intimidation may
constitute a cause of action : (i) When the intimidation
consists in a threat to do or procure an illegal act;
(2) when the intimidation is the act, not of a single
person, but of two or more persons acting together in
pursuance of a common intention."1 As regards (1) if the
act threatened is a crime or is actionable as a tort the
threat is unlawful. But after Rookes v. Barnard if the
1. salmond on the Law of Torts, (1961), 13th ed., Chap. 18,
p.697; cited and approved in hookes v, Barnard [1964],
2 Vs.L.R. p.311, per Lord Devlin.
- 23 -
act threatened is actionable as a breach of contract it
2
is also unlawful. "The essence of the offence is
coercion. It cannot be said that every form of coercion
is wrong. A dividing iine must be drawn and the natural
line runs between what is lawful and unlawful as against
the party threatened. If the defendant threatens something
that the intermediate party can legally resist, the third
party likewise cannot be allowed to resist the consequences;
both must put up with the coercion and its result."*^ In
4
i). C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Peak in the Court of Appeal
held that acts of a third party lawful in themselves do
not constitute an actionable interference with contractual
rights merely because they bring about a breach of contract,
g
even if done with that object and intention. * But if the
intermediate party is threatened with an illegal injury,
2. When the Trade disputes Pill (1965) becomes law this
will not be unlawful provided, of course, the act is
done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.
For t'raae pxsputes Dili (1965) see ante, p. 21 footnote 11.
3* KQQkes v. Barnard [1964] 2 W.L.H. p.312, per Lord Devlin.
4. |,1952] Ch.646. The plaintiffs in this case were
printers whose papers were supplied under contract with
the B. company. The plaintiffs dismissed an employee
who was a union member. His union called a strike of
the union members employed by the plaintiffs. In
support, the members of two other unions told 8. Company
that they might not be willing to deliver paper to the
plaintiffs. The B. Company to avoid trouble, allowed
deliveries to tae plaintiffs to cease. Held j plaintiffs
were not entitled to an interlocutory injunction.
5. Cf. Stratford v. Lindley [1964] 3 W.L.Jt. p.54l.
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the third party who suffers by the aversion of the act
threatened can fairly claim that he is illegally injured.
The wrong can be committed individually and in combination
0
with others.
As regards (2) it is one form of the tort of
conspiracy, the type where the act and means employed
7
are lawful but which lias an unlawful purpose. Thus if
the combiners were acting in contemplation or furtherance
of a trade dispute they are protected by s.l of the Trade
Disputes Act, 1906. Moreover, where the predominant
purpose of the combination is to advance the combiners*
lawful interests and no unlawful means are employed no
action lies.8
In ureat Britain, therefore, if the union adheres
to the rules of the game secondary activity is generally
speaking not unlawful. If union officials go directly
to the secondary employer as long as they do not threaten
9
to do or procure an illegal act, this is not actionable.
As regards the employees of the secondary employer if they
threaten to go on strike or threaten that they will not
Kookes v. Barnard [1964] 2 Vt.L.R. p.312, per Lord Devlin.
T, For this type of conspiracy see ante, pp.17 f.
8. See ante, pp.19 f.
9. It should be remembered where there Is a trade dispute
by s.3 of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, inducement of
a breach of contract is not illegal.
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handle the primary employers goods this will not be
unlawful after the passage of the Trade Disputes Bill,
provided it is done in contemplation or furtherance of
a trade dispute. Union officials who induce them to do
so clearly do not commit any wrong. Furthermore they
can actually go on strike and cease handling the goods
of the secondary employer as long as they do not commit
a breach of contract and it is for a lawful purpose.
In such cases even if it is for an unlawful purpose s.l
affords protection where there is a trade dispute; or
in absence of a trade dispute where the predominant
purpose of the combination is to advance the combiners*
lawful interests also no action lies.
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Ill picketing
Picketing is a concomitant of a strike. A strike
may be of little effect in enforcing the employees* demands
if the employer is able to replace the strikers and resume
normal production. To prevent this, unions resort to
picketing. In addition it is a type of advertising.
It informs the public that there is a strike or dispute
and states the union*s version of its cause. Picketing
may take the form of persuading customers not to patronize
the employer.
In Great Britain peaceful picketing is lawful. The
question arises what is meant by "peaceful picketing".
The Conspiracy and protection of property Act, 1875,
by s.7(4), makes it a criminal offence1 to watch or beset
a person with a view to compelling bin to do, or abstain
from doing some lawful act. This subsection is of general
application it is not confined to disputes between employees
and employers, nor to trade disputes. The offence is
committed by either watching or besetting or both. The
words "to watch or beset" are not defined in the Act.
The duration of the watching is a matter of degree and
entirely a question for the jury. Besetting may be a
crime although of a very short duration. There must be
wrongful compulsion. It is not quite clear what constitutes
this act. Where there is a prosecution under s.7(4) the
court must consider the character of the meeting and all
1. Punishable by a fine up to £20 or imprisonment up to
turee years. The amount of the fine seems out of date.
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the circumstances, and must be satisfied that the parties
were not acting merely for the purpose of peaceful
picketing.2
As far as persons acting in contemplation or
furtherance of a trade dispute are concerned, by virtue
of s.2(l) of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, they may attend
at or near a house or place where a person resides or
works or carries on business or happens to be, if they
so attend merely for the purpose of peacefully obtaining
or coraomnicating information, or of peacefully persuading
any person to work or abstain from working,
S.2(l) establishes a clear right of peaceful
picketing in trade disputes. Picketing of the kind
mentioned in the section is lawful in the civil as well
as in the criminal sense. So far as civil liability is
concerned its taaia effect is in establishing that attending
for the purposes of the section does not constitute a
trespass to trie public highway or a common law nuisance.
The section is not confined to union activity; it
applies to one or more persons acting on his or their own
behalf, or on benalf of a trade union or of an individual
employer or firm.*
2. For "peaceful picketing" see below.
3. For trade dispute see ante, pp.15 f.
4. The term trade union includes an eraployers* association.
A limited company is, of course, included in the
expression individual, employer, or firm.
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Peaceful picketing may involve an attending of long
duration. The sole tests of the legality of the attendance
are its purpose and its manner.
Any wrong, other than trespass to the public highway,
remains intact. If pickets enter or remain on private
5
property without authority they are trespassers. This
liability for trespass applies also to pickets who are
normally entitled to use the premises as employees. For
employees have the right to enter and remain upon their
employer*s premises only for the purpose of their work or
for such other purposes as the employer may allow. If
a picket commits a private nuisance by shouting, obstructing
ingress or egress to premises, or otherwise seriously
interferes with the enjoyment of the premises the section
does not afford xxrotection. However, where the picketing
is done under the section some degree of nuisance seems
7
to be justified.
Criminal liability which may be involved in acts of
picketing is unaffected. If a picket commits a public
nuisance sucu as behaving in a manner calculated to cause
5. It should be noted, uowever, that unless expressly
prohibited from doing so, any person wishing to see
another for any lawful purpose has his implied authority
to call at his house in a reasonable manner and for
that purpose, to use the private way leading to it.
6. Employees participating in a sit down strike commit
tne tort of trespass.
7. It was held in Ferguson v. 0*Gorman (1937) I.E.620
(an Irisu case) that continually marching to and fro
in front of a shop window is protected by the section.
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a breach of the peace, or unreasonably obstructing the
highway the section does not afford protection. It was
8
held in K. v. Lewis & Others that pickets are not
entitled to obstruct the passage of vehicles by lying
down in the highway in front of them. A mass gathering
9
blocking the highway may still be a public nuisance.
Any suow of violence or any other unlawful threat likely
to create fear in the mind of a reasonable man renders
picketing unlawful and may make it criminal.10
The section applies to persuasion of a particular
kind only, The section does not protect where the
peaceful persuasion is directed to some object other than
iuaueing a person " to work or abstain from working". For
example, it is considered that it would not cover the
picketing of a retail shop with the object of persuading
11
customers to boycott it. The section does not require
that the information should have reference to the question
of working or abstaining from working. If the pickets
confine tuemseives to publishing, by placards or handbills
or by word of mouth, accurate information as to the nature
8. See Tne Times, 9 Dec. 1947. Action arising out of
the Savoy Hotel strike.
9. Thus mass picketing is unlawful.
10. For the meaning of "reasonable man" see Glasgow
Corporation v. Huir [1948] A.C. *48, at p.457, per
Lara Mat-raillan. However that case related to
"negligence".
11. See Toppin v. Feron (1909) 43 l.L.T. 11.190, 192.
This point was not decided but Palles L.C.ii. said:
"preventing people going into the theatre is not,
I think, within the saving clause of (the 1906 Act)".
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of the dispute the section will cover them. Lord Citrine
in his book expresses the opinion that it is probable
that pickets would still be covered by the section if
they were merely to invite as opposed to persuade the
12
customers not to deal with the establishment. The
difficulty here is what pickets or those who instruct
them might consider mere information judges might consider
persuasion.
If the object of the picketing is to induce breaches
of contract it will be unlawful. For example,it is
unlawful to induce the breach of contracts of sale, hire
or carriage of goods. As regards contracts of employment,
by virtue of s.3 of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, the
13
inducing is not generally unlawful.
In conclusion one can only say that the law regarding
1 A
peaceful picketing is not clearly laid down.
12. Citrine, Traae Union Law, second ed, (1960) p.464.
13. For s.3 see ante, p.14.
14. For further details see Citrine, Trade Uuion Law,
second ed, (I960) pp.444 ff.
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Chapter 3
Freecom to Organise ia the U.fr.A.
The Fundamental higut To Organise
iu Nana v. Jones & JL.au, hi in 5teel Corporat ion1
- the decision in which the Supreme Court of the United
States upheld the constitutionality of the National Labour
halations Act - Hughe* e. J. said that the right of workers
to organise labour unions was a "fundamental right". in
%A
IsLuxi v. budd tifg. Co. the Court said that this right
was "protected by the Constitution against governmental
infringement (as distinguished from Infringement by private
employers), as are the fundamental rights of other individuals".
The Court appeared to say that the protection was to be
found in the First Amendment-.
A few States have constitutional provisions
guaranteeing the right of employees to organise and to
bargain collectively through re present atives of their own
choosing. A number of specific features of union organising.
1. 30i Ui> 1, (1937). Nl<Ml) is the abbreviation of National
Labour delations Board.
2. 333 Ue 90S (1948). See also internalional Union J,A.ft.
v. Wisconsin Lg'loyment relations Board 336 US 245 (1949).
' 3. The first ten amendments make up the so-called Bill of
bights of the Federal Constitution. The First Amendment
reads j "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress
of grievance".
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involving rights of assembly and speech, have been held
to be protected against state and local governmental
interference,*
Whatever may be the fundamental nature of the right
to organise it is clearly a statutory right under s.7 of
5
the National Labor Relations Act. S.7 of the Act provides t
"Employees shall have the right to self-organisation
to form, join, or assist labor organisations,
to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any of
such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organisation as a condition
of employment as authorised in section 8(a)(3)."
S.2 of the hailway Labor Act (1926) makes it unlawful
for a carrier to interfere with, influence or coerce
employees in organising. In case those provisions are
violated either criminal proceedings can be instituted or
a petition lodged in the courts for injunctive relief.
4. It has been held that the right to organise is protected
by the Civil bights Acts against interference by state
agencies. see Condra v. Leslie & Clay Coal Co. 101 F.
Supp.774 (L.G.ky. 1952). ~
5. i'ne act, which was generally referred to as the Wagner Act,
was originally adopted in 1935. See 49 Stat. 449,
29 U.s.C. s.151 et seq. It was extensively amended by
the Labor Management Eelat ions Act of 1947, known as
trie Taft-Hartley Act. See 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.
s.l4l et seq. Congress again amended the NLfiA in 1959
by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
known as the Landrum-Griffin Act. See Public Law 86-257,
73 Stat. 519.
6. 45 U.s.C.A. 5§151-163, 181-1SS. It applies to railroads
and their employees. In 1936 an amendment brought air¬
lines within the scope of the Act.
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About one-fourth of the states have labour relations
7
statutes. Connecticut, New York and Ehode Island have
Acts listing unfair labour practices of employers only,
the rest specify unlawful labour practices by both employers
anu unions* In addition to the labour relations acts
many states have laws regulating picketing and boycotts.
7. Because of the wide variations in these state acts,
it does not appear appropriate to deal with them here.
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protection of Freedom to Organise
Unfair Labour Practices
1« General Observations.
Congress has taken steps to make an end to practices
directed against the exercise of freedom to organise.
Congress enumerates in s.8 of the NLRA1 certain practices
which are outlawed. These practices are expressly
proscribed in order to protect and guarantee the right
of organisation. They are called "unfair labour practices"
which under s.10 of the Act the National Labour Relations
Board, created by the Act in order to implement its
policies, is empowered to prevent.
2
The NLRB is the administrative agency created by
Congress to enforce the NLEA. The principal duties of the
NLRB are to conduct elections and designate representatives
under s.9 of the NLEA and to investigate and process unfair
labour practice charges under s.8 of the NLRA.
3
It was held in Polish National Alliance v. NLRB
that the Board's jurisdiction under the Act extends to the
full limits of the power of the federal government to
regulate interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Board may
assert jurisdiction over labour disputes with employers
engaged in the manufacture or process of materials shipped
in interstate commerce, with eiaployers engaged in shipping
1. Abbreviation of National Labour Relations Act.
2. hereafter also referred to as Board.
3. 322 US 643, 647
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or transporting across state lines, or with retail employers
selling goods which have passed from the stream of commerce.
4
In NLKB v. ueliance Fuel Oil Corporation where Reliance
sold locally fuel oil which it had purchased from the Gulf
Oil Company, which had brought the oil in from other states,
the Supreme Court held that by virtue of Reliance's purchases
from Gulf, Reliance's operations and the related unfair
practices 'affected* commerce within the meaning of the Act.
Potentially, the NLEB is given authority to exercise
5
its jurisdiction over all but the smallest of business
but the Board has never exercised the full measure of its
jurisdiction. It has used its administrative discretion
and established certain standards, based on the dollar
volume of goods the employer buys from or ships to other
states or the annual dollar volume of business he does,
below which it declines to assert jurisdiction. 5.14(c)(1)
7
of the NLliA provides that the Board may continue to
decline to assert its full jurisdiction provided that it
does so by rule of decision or published rules, and
provided that it does not raise the doliar-volume standards
4. 371 US 224 (1963).
5. See NLkti v. Fainblatt, 306 US 601 (1939).
6. See hues v. Utah Labor Board. 353 US 1,3 (1957).
7. Subsection (c) was added by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act. 1959.
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8
prevailing oa 1st August 1959. Regardless of the aollar-
volume staauaras, the Board has had a longstanding policy
of refusing to assert jurisdiction over certain industries.
The Act does not apply to agricultural labourers,
domestics, employees of Federal, state and local governments,
employees who are subject to the Railway Labor Act.
9
independent contractors and supervisors. Thus these
are not within the jurisdiction of the KLAB.
A body equivalent to the NLRfi was not created under
the Railway Labor Act. Violations of s.2 of the Act
cannot be stopped by way of administrative procedure.10
Most probably it was considered unnecessary to create
such a tribunal since unionism has reached a fairly mature
state in that industry and thus very little litigation
occurs.
S. Whenever a state law covers an area also regulated
by a federal statute, problems of exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction and federal pre-emption arise.
The extent to which this "federal pre-emption" has
occurred or should occur is one of the most
controversial and complex issues in the labour law
field. See San hie^.o Unions v. darmon, 359 US 236 (1959),
The 1959 amendment to the ALBA (s.14(c)(I)) giving
the states authority to handle cases rejected by the
KL«hi under its Jurisdictional standards, resolved one
of the most difficult of these problems.
9, The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, has withdrawn
the legislative''protection given' to supervisors.
Supervisors may still join unions if they so wish,
but tuey aiso may be discharged for doing so.
Bee post, p.213.
10. For s.2 see ante, p.33.
- 37 -
2. Employer Unfair Labour Practices
S.8(a)(1) of the NLHA is a broad general provision.
It gives to unions and employees legal protection against
employer anti-union tactics. The section declares it
to be unfair labour practice to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in s.7.^11^ It has been held in NLKB v.
i 2
Express publishing Co.. that a violation of subsection (2),
13
(3), (4) or (5) of s.8(a) is also a violation of s.8(a)(l).
but it should be noted that s.8(a)(1) may be violated on
its own, independently of any other specific unfair labour
14
practice. Any conduct on the part of the employer
which is likely to influence the decision of employees to
organise is suspect; it may be privileged but unless a
15
justification is available it violates s.8(2)(l).
An employer is responsible for unfair labour practices
11. For s.7 see ante, p.33.
Yellow dog contracts or documents (an agreement under
which an employee undertakes not to join a union while
working for his employer) are also made illegal and
unenforceable by the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932
(The Anti-Injunction Act•) They are unlawful under
the hailway Labor Act.
12. 312 US 426 (1941).
13. For subsections (2), (3) and (4) of s.8(a),
see post, pp.160 ff, pp.142 ff.
14. In the first years after the NLkA came into force
s,8(a)(l) on its own was rarely applied. Only in
later years when employers began carefully to avoid
specific unfair labour practices the NLEB began to
revert to it.
15. For s.8(a)(1) see post, pp.122 ff. See A. Cox
Labor Law Cases & Materials. 4th ed., pp.175 ff.
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committed by anyone acting directly or indirectly as his
1 p
agent. fhether the specific acts were authorised or
ratified by the employer is not controlling in determining
17
whether a person was acting as agent. Thus employers
may be accountable for the conduct of their foremen and
18
managers and the discriminatory practices of their
19
personnel managers.
8. Union Unfair Labour Practices
The Taft-Hartley amendments remake s.7 of the hLliA
by guaranteeing employees in addition to the right to
20
form, join or assist labour organisations the right
21
to refrain from such activities.'" S.8(b)(1) of the
NLtiA declares it to be an unfair labour practice for a
labour organisation or its agent to restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by s.7
16. See 8.2(2) of the NL&A.
11. See s.2(12) of the NLBA. Tnis provision was added
by the Labor 4ana&eaent relations Act. 1947.
IS. See NLhB v. Beatrice Foods Co.. i83 F2d 726 (1950)
and NLKB v. LaSalle Steele Co., 178 F2d 829.
(CA7TT§49).
19. see 01in Industries v. NLKB. 191 F2d 613, 616
(GAS, 1951).
20. The term * labour organisation* means for the purposes
of the Act any organisation of any kind, or any agency
of employee representation committee or plan, in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose
in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labour disputes, wages, rates
of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
See s.2(5) NLkA.
21. For s.7 see ante, p.33.
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22
of the Act, By s.8(b)(4) of the Act various concerted
activities to bring about unionisation are made unfair
23
labour practices.
4. procedure in Unfair Labour Practices Cases
A proceeding before the NLRB is initiated by a charge
filed by an individual or by a labour organisation in a
O A
Regional Office of the KiLEB. The Board has no power
to initiate proceedings. Charges and informal complaints
are investigated by Field Examiners who belong to the staff
of the Regional Office. The Field Examiner takes testimony
and arranges a meeting of the parties; he has authority
to coaie into the plant, require access to the records, and
make whatever inquiries he may deem necessary. By this
informal procedure a great many of the charges are disposed
of.
If the case is not disposed of informally a formal
22. For s.8(b)(l) see post, pp. 75 ff.
23. For s.8(b)(4) see post, pp. 59 ff.
24. The charge may be against an employer or against
a labour organisation or its agent. The Act-
contains a six-month statute of limitation, see 10(b)
NLEA. Under s.10(e) and (m) of the NLRA priority
handling must be given to cases involving secondary
boycott, a hot cargo contract, organisational or
recognition picketing and discrimination against
individual employees. as a matter of policy the
Board does not permit litigation of allegations of




complaint is issued by the General Counsel. The
NLliB by s.lO(j) of the Act can apply for a temporary
injunction against the unfair labour practice, but the
NLRB rarely takes this step and ordinarily the controversy
proceeds to a formal hearing before a Trial Examiner.
The proceedings are conducted so far as practicable
like judicial proceedings in the District Courts of the
27
United States. At the conclusion of the proceedings
the Trial Examiner prepares his intermediate Report, which
is in essence a review of the facts and a recommended
decision. After receiving a copy of the Report
25. The title is misleading because he does not advise
the Board on points of law. Under s.4(d) of the
MLiiA he has final authority over the investigation
and prosecution of unfair labour practices charges.
The twenty regional offices of the NLKB are under
the supervision of the General Counsel.
26. Trial Examiners are appointed by the NLEB, but under
s.ll of the Administrative Procedure Act, they are
independent of the Board in tenure and compensation
and can be removed only for good cause established
and determined by the Civil Service Commission,
27. See s.lo(b) of the NLkA.
28. During 1961, the late President Kennedy submitted to
Congress Reorganisation Plan No. 5, wnich had unanimous
Board support but was rejected by a House vote. The
object of the plan was to provide speedier processing
of unfair labour practice by delegating decisional
functions to the Board's trial examiners, subject to
the provisions of s.7(a) of the Administrative Procedure
Act, The plan reserved to the Board the right to
review any such delegated action or decision upon the
motion of two or more Board Members either on their
own initiative or in response to a request for review
by a party or intervener. For further details see
26th Annual Report of the NLRb, p.5. It seems a pity
that the plan was rejected - must the uills of justice
grind slowly!
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parties are given an opportunity to file exceptions with
the board. If no exceptions are filed the Board will
ordinarily adopt the Report- as its own decision and order#
But if exceptions are filed the Board will review the
case on the record and briefs which the parties filed in
support of their exceptions. An application way be made
for oral argument before the NLRB, but it is seldom granted.
The decision of the Board is in the form of findings
of fact, conclusions of law and an order. The order way
be a dismissal of the complaint hut where the Board finds
29
upon the * preponderance*of the testimony that an unfair
labour practice has been or is still committed it issues
a cease and desist order which may be accompanied by an
order for affirmative action such as reinstateaent.
Orders of the Board can be enforced only by the
QQ
United States Courts of Appeals upon petition of the
Board. A court order of enforcement is in the nature
of an injunction, and failure to obey the order may be
punished as a contempt. The Act provides no penalties
for unfair labour practices. However, certain remedial
orders of the Board, particularly orders reinstating
employees with back pay, resemble penal sanctions in their
effect.
29. See s.10(c) of the NLha.
30. The United states is now divided into eleven judicial
circuits (counting the district of Columbia as a
eircuit) with a United States Court of Appeals for
each of the circuits.
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Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board
may obtain a review of the order upon petition to the
31
appropriate Court of Appeals.
Recently it was held by the U.S. supreme Court that
both the successful oharged party and the successful
charging party have a right to intervene in the Court of
Appeals proceedings which reviews or enforces Board
32
orders.
The final possibility for review is to the United
States Supremo Court upon petition for writ of certiorari.
The Supreme Court has warned petitioners in Universal
33
Camera Corporation v. NLii.II : " .... Whether on the
record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support
agency findings is a question which Congress has placed
in the Court of Appeals. This Court will intervene
only in what ought to be the rare instance when the
standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly
misapplied." Denial of an application does not necessarily
mean that the Supreme Court adopts the results reached in
that specific case as a guide for its future action but
it does adopt the result as the final outcome of this
controversy.
31. see s.10(f) of the NLRA.
32. See Local 283. United Automobile Workers. AFL-CIO. v.
iiussel Scofield and Local 133. United Automobile workers.
AFL-CIO v. Fafnir hearing Co. (US December 7. 1965)
(No. 18 & 53JT
33. 340 US 474 (1951).
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Chapter 4
St atut ory Protect ion and Limitations
Conpern in,',, Labour's Li^ut To Exert
Sconotflic pressures in the United States
General Observations;
Although the NLhA was primarily concerned with
guaranteeing employees the right to form, join and assist
labour organisations and to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, s.7 of the Act
also guarantees the right to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.
"In the United States the right to engage in
concerted activities has been used effectively in
spreading union organisation.1,1
1. Cox, Cases on Labor Law. 4th ed.f p.282
44
£ Lawful strikes
It is obvious that an employer violates s.8(a)(1)
of the Act if he punishes or otherwise exacts reprisals
against employees who have gone on a peaceful, orderly
strike for a legitimate purpose. 3.3(a)(1) provides
that it shall be an unfair labour practice for an employer
to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in s,7.
3.13 of the Act preserves the right of employees to
engage in lawful strikes. But what is meant by the term
"lawful" in this connection? It is stated in the 2£rd
Annual deport of the IMLAB (1959)" that the activities
must nave a lawful objective and must be carried on in
a lawful manner.
Fairly clear are the cases in which the concerted
activities are for an objective which is outlawed by the
Act itself as a union unfair labour practice. It would
not effectuate the policies of the Act to afford relief
against employer reprisal to employees who were themselves
g
violating the Act.
Even though the objective is legal, the Act affords
no protection if the concerted activity is tortious or
criminal in nature.
Concerted activities which contravene a basic policy
of the Act, sueh as the promotion of stable collective
2. At p.64.
3. See Local Union No. 1229 v. hbUB. 202 F2d 186
CAJbCl 1952) and Hoover Co. v. NLKB, 191 F2d 380
CA6, 1951)
bargaining relationships and the sanctity of collective
agreements, have also been held to be unprotected.
Employees who engage in such activities cannot complain
about discharges for such activity. Examples are strikes
and other refusal to work in breach of a collective
4
agreement and "wild-eat" strikes in derogation of the
authority of the authorized collective bargaining
representative."
Partial strikes of various varieties have been held
to be unprotected concerted activities. In Elk Lumber
6
Company v. Ni.ii.ii it was held that 'slow down1 was an
unprotected concerted activity. In NLttB v. Montgomery
7
ward & Co. the court of appeals said j "While these
employees had the undoubted right to go on a strike and
quit their employment, they could not continue to work
and remain at their positions, accept the wages paid to
them, and at the same time select what part of their
allotted tasks they cared to perform of their own volition,
or refuse openly or secretly to the employer's damage,
to do other work."
4. See Joseph Dyson & sons Inc., 72 NLKB 445 (1947)
5. See Harnischfeger Corp. v. NLiiB. 207 F2d 575 (CA7,1953).
For "authorised collective bargaining agent"
see post, pp.62 f.
6. 91 NLKB 333 (1950).
7. 157 F2d 486 (CAS, 1946).
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In Interim!ional Onion, UAwA-AFL v. Wisconsin Employment
8
delations Board the Court held that intermittent,
unannounced, "quickie1* strikes were not included in the
concerted activities protected by s.7 of the Act.
As long as it is "for mutual aid and protection"
even informal action without union organisation saay be
9
protected. In aLitB v. fasaington Aluminum Co. seven
unorganised employees were discharged when they walked
off the job because of extremely cold working conditions.
The Court held that they had been engaged in protected
concerted activities, even though they failed to comply
8. 336 US 245 (1949). In this ease the leaders of the
Union submitted to its members a plan for a new method
of putting pressure upon the employer. The stratagem
consisted of calling repeated special meetings of the
Union during working hours at any time the Union saw
fit. It was an essential part of the plan that this
should be without warning to the employer or notice
as to when or whether the employees , ould return. The
device was adopted and the first surprise cessation
of work was called in November, 1945. Thereafter and
until March, 1946, such action was repeated on twenty-six
occasions. The employer was not inforiaed during this
period of any specific deraanas which these tactics were
designed to enforce nor what concessions it could make
to avoid them. As the activity was neither protected
nor prohibited by the Federal Act, the states were held
free to regulate it.
9. 370 US 9 (1962). See also Ohio Oil Co.. 92 NLAJ3 1597
(1951). Cf. NLiih v. Office Towel Su?3ply Co. Inc.. 201
F2d 838 (0A2, 195^) and Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLiiB
176 F2d 749 (CA4, 1949). These cases did not involve
collective withdrawal of labour but the same principle
applies.
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with the employer's rule requiring permission to leave
and even though they did not present a specific demand
on the employer to remedy the condition before they left.
In Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp. v. NLhti10 the court
of appeals held i M .... We do not hold as a matter of
law that employees engaged in concerted activities must
give formal or even informal notice of their purpose.
However, where the employer from the facts in its
possession could reasonably infer that the employees in
question are engaging In unprotected activity, justice
and equity require that the employees, if they chose to
remain silent, bear the risk of being discharged .... "
In Mastro Plastics Corp. v, the Court ruled
that a strike in violation of a no-strike contract provision
was lawful where it has been provoked by the employer's
unfair labour practices, and that the 60-day notice and
eooling-off period do not apply to a strike caused by
serious unfair labour practices of the employer not involving
12
contract issues. This is a very important decision.
10. 264 F2d 637 (CA7, 1959).
11. 350 US 270 1956. For a discussion of the Mastro
Plastics case see Cox, The Lepal Nature of Collective
Bargaining Agreements 57 Mlch.L.Rev, 1, 16 et seq.(l958) „
12. In an effort to encourage the resolution of contract
disputes through bargaining the NLKA lays down some
strict procedures that must be followed before a party to
a contract may engage in a strike or lockout over an
attempt to modify or terminate a contract. see s.S(d)
of the NiiLA. Under s.8(d)(4) before modifying or
terminating a contract the moving party must permit the
contract to continue in full force and effect, without
resorting to a strike or lockout, for 60 days after the
original notice was given or until the expiration date
of the contract, whichever occurs later. Employees
who strike during the 60 days cooiing-off period forfeit
their status as employees under the Act and are not
protected against being discharged or otherwise




Iu Mid-,est .metallic Products. Inc. the union had
agreed that it would not strike over grievances, including
discuarges, until it haa exhausted the grievance procedure
provided in its contract. This case was distinguished
from the Mastro Plastics case on the following ground t
M Since .... the processing of a grievance could be
completed in about 5 days, the union was in effect merely
agreeing to suspend any strike action over a grievance
for 5 days from the cate that the grievance arose.
Unlike the union in the Mastro plastics case the instant
union did not jeopardize its very existence by renouncing
self-help against unfair labor practices for a substantial
period of time. Accordingly we believe that the
considerations, which led the Board and the Court to
require an 'explicit* waiver of the right to strike
against unfair labour practices are not applicable here .... M
14
in Arlan's Department Store a majority of the
Board held that only strikes in protest against serious
unfair labour practices should be held immune from general
13. 121 NLlui No. 164 (1958).
14. 133 NLlui 802 (1961).
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15
no-strike clauses. Member Fanning dissented,
expressing the view that all unfair labour practices
are serious.
S.3C5 of the Labor-Mana, ement- lielations Act. 1947,
makes it unlawful for any individual employed by the
federal government to participate in any strike. Any
such individual shall be discharged immediately, shall
forfeit his civil service status, if any, and shall not
be eligible for re-employment by any branch of the
federal government for three years. There is no record
of any strike called by federal employees since the
1 fi
enactment of the Act in 1947.
15. If the strike activity violates a "no-strike" clause
the union atay be liable in damages. See Cuneo Press.
Inc. v. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union No. 34.235 F2d 108
(0A7 1956). S.3ol of the Labor-Mana; emenf Relations
Act, 19*7, provides that "suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labour organisation
representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce .... may be brought in any district court of
the United States" (This section has established
that a collective agreement is legally enforceable).
The last part of the section provides that any money
judgment rendered against a union is enforceable only
against the union as an entity and against its assets
and that the property of individual union member may
not be taken to satisfy the judgment, Does this
mean that where a union has breached a no-strike
clause the employer can obtain an injunction against
the strike? It was held in Sinclair Kefininn Co. v.
Atkinson, 370 US 195 (1962) by the Supreme Court that
in such cases the employer cannot obtain an injunction
against the strike. The Court relied in its judgment
on s.4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. For Morris-LaGuardia
Act see post, pp.54 f
16. See U.S. v. U.M.W. and John h. Lewis. 330 US 258 (1947)
which took place before the enactment of the habor-
Aitanafcemeflt delations Act. State courts have authority




Where a strike has been called because of the
employer's unfair labour practices, the employer is not
legally free to hire permanent replacements, and is
17
obliged to reinstate the strikers upon their request*
where a strike is partially 'economic1 and partially in
response to the employer's unfair labour practice the
18
same rule applies. It was held in Brown Radio service
19
& Laboratory that ail unfair labour strike does not
lose its character as such merely because economic reasons
may have contributed or even precipitated the work stoppage.
2ft
But it was held in NLKB v. Stackpole Carbon Co. if the
employer can show that the strike would have occurred
despite his unfair labour practices, he may be absolved
of a duty to discharge replacements in favour of strikers.
Where an unfair labour practice of the employer is
a contributory cause of the strike, it will be treated as
an unfair labour practice strike. The burden rests upon
the employer to show that the strike would have taken place
21
even if the unfair labour practice had not occurred.
17. See tiLKB v. Biles-Coleman Lumber Co.. 98 F2d 197
(CA9, 1938).
18. See NLflB v. Barrett Co.. 135 P2d 959 (CA7, 1943).
19. 70 NLPdi 476 (1946).
20. 105 F2d 167 (CA3, 1939).
21. See NLA3 v. booster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.
236 F2d 898 (CA6, 1956) applied on remand to the Board,
121 NLJ&3 No. 186 (1958).
If unfair labour practices are first committed during
the course of a strike, there arises a duty to reinstate
strikers who have been replaced following the commission
of the unfair labour practice*
22
If employees go out on strike for economic reasons
and not because of any unfair labour practice on the part
of their employer, the latter may replace them in order
to keep his business running, and the strikers thereafter
have no absolute right of reinstatement to their old jobs.
If permanent replacements are hired before the strikers
apply for reinstatement, the employer may reject the
23
strikers application without violating the law.
24
In NLfch v. Resistor Corp. the Supreme Court refused
25
to extend the Mackay rule but they emphasized that they
were not questioning the continuing vitality of that rule.
The question before the Court was whether an employer
commits an unfair labour practice when he extends a
20-year seniority credit to strike replacements and
strikers who leave the strike and return to work.
22. A strike to enforce economic demands, but the term
also embraces a strike for recognition or organisation.
23. The rule was enunciated in ULiiB v. fcackay nadio &
Telegraph Co. 304 US 333 (194SJ. uenerally referred
to as the ktackay rule.
24. 373 US 221 (1963).
25. see supra, note 24. A new Board was appointed in
1961 which seems more favourably inclined towards
unions* Lately the same tendency can be noticed
from the judgments of the Supreme Court.
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The Court speaking through Justice White held j " .... The
Court of Appeals and respondents rely upon Mackay as
precluding the result reached hy the Board but we are not
persuaded. Under the decision in that case an employer
may operate his plant during a strike and at its conclusion
need not discharge those who worked during the strike in
order to make way for returning strikers But Mackay
did not- deal with super-seniority, with its effects upon
all strikers, whether replaced or not, or with its
powerful impact upon a strike itself. Because the
employees interest must be deemed to outweigh the damage
to concerted activities caused by permanently replacing
strikers does not mean it also outweighs the far greater
encroachment resulting from super-seniority in addition
to permanent replacement
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il The Labour Injunction
For Many years the us al response of an employer
to boycotts, collective withdrawal of labour or picketing
was to ask the court to issue an injunction against the
union. In li'32 the Norris-Latiuar<iia (the Anti-Injunction)
Act1 was passed. For the first time the right to strike,
to picket and to boycott were legislatively protected.
The Xorris-LaGuardia Act prescribes limits on federal
judicial power to grant injunctive relief in labour disputes.
It should be noted that the Act applies only when the
particular ease involves 01 grows out of a labour dispute.
The Act protects nine specific activities from the
injunctive process; they include most of the usual self-
2
help devices of employees or unions. \s regards other
activities the Act forbids the federal courts to issue
injunctions unless certain prior conditions are fulfilled.
Among the conditions that must be fulfilled before an
injunction may be issued is the condition that the
petitioner must have aabe every reasonable effort to
3
settle the labour dispute. Bx parte injunctions are
not permissible.
1. 47 Stat. 70, 29 U,S.0.§ 101-115.
2. See B.4 of the Act. Where a union combines with
some aon-labcur group to effect some direct commercial
restraint, and the activity violates the anti-trust
laws, the Act does not afford protection. see Allen
■ rauley & Co. v. Local 5. 1,!>♦&«>»,. 325 (JS 797 (TOST.
3. s.8 of the Act. See Brotherhood of kailroad Trainmen
v. Toledo. Peoria L i.ost'era' dailroad.' ^21 bs'50 (1044).
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In U«S. v. OAlrt and John Lewis* the Supreme Court
held that the Government might obtain an injunction
against a strike directed at it as an employer operating
an industrial property.
Seventeen states have followed the lead of Congress
and passed 'little* Norris-LaGuardia Acts patterned after
the federal law.
The amendments made to the NLRA by the Labor-Management
Relations Act. 1947, and the Labor-Management he porting
ano Disclosure let, 1959, have to some extent brought the
labour injunction back to the arena of the labour scene*
Under s.lO(j) and (1) of the NLRA, the Board is empowered,
and in the case of some union unfair labour practices,
directed to petition a federal District Court for a
temporary restraining order.
3.10(1) of the NLKA provides that whenever it is
charged that any person has engaged within the meaning
4. 330 US 258 (1946). At the time the coai minefcs were
operated by the Government. When a strike took place
in that industry the Government petitioned the federal
court of the District of Columbia for an injunction*
The court came to the conclusion that the term "employer"
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not include the
Government and granted the injunction. The U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. A
discussion of this case can be found in K. F. ftatt,
The Divine Right of Government by Judiciary.
14 U.Chi.L.Rev.409 (1947).
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of s.(4) (A), (B) or (C) of s.8(b)° or s,8(e)6 or
s,8(b)(7) the preliminary investigations of such charge
shall be given priority over all other cases. If, after
such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to
whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to
believe such charge is true and that a complaint should
issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition a
district court of the U.S. for appropriate injunctive
relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with
respect to such matter. The section further provides
that upon the filing of any such petition the district
court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive
relief or temporary restraining order as it deems just
and proper, notwithstanding any provision of law. The
section contains a proviso in which it is stated that no
temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice
unless a petition alleges that substantial and irreparable
Injury to the charging party will be unavoidable and such
temporary restraining order shall be effective for no
longer than five days and will become void at the expiration
of such period. In a proviso which was added by the
Labor-Management- lleporting and Disclosure Act. 1959, to
the section, it is stated that such regional attorney or
5, S.8(4)(A)(B) and (c) outlaws most secondary activity
i.e. secondary boycott, secondary strikes and secondary
picketing. See post, pp.59 ff.
6, 3.8(e) outlaws hot-cargo agreements. See post, p.60.
7, S.8(b)(7) outlaws organisational and recognition
picketing. see post-,pp.71 ff.
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officer shall not apply for any restraining order under
s.8(b)(7) if a charge against the employer under s.8(a)(2)
has been filed and after the preliminary investigation,
he has reasonable cause to believe that such charge is
true and that a complaint should issue*
By s.lo(j) of the NLKA the Board is empowered upon
issuance of a complaint that any person has engaged or
is engaging in an unfair labour practice to petition a
district court of the U.S. for appropriate temporary
relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any
such petition the court has jurisdiction to grant the
Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it
9
deems just and proper.
Thus the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not stand in the
way of injunctions against unfair labour practices when
they are sought by the NLRB.*0 It is important to note
that a private party is not permitted to obtain an
injunction against an unfair labour practice.
Under the Labor-Management Relations Act. 1947 a
U.S. District Court has jurisdiction to issue an injunction
8. S.8(a)(2) makes it an unfair labour practice for an
employer to dominate or interfere with the formation
or administration of any union or contribute financial
or other support to it. See post, pp.160 ff.
9. It is obvious that this provision is vital? immediate
intervention is sometimes absolutely necessary. It
should be noted that this section is not merely directed
against union unfair labour practices but employer
unfair labour practices as well.
10. See s«lO(h) of the &LKA.
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on application of the Attorney General of the United
States, in certain circumstances where a so-called
11
national emergency strike is involved. A challenge
to the constitutionality of these provisions and to an
injunction issued under them in the 1959 basic steel
12
strike was rejected by the Supreme Court.
11. seess.206-210 (inclusive) of the Labor-Management
delations Act. See also, Kramer, Emergency strikes.
11 Lab. L. J. 227 (I960).
12. See Steelworkers v. U.S.. 361 US 39 (1959).
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ill secondary Boycott
The Famous S«8(b)(4) of the NLftA
The primary objective of a.8(b)(4) of the NLRA is
the prohibition of secondary boycotts and certain types of
strikes* The section does not speak generally of secondary
boycotts, it describes and condemns specific union conduct
directed towards specific objectives.1 Subsections (1) and
(ii) of s*8(b)(4) list the type of activity banned and
subsections (a), (b), (c) and (d) of s.8(b)(4) enumerate
the prohibited objectives. If a union engages in any of
the kinds of activity mentioned in subsections (i) and
(ii) for one of the purposes mentioned in subsections (a),
(B), (C) and (fl) it commits an unfair labour practice.
A union or its agents commits an unfair labour practice
if it engages in any of the following kinds of activityt
(i) induces or encourages any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in industry
affecting commerce to strike or to refuse to perform
services;
4
(ii) threatens, coerces or restrains any person engaged
in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce;
1. Per Mr# Justice Frankfurter in Local 761, electrical
Radio and Machine Workers v. NLuB.
2. Thus the inducement of a single secondary employee
falls within the ban of the section*
3# The Supreme Court has held that a railroad and a
governmental unit such as a county, are persons within
the MbiiA and hence that they have standing to seek
relief against union conduct which violates s,8(b)(4).
4. a term, which, of course, includes an employer.
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for any of the following purposes}
A# Forcing any employer or self-employed person to join
any union or employer organisation or to en|er into
an agreement which is prohibited by s.8(e).°
Thus a secondary as well as primary strike, called
by a union, whose purpose is to force an employer or
self-employed person to join a union or employer organisation
is a union unfair labour practice.
S.8(e) makes it an unfair labour practice for any
union and any employer to enter into an agreement whereby
such employer ceases or refrains from handling, using,
selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the
products of any other employer, or to cease doing business
with any other person. Furthermore such an agreement is
void and unenforceable. This type of agreement is called
6
"hot cargo agreement*. Thus a strike, called by a union,
for a hot—cargo agreement is a union unfair labour practice.
Likewise if a union threatens or ooerces an employer to
enter into such an agreement it commits an unfair labour
practice,
B» Forcing any person to cease dealing in the products
of any other producer, processor or manufacturer or
to cease doing business with any other person.
5. See 8.8(b)(4)(A).
6. There are certain exceptions. The provisos to s.8
(e) allow unions engaged in the construction and
garment industries to enter into modified types of
hot cargo agreements under certain conditions without
violating the law*
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This clearly outla\TS the secondary boycott. It
7
is unlawful for a union to go to a neutral employer and
by threats to get him to stop doing business with the
employer with whom the union has a dispute. Furthermore
it is a violation of the Act for the union to induce or
encourage employees of a neutral employer to strike or
refuse to perform services as a means of putting pressure
on the neutral employer to stop doing business with the
employer with whom the union has a dispute.
Forcing another employer to recognise or bargain with a
union as the representative of his employees unless such
union has been certified as the representative8 of such
employees under the provisions of s.9
If a union calls out employees to strike for the
purpose of forcing not their employer but another employer
to recognise a union not certified by the KL11B, it violates
the Act.
7. When a union charged with a violation of s.8(b)(4)
is able to show that the neutral employer is in fact
an tally* the Board will dismiss the complaint.
Neutral employees have been held to be allies for
secondary boycott purposes on the basis of their
corporate relationship or of the performance of struck
work turned over by the employer, with whom the union
has a dispute, to the neutral employer. See Miami
Newspaper pressiaan*s Local 46 v. NLKB 322 F2d 40&
(dAPC. 1963) and Ponds v. Metro Fed. of Architects,
75F Supp. 672 (DCSDNY 1948)1
8. See s.8(b)(4)(B). This clause contains a proviso
which provides that "nothing contained in this clause
(8) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not
otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary
picketing." Primary activity is where the strike or
picketing is limited to the scene of the primary dispute.
For s.9 see post, pp.62 f.
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C, Forcing an employer to recognise a union as bargaining
agent if another union already has heen certified to
represent his employees,®
A basic objective of the NLEA is to protect the
right of employees to bargain collectively with their
employer through a representative of their own choosing,10
An employer is under a duty to bargain in good faith with
a union representing a majority of his employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit on the one hand, and a union
representing a majority of the employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit is obligated to bargain in good faith with
the employer on the other,
11
Subject to certain limitations imposed by the NLRA
12
the Act confers on the NLIiB the authority to decide in
each case whether the unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining shall he the employer unit, craft
unit, plant unit or subdivision thereof,
The NLIiB is entrusted with conducting representation
elections. Representation proceedings begin with filing
a representation petition at the Board offices.
9, see s,S(b)(4)(C), This section should be read in
conjunction with s,8(b)(7) which makes it virtually
obsolete. See post, pp.71 ff.
10, See s#7 of the NLEA,
11, For the limitations imposed by the Act see the proviso
in s,9(b).
12, 3,701 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act, 1959, allows the NLIIB to delegate authority to
its regional directors to determine appropriate
bargaining units and other questions of representation,
to direct elections and to issue certifications,
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If the petition has been filed by a union, there must
be a showing that at least So per cent of the employees
involved have indicated that they wish to be represented
by the petitioning union* An employer may file a
petition when one or more unions have asked it for
recognition as the bargaining representative# If a
majority of the employees vote for the union, the Board
certifies it as their bargaining agent#
A question of representation may also be raised by
petition for decertification of a bargaining agent which
has been certified, or is currently recognised by the
employer. A showing of at least 30 per cent interest
of the employees in the bargaining unit must accompany
13
the decertification petition.
When a union loses a certification or decertification
election 12 months must elapse before another representation
14
election may take place# The Board will not direct an
election among employees covered by a valid collective
agreement except under certain circumstances# The contract-
IE
bar rules insist that for the contract to be effective
it must be in writing, properly executed and binding on
the parties and of no more than reasonable duration.
13. see s#9(c)(1)(a){il).
14# See 9(c)(3).
15. Eulos applied by the MhEB in determining when an
existing contract between au employer and a union
will bar representation election sought by a rival
union#
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Thus the NLliA establishes a procedure for the
resolution of disputes over organisation and representation
and the freely expressed wishes of the majority in the
bargaining unit is controlling. Before 1947 the law
did not proscribe picketing after a union had been
certified by the Board. Maturally a union which had
been rejected in the election or did not stand for election
very often seized the opportunity and after the election
1 t*
began to picket the plant. The employer was caught in
the middle because under the Norris-Lattuardia Act the
activity was immune froia federal injunctive process. To
make an end to this s.8(b)(4)(C) was enacted. When
picketing which is proscribed by s.S(b)(4)(C) occurs, the
Board, on a complaint filed with it by the employer, is
required to seek an injunction to enjoin the picketing.
D, Forcing an employer to transfer^,work froia one group
of employees to another group,17
The provision was enacted in order to make an end
to pressures exerted by unions where there was a job
demarcation dispute. An unfair labour eharge involving
a job demarcation dispute aust be handled differently
from charges alleging any other type of unfair labour
practice.
16* This type of picketing occurred more frequently




Consumer Picketing and Publicity
18
S.8(b)(4) contain a proviso designed to preserve
a union's right to publicise a dispute with an employer.
It is stated in the proviso that nothing in the section
shall be construed to prohibit publicity, "other than
picketing® for the purpose of advising the public that
a product produced by an employer with whom the union
has a dispute is being distributed by another employer.
But an important condition is attached to this right to
publicise the dispute, namely, the publicity must not
induce employees of other employers to refuse to pick up,
deliver, or transport any goods or to refuse to perform
any services at the distributor's establishment.
The Board and the courts had to deal with the
question whether "other than picketing® meant that all
peaceful consumer picketing was proscribed by s.8(b)(4).
19
In hJLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen the
question before the Supreme Court was whether the unions
had violated s.8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act when they limited
their secondary picketing of retail stores to an appeal
to the customers of the stores not to buy the products
of certain firms against which one of the unions was on
strike. The supreme court held that this was not
violative of s.8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
18. See s.lC(K) of the Act.
19. 84 SupCt. 1063 (1964).
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Damages
Under a. 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947,
a anion may be sued for damages by a private party in a
United States District Court for engaging in conduet
20
proscribed by this section. The unlawful conduct is
the same as the unfair labour practices which are described
in s.8(b)(4).
An action may be brought under s.303 regardless of
whether unfair labour practice charges are filed with the
NUB, or if unfair practice charges are filed with the
HLMB a damage suit may be brought at the same tine.
Damages may be awarded even though there has been a finding
21
that no unfair labour practice was committed. The
two procedures are independent- of another.
Punitive damages cannot be awarded under s.303.
22
In Teamsters, Local 20 v. Morton the Supreme Court
unanimously held that state law has been displaced by
s.303 in private damage actions based on peaceful union
secondary activity. Consequently, the court declared
that the District Court was without authority to award
20. Even though the usual federal court requirement that
an amount of at least jf 3,000 must be in controversy
is not satisfied, damage suits under s.303 may be
instituted. However, the secondary activity must
occur in an industry or activity affecting commerce
for jurisdiction to esist under s.303. In determining
whether commerce is affected, the business of both
the primary and secondary employers may be considered.
21. See United Brick & Clay Workers v. Deeaa Artware
198 P2d 637 (GAG, 1952).
22. 84 SupCt. 1253 (1964).
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punitive damages* The Court noted that in oases
m •
involving union violence, state lav has been permitted
to prevail by reason of controlling considerations which
were entirely absent in this case*
- 6T
IV picketing
Thomhill v. Alabama"*" the Supreme Court held that
the dissemination of information and opinions concerning
a labour dispute and advice given to the public not to
patronise or do business with a particular employer are
within the area of free speech protected by the Constitution
of the United States against governmental abridgment*
The court relied in its decision on the First and Fourteenth
2
Amendment of the Constitution. The Thomhill case
established the right of employees to picket peacefully
for lawful objectives without interference on the part of
any state.
In Milk Wagon Drivers' union of Chicago v, Meadowmoor
2
Dairies Inc. - where the picketing started peacefully
for a lawful purpose and then exploded into a reign of
terror the Supreme Court held that the state courts may
enjoin isolated instances of picket line violence, but
they have no authority to issue injunctions so broad as
to prohibit the peaceful phase of picketing. In this
case the decision of the state court was upheld because
1. 310 US 38 (1940).
2. For the First Amendment see ante, p.32. The Fourteenth
Amendment, s.l states: "All persons bora or naturalised
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United states and of the
State wherein they reside. Mo state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law, nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
3. 312 US 287 (1940)
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the good and bad part of the picketing were so enmeshed
that it was impossible to separate the lawful from the
unlawful acts*
It was held in Carpenters and Joiners Union of America
v» Hitter*s Cafe* by the Supreme Court that picketing
must be confined to the immediate area where the labour
dispute has arisen in order to be lawful. In AFL v. Swing5
the main issue was whether the relationship of employer-
employee must exist before peaceful picketing will be
permitted. The Supreme Court per Justice Frankfurter
said that if a labour dispute existed strangers having
no relation with the employer might exercise the right
of free speech by picketing.
Whenever the picketing by unions was directed to
objectives which were contrary to the state public policy
(expressed by state courts or by state legislation) the
Supreme Court has sustained the constitutionality of
injunctive relief against picketing despite its peaceful
conduct.
g
Teamsters v. Vogt the unions after having failed
in their effort to make the plaintiff's employees join
them, picketed at the entrance of the plaintiff*s premises.
A Wisconsin state court enjoined the picketing and the
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the state
4. 315 US 722 (1942).
5. 312 US 321 (1940).
6. 354 US 284 (1957),
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on the ground that the picketing was planned to coerce
the employer to interfere with its employees in their
right to join or refrain from joining, a union* The
decision was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court,
Mr* Justice Frankfurter said j "The mere fact- that there
is picketing does not automatically justify its restraint
witnout an investigation into its conduct and purposes;
neither state courts nor state legislatures can enact
blanket prohibitions against picketing .... The policy
of a state prohibiting a union from picketing to coerce
an employer to put pressure on his employees to join a
union is valid."
When lawful objectives have been sought through
violent picketing restraining orders have been sustained
by the supreme Court* In cases where isolated incidents
of violence had occurred the court has modified the
injunction to prohibit only the violent phase of picketing.
As has been mentioned before s.8(b)(4)(C) of the Act
makes it an unfair labour practice for a union or its
agent to engage in or encourage a strike (this includes
picketing) for the purpose of forcing an employer to
recognise a union as bargaining agent if another union
7
already has been certified to represent his employees.
This section was enacted to proscribe jurisdictional
picketing but it was not precise enough and could, therefore,
be circumvented in certain situations*
7, See ante, pp.62 ff.
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The Board gives employees both the right to bargain
through representatives of their own free choosing and the
right to refrain from collective bargaining. Therefore
the ballot gives the employees the right to vote 'yes' or
•no* on the question of representation by a union. If
a majority of the employees voted 'no' in a Board election,
the rejected union and other unions if they wished to do
so, could lawfully picket the plant and s. 8(b)(4)(C) did
not afford any protection.
In cases where an uncoerced majority of the employees
selected a union as their bargaining agent, which was
recognised by the employer, without the formality of an
election, other unions could still picket the plant without
committing an unfair labour practice.
A new section, 8.8(b)(7), was inserted in the NLiiA
by the Labor-Manry,emeat ueporting and Disclosure Act in
1959, which deals with recognition and organisational
picketing.**
3.8(b)(7) makes it unlawful for a union to picket
"to force or require" the employer to recognise the union
or the employees to accept it as a bargaining agent where t
(A) Another union has been recognised as bargaining
agent, and the NLitB would not conduct an election
because a question of representation does not exist, or
(B) A valid election has been conducted within the
preceding 12 months, or
8. So far the restrictions placed on recognition and
organisational picketing have not been challenged by
unions on constitutional grounds.
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(C) The picketing has been conducted for a reasonable
period of time (not to exceed 30 days) and no election
petition has been filed.
The section closes the above mentioned loopholes,
la cases where another union has not been recognised as
bargaining agent by the employer and no valid election
has been conducted within the preceding 12 months a union
can picket for 30 days and when it files an election
petition it can go on. If the picketing continues beyond
the 30 days without a representation petition having been
filed, the hoard, on a complaint filed with it by the
employer, is required to seek an injunction to enjoin the
picketing. A proviso to s.lO(l) prohibits the Board
frois seeking injunctive relief in a s.8(b)(7) case
whenever a meritorious charge has been filed alleging
that the employer has dominated or interfered with a union
in violation of s.3(a)(2) of the Act.10
3.8(b)(7) restricts the right to organise.
Sometimes a union is rejected in a Board election because
employees are afraid to displease their employer and
therefore vote *no* in the election. The Supreme Court
has stressed that peaceful picketing is a form of free
speech. It seems that in such cases the union is
justified in opening its mouth but s.8(b)(7)(3) shuts it.
Before the enactment of the section, if a union failed
9, See s.lo(l) of the Act and ante, pp.55 ff.
10. For s.8(a) (2) see post, pp.160 ff.
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in its campaign to enlist members and no other union had
been certified by the NLEB it could resort to picketing,
now it can do so only if no other union has been recognised
and there was no election within the preceding 12 months
and then the period allowed is limited*
However, a very important exemption to the 30 day
picket rule has resulted from a proviso in s.8(b)(7)(C)
which allows picketing »for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public (including consumers) that an employer
does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a
union, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce
any individual employed by any other person in the course
of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport
any goods or not to perform any services# It should be
noted that the proviso pertains to subsection (C) only.
Informational picketing which lacks an organisational
or recognitional purpose is outside the reach of s.8(b)(7)(C)
even though it causes refusal to work.11
In defining the term "effect* in the proviso to
s#8(b)(7)(C) the Board has looked to the actual impact on
the employer*s business, rather than to a quantitative test
based solely on the number of deliveries not made or services
not performed, when determining whether to remove the
informational picketing from the proviso*s protection. If
the picketing disrupts, interferes with or curtails an employer's
business a violation takes place. This is a question of
fact to be decided in the light of the facts in each case.
11# See Local 89. Chefs, Cooks, Pastry Cooks and Assistants
(Stork kestaurant) 130 KLRB 67 (1961).
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Very often the picketing has a number of objectives.
Does a violation of s.8(b)(7) take place if one of the
objectives of the picketing is to gain recognition?
This question was dealt with in Local 840, Hod Carriers Union
12
(BlinneConstruction Company). The Board held in this
case that s»8(b)(7)(C) applies to a majority union which
has not been certified. The fact that organisational
or recognition picketing is also for the purpose of
protesting against an employer unfair labour practice
does not prevent violation of s.8(b)(7)(C)• However, a
union may continue organisation or recognition picketing,
without filing a petition for an election, if it files a
refusal-to-bargain charge and the General Counsel finds
it meritorious and issues a complaint.
In Bldg. & Construction Trades Council (Sullivan
13
Electric Co.) the Board held where the union*s picketing
is solely to compel the employer to comply with an existing
valid collective agreement it is not unlawful picketing
for recognition within the meaning of s.8(b)(7)(C) of
the Act.
12. 135 NLKB 1153 (1962).
13. 146 NLEB 138 (1964).
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V Coercion by Labour Organisations
3.8(b)(1)(A) of the NLEA provides that it shall be
an unfair labour practice for a labour organisation or
its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 7 : "Provided that
this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labour
organisation to prescribe its own rules with respect to
the acquisition or retention of membership therein ....
By 6.8(b)(1)(A) Congress sought to fix the rules of
the game to ensure that strikes and other organisational
activities of employees were conducted peaceably by
persuasion and propaganda and not by physical force, or
threats of force or economic reprisal. In this section
1. This section has been added by the Taft-Hartley
amendments. For s.7 see ante, p.33. S.8(b)(l)(A)
follows the phraseology of 3.8(a)(1) of the Act except
omitting the words "interfere with". For s.S(a)(l)
see post, pp.122ff.In its original form the amendment
followed the exact words of s.8(a)(l), see Cong.Hee.
pp.4136 ff. But the deletion of the words "interfere
with" does n®t seem to have an effect on court decisions.
The proviso to the section should not be overlooked.
In UAJ Local 238(Wisconsin Motor Corp), 145 NLEB 109
(1964) the Board held that a union did not unlawfully
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
statutory rights by imposing fines on certain of its
members who exceeded production earning ceilings for
piece work in violation of the union rule, since the
union*s rule was only enforced against its members and
eraployees were free to refrain from becoming union
members. Under the circumstances the imposition of
the fines constituted internal union action within
the protection of the proviso to s.8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act,
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Congress was aiming at means, not at ends.4' It should
b© noted that the section does not apply only to strike




In NLKB v. Teamsters Union 639 the Supreme Court
held that s.8(b)(1)(A) is not a general clause and that
the provision of the section prohibiting union tactics
that coerce or restrain employees in the exercise of the
right to join or refrain from joining a union is limited
to acts of violence, intimidation, and reprisal or threats
of such acts#
By s.8(b)(l)(A) of the Act the following conduct by
pickets on the picket line and elsewhere is unlawful *
threats of violence against nonstrikers, blocking entrances,
trailing nonstrikers, assaulting nonstrikers, and damaging
5
the house of a nonstriker.
2. However, s.8(b)(l)(A) was not intended to confer on the
Board general police power covering all acts of violence
by a union, but rather was intended to bring within its
scope only such acts of violence as are directed against
the exercise by employees of rights guaranteed by s.7.
In KLEB v. Furriers Joint Council. 224 P2d 78 (CA2, 1955),
an employee worked overtime for another employer, in
violation of the collective agreement with his principal
employer. For this he was assaulted by a union agent.
The court of appeals held although the assault was
coercion, the employee was not acting in the rights under
s.7, and that conduct in breach of a valid collective
agreement is unprotected.
3. See, for example, Personal Products Co, 108 NLK13 1129 (1954)
and NLi-LB v. J>ie and Tool Makers Lod; e Ho. 113. AFL,
231 F2d 298 (CA7, 1956),
4. 362 US 274 (I960) generally referred to as the Curtis case.
5. See Packinghouse Workers. 123 NLfiB (Ho. 53) (1959) $
Steelworkera, 123 KJLkB (ko. 35) (1959); gagle Mfg. Corp..
112 NLKB 74 (1955), Tungsten Mining; Corp, IOC NLEB 903,
(1953).
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The Board is authorised under s. 10(c) of the Act
to issue a cease and desist order for a violation of
8.8(h)(1)(A). It is important to note that the states
are not barred from exercising regulatory power in those
eases in which violence, threats of violence, or mass
6
picketing may he present.
Local 513, operating Engineers (Long Construction Co.)
145 NLKB No. 57 (1963) the Board made the following
observations: "We are dealing here with conduct which,
though violative of the Act, is not beyond the reach
of state power. The Act generally pre-empts State
authority with respect to conduct within its purview.
However, it does not pre-empt state authority to deal
with breaches of the peace stemming from the use of
force and violence in labor disputes. The States can
enjoin such conduct, and they can remedy the consequences
of such conduct.n For "unpeaceful picketing"




Freedom to Organise in the Federal Republic of Germany
The Basic Right to Organise
In the Federal hepublic of Germany the right to
organise is guaranteed by the Constitution i.e. the Basic
Art.9(3) of the Basic Law provides x
"The right to form associations to safeguard
and improve working and economic conditions is
guaranteed to everyone and to all trades and
professions. Agreements which restrict or seek
to hinder this right are null and void; measures
directed to this end are illegal."2
What rights does an employee derive from the article?
He has the right to participate in the formation of aay
tra e union and to join any existing trade union.w
1. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany;
Bonn Charter (1949) hereafter referred to as Basic
Law, The English text quoted here is a translation
which was approved by the Allied High Commission in
Germany.
2. Art.1^2 of the Basic Law provides that provisions in
the Laender (provinces) constitutions guaranteeing
basic rights which are not inconsistent with Art.1-18
of the Basic Law remain in force. The Basic Law of
the Land is only then applicable if the protection
of the Land*s constitution is less than that of the
Federal Constitution. For example Art.36 of the
constitution of Hesse guarantees freedom to organise
to trade unions and employers' associations only,
here Art.9(3) of the Basic Law of Bonn steps in and
enlarges the scope.
3. By s.152 of the Industrial Code (uewerbeordnung)
certain combinations are not forbidden. But, of
course, Art.9(3) goes much further and the right is
guaranteed to everyone i.e. all employees.
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This right is safeguarded and protected by the Basic Law.4
Art.9(3) is a basic right, and is therefore like the
rest of the basic rights protected by the Constitution
(the Basic Law) against governmental infringement.
Art.9(3), since it is a basic right, can be amended only
by a law which expressly amends or supplements the text
thereof. such a law requires the affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the members of the Bundestag and two thirds
of the votes of the Bundesrat. An amendment affecting
the basic principles laid down In the article is
g
inadmissible.
Art.9(3) is not a declarative or programmatic
provision; it binds the legislature, the executive and
£
the judiciary as directly enforceable law.
Administrative measures taken by the State which
restrict or seek to hinder the right to organise are illegal.
4. The article also protects the right of employers to
form and to join employers' associations. Moreover,
it is now generally accepted that Art.9(3) guarantees
to the organisation as such, the right to exist and
function. Of course, this applies only to organisations
which are an organisation within the meaning of Art.9(3)
see post,pp.82 ff.since this study is concerned with
freedom to organise of individual employees the right
of the organisation will be mentioned only when it
affects the right of the individual.
5. See Art.79(3) and Art.l9(2) of the Basic Law.
6. See Art.1(3) and limb 2 of Art,9(3).
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7
For example if a public official is transferred from
bis post in order to stop his union activities Art.9(3)
has been violated. An action to set aside such an
administrative measure has to be lodged before the
Administrative Court. In addition an unconstitutional
administrative measure is also a breach of an official
m
duty. The plaintiff is entitled to compensation which
is payable by the Appointment Body.
There is a great difference between the guarantee
of freedom to organise as against the State and its
protection against a powerful group or person. Freedom
to organise is not only protected by the Basic Law against
governmental infringement but also against infringement
by private forces (privaten Maechten) e.g. a private
employer or trade union.
Limb 2 of Art.9(3) provides that agreements which
7. The term public official is used here for 'Beamfe'.
The present writer realises that this term is not-
adequate but there is no equivalent English expression.
Civil servants and many employees employed in the
public sector e.g. railways, hospitals, secondary
schools are Beamte. Their status, service and loyalty
are governed by public law. Public officials have
the right to organise like the rest of employees,
see post, p.82.
8. See Art.34 of the Basic Law and s.839 of the Civil
Code (Buergeriiehes Gesetzbuch). By s.839(1) a
person injured by a public official's negligence has
no claim against him, if he can obtain compensation




restrict or seek to hinder the right are null and void;
measures directed to this end are illegal. It should be
noted that agreements which restrict or seek to hinder in
the exercise of the right to organise are null and void.
This provision, among other things, makes the yellow dog
document null and void. "Measures" means here not only
administrative measures but also measures employed by private
forces, e.g. an employer, which restrict or seek to hinder
9
freedom to organise. Where the plaintiff alleges that a
restriction has taken place there is no need to prove
"intention". It is the fact that a restriction has actually
taken place on which liability depends. It is quite
immaterial whether the defendant intended to do so or not.
But a mere attempt to hinder freedom to organise is also
illegal even if in the specific case it did not bring about
an actual restriction. It is obvious that in such cases the
court has to look at the intention (animus) of the defendant.
It is important to note that Art,9(3) expressly
provides that freedom to organise is guaranteed to
"everyone and all professions". Freedom to organise
8a. "Abredea" is translated here as agreements. Why the
term "abrede" (arrangement) and not the legal term
agreement (Vertrag) was used cannot be learned from
the wording of the article or from its legislative
history. But there is a general consensus of opinion
that in Art.9(3) the tersa "Abrede" is meant in the
sense of agreement (Vertrag). See IIueck-Nipperdey,
Lehrbuch des Arbeitsrecht, vol.II, 6th ed., 1957,
(hereinafter cited as iiueek-Nipperdey IX), p.96;
v. Mangolat-Klein, Das Bonner Grundgesetz. Komaientar,
2nd ed., 1957, (hereinafter cited as v.Mangoldt-Klein)
comment V 12, concerning Art.9.
9. A detailed discussion of this is made in Chapter 8.
See post, pp.167 ff.
10. See post, Chapter 8, pp.180 f.
- 81 -
is a general human right and has to he distinguished
11
from freedom to associate; the latter is not guaranteed
12
to everyone but to Germans only.
13
Freedom to organise is guaranteed to all professions.
Hence individual professions cannot he excluded. The
article applies to all professions and all professions are
meant thereby, even public officials and domestics.
The reader by looking at Art.9(3) might get the
impression taat the article protects the right of employees
to form and to join any type of labour organisation. But
this is not the case. The article speaks only about
organisations with certain characteristics. The essential
characteristics are :
1. The aim of the organisation must be "to safeguard
and improve working and economic conditions". It is the
11. See Art,9(1) of the Ba:>ic Law. Freedom to associate
is net protected against infringement by private
forces. See post, p.94 footnote 43.
12. Freedom to organise is guaranteed to aliens and
stateless persons as well. Presumably while drafting
the Constitution the importance of this part of the
article was not conceived. Nowadays with foreign
labour being common in the Federal liepublie one should
not overlook this provision.
13. Freedom to organise fox* "ail professions" was for
the first time guaranteed in the Weimar Constitution.
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1 ,4 /v
prevailing opinion of scholars that x\rt.9(3) refers
chiefly to employers' associations and trade unions,
notwithstanding that this cannot be learned from the
text.*^
It Is now generally accepted that it is most desirable
that an organisation should further working conditions
on a collective basis, i.e. by concluding collective
14. Germany is a country of codified law, whioh means
that only the provisions set forth in the constitution
ana in the different codes are considered law. A
decision of a higher court is only the law of the
particular case, and if the matter is remanded the
lower court is bound thereby. However, decisions
of higher courts are frequently cited, and quoted
and aiso followed by lower courts, not as the "law"
but because of their reasoning and persuasive force.
Especially the Federal Labour Court through its
decisions exercises a great influence on the lower
labour courts. This happens because of certain
provisions in tue Labour Court Statute (1953), By
that statute there is a right of appeal to the Federal
Labour Court from the Land Labour Court if the Federal
Court has not decided on the legal issue involved in
the specific case, or if the decision of the Land
Labour Court conflicts with a decision of the Federal
Labour Court or with a decision of another Land Labour
Court, or a superior labour court of the Land. There
are other grounds which give rise to a right of appeal
but this is among them. Moreover the great panel
(Urossen senat) of the Federal Labour Court has to be
called upon if a panel of this court wants to dissent
from a decision, which Involved a question of law,
given by another panel of the court. High authority
is accorded to the opinions of scholars, set forth In
textbooks, commentaries, pamphlets, periodicals etc.
This is the reason why reference will be made here to
the opinion of eminent scholars.
15. Prof, Nipperdey is of the opinion that sometimes
organisations which have only self-employed persons
as members are organisations within the meaning of
the article. He cites as an example the Health
Service Loctors Association. See Hueck-hipperdey,
Lehrbuch des vrbeit erecht« vol. II, 5th ed., p.478,
coiaraent 24a.
- 83 -
agreements but it is not a must for the purpose of the
1 0
article. It is up to the organisation to decide whether
it wishes to do so or not. It is true that nowadays an
organisation which as a matter of principle refuses to
conclude collective agreements cannot be very influential.
Public officials* unions are not permitted to conclude
17
collective agreements, but the prevailing view is that
they are organisations within the meaning of Art.9(3).
Then there are the top organisations. By s.2 of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement Statute (Tarifvertragsgesetz)
top organisations are only allowed to conclude collective
agreements if there is a provision to that effect in their
18
by-laws. Very often there is no such provision in
the by-laws for example In the by-laws of the Federation
19
of German Trade Unions (DGB) there is no such provision
but it is nevertheless considered an organisation within
the meaning of Art.9(3).
16. See Nikisch, Arbeit srecht. Vol.II, 2nd ed., 1959,
(hereinafter cited as Nikisch II) p.12; Bettermatm-
;»ipperdey-scheuner, Die Grandrechte. (H&ndbuch dor
Theorie und Praxis der Grundrechte), Drifter Band,
1. Halbband (hereinafter cited as Dietz, die
Gruiidrechte Ixl/l), p.443. For a different view
see Iluber, i'irtschaftsverwaltungsreoht.. Vol. IX,
2nd ed., 1954, (hereinafter cited as liuber II) p.376;
Dersch-Volkaar, Kommentar zua Arbeitsgerlchtseesetz
6th ed., 1955, s.10 comment 5b hh; Hueck-Nipperdey II,
p.75; Hueck-Nipperdey-Tophoven, 3rd ed., 1955,
iariIvortrags^esetz. s.2 comment 32 ff.
17. The service conditions of public officials are governed
by public law. See Art.33(5) of the Basic Law.
18. The Collective Bargaining Agreement- Statute was passed
in 1949 and amended in 1952. Federations of trade
unions ana fenerations of employers' associations are
called top organisations (Spitzenorgauisationen).
19. Practically all trade unions are concentrated in the
Federation of German Trade Unions (Deutscher
uewerkschaftsbund) and in the Federation of White Collar
Workers (Deutsche Angestelltengetferksehaft). There are
a few splinter groups.
A controversial point is whether an organisation
which as a matter of principle renounces the use of
economic weapons or which is prohibited to employ them
toy law is an organisation for the purposes of the article.
Prof. Nipperdey used to be of the opinion that the use
of economic weapons is an essential requirement but
lately has changed his view. He maintains that nowadays
trade unions have advanced to such a stage and are such
a powerful factor in the social and econosaic life of the
nation that one can presume that they are capable of
pursuing their members' interests without resorting to
20
economic weapons, T«is seems a realistic view. It
is generally accepted that public officials' unions are
organisations within the meaning of the article despite
21
the fact that they are not permitted to strike.
2, Organisations in which both employees and employers
are organised are not organisations within the meaning
of Art.9(3) even if their aim is the protection and the
improvement of working and economic conditions.
20. See iiueck-Nipperdey II, p.77, and comment 38
concerning s.2 of the Collective Bargaining Statute;
Nikisch II, P«13; Schnorr EdA 1953 p.377, 1955, p.6;
Meissinger, lieliefbild des Arbeitsrecht. 1952,
(hereinafter cited as Heliefbild) p.65. Cf. huber II,
p. 375.
21. A public official is not allowed to strike and
participate in a slow-down because he owes a special




3, The social partners" must be financially and
23
otherwise completely independent of one another. "
4. An organisation should under no circumstances be
dependent on the State. The basic right of freedom to
organise first of all guarantees a status libertat is.
Freedom to organise is primarily concerned with protection
against the State. An organisation which is controlled
by the State is not an organisation within the meaning
O
of Art.9(3). This does not mean, however, that the
State by enacting laws, through the proper channels, is
not allowed to exercise an influence on the activities
of an organisation.
Opinions are divided as to whether an organisation
must also be free from control by political parties and
25
the Church. Nipperdey is of the opinion that organisations
22. Nowadays in the Federal Republic trade unions and
employers* associations are considered partners.
They are called social partners because they co-operate
in many spheres, e.g. they set norms for a whole
industry by collective agreements. It is true that
the law looks on them as partners but nevertheless
the term seems unsuitable. Their interests are not
the same but rather opposing. In a full employment
situation these interests are apt to clash less,
employers and the representatives of labour are able
to find a solution whicu satisfies both parties, but
even then the expression seems inappropriate.
23. This harmonizes with Convention 98, Art.2 of the
I.L.O. which the Federal Republic ratified in 1955.
See post, p.208 footnote 25.
24. See Nikisch ll, p.9; Huber II, p.369; Dietz,
Die hrundrechte 111/1t p»435.
25. According to Prof, Dietz religious and political
neutrality is not a requirement. See Dietz, Pie
druadrechte III/I, pp.434 f., Dietz-hikiseh, Kommentar
zum Arbeit st. ericht sgesetz. 1954, (hereinafter cited
as Dietz-Nikiseh) comment 47 concerning s.10 of the
Labour Court Statute; Herschel liABI 1950, p.378.
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which are controlled by political parties or the Church
are not organisations witnin tae meaning of the article."
By control he means tnat organisations should not take
27
instructions from a political party or the Church,
According to Nipperdey party or church attachments hear
the risk that they might become an important objective
28
of the organisations. He believes that in their
activities organisations may be led by a certain ideology
or by economic and social principles; provided a decision
on a democratic basis, has been taken by them and the
particular political party, to whose views they adhere,
29
has not been banned. For exa.apie the Christian unions
are organisations within the meaning of Art.9(3).
26. oee liueck-Nipperdey II, p. 69 and comment So
concerning s.2 Collective Agreement Statute;
Meissinger, Eeliefbild pp.23 f. and p. 58. Schnorr
RdA 1955, p.6.
27. See Mueck-Nipperdey II, p.296.
28. Bearing in mind the events of the thirties this
view seems reasonable especially as regards
employers* associations to which Art.9(3) applies
as well.
29. The Communist party is banned in the Federal
Republic but allowed to operate in W. Berlin.
The federation of Herman Trade Unions (PUB) has
generally a non-committal attitude towards religious
and political matters. This is desirable or even
necessary since it is interested that employees
belonging to various parties and confessions
suould join the trade unions which are affiliated
to it.
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5« Organisations of employees which are confined to
a specific company, the so-called Werkvereine, are not
On
organisations within the meaning of Art,9(3), If
an enterprise is a special economic branch, exception
to this rule is allowed. For example, employees of the
railways and postal services are organised in the Railway
31Union" and Postal and Telegraph iforkers* Union
respectively, and these unions are considered organisations
within the meaning of the article.
How did this requirement cotse about? It seems
because of historical reasons. To begin with employees
organised on a craft-wiae basis and later on an industry¬
wide basis, A group of jurists led by the President of
the Bavarian Labour Court has added another requirement,
namely that the union must be organised along industrial
lines, which is the present dominant pattern of union
32
organisation. This view, however, has been generally
rejected.
30. See Hueck-Nipperdey II,pp.69 f; Dietz-Nifciseh,
comment 43 concerning s.10 of the Labour Court
Statute, Ruber, however, is of the opinion that
company unions if they fulfill the other requirements
are organisations within the meaaing of Art.9(3).
See Huber II, pp.370 f.
31. Tae Railway Union takes in administrative, operating
and maintenance employees of the railroads. Since
the railroads are state-owned it might seem more
appropriate to add the railroad employees to the
medley jurisdiction of the Public Service, Transport
and Traffic Union. For a short period railroad
employees belonged to the Public Services Union but
quickly fought their way out. The reason for that
was the employees in that branch insisted on separate
recognition of their position in society,
32. See decision of the Bavarian Labour Court, LAG Bayern,
AP 50 Nr. 1 and AP 53 Nr. 150. Cf. the decision of




la the Works Council statute" a distinction is
expressly made between the collective agreement aad the
contract like agreement entered into between the works
council and the employer.
The ban on company organisations does not mean,
however, that the organisation has to be affiliated to
the top organisation.
34
6. Membership in the organisation must- be voluntary.
If the state were to compel employees to form an
organisation or to join an existing organisation by
enacting laws, even through the proper channels, or
otherwise this would constitute a clear violation of
Art.9(3).35>36
Act hoc organisations as long as they fulfill the
other requirements are organisations for the purposes of
the article. It is not necessary for a combination of
employees whose aim is to safeguard aad to improve working
ana economic conditions to be a permanent organisation.
33. Passed by the Bundestag in 1952.
34. For compulsory unionism see post, pp.171 ff.
35. The same applies to employers' associations.
Where the state forces employers to join a certain
organisation it is not an organisation within the
meaning of the article.
36. Prof. Nikisch is of the opinion that this would be
Incompatible with the social state principle which
is pronounced in the Basic Law. See Nikisch II, p.6
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An organisation which is being formed in order to achieve
a single objective and then disbands if it has the essential
characteristics which the article requires is an
organisation for the purposes of the article. However,
they do not seem of great significance. Nowadays only
trade unions and employers' associations which are formed
on a permanent basis can effectively fulfil their mission
and play an important role in the economy of the nation,
8, An organisation within the meaning of Art,9(3) can
be a body corporate under private law or an unincorporated
society (Verein), bodies corporate under public law are
not organisations within the meaning of the article since
a body corporate under public law has to be recognised
by act of state (Staatsakt) and one of its features is
that it is placed under the supervision of the State.
A free representation of the interest of members comes to
nought if the State has the power to interfere. The
question arises whether the Artisan Guilds (Nandwerkerinnungen)
which are bodies corporate under public law, are
organisations within the meaning of the article, Nipperdey
is of the opinion that those guilds constitute an exception
to the rule since s.49(3) of the Artisan Order confers on
37
them collective bargaining capacity.
37. see Hueck-Nipperdey II, p.152, Prof. Dietz does
not consider the Artisan Guilds organisations within
the meaning of Art.9(3). He maintains that collective
bargaining capacity is not self evident but is specially
conferred on them. This had to be done since they
are not organisations within the meaning of the article.
See Dietz, Die Grundrechte ill/i, p.439,
90 "•
Prof. Dietz, however, is of the opinion that an
organisation which is a body corporate under public law
if it has the essential characteristics of an organisation
and members join it voluntarily, can also be an
organisation for the purposes of the article. Above all
38
its independence from the State must be guaranteed.
According to Prof. Nikisch corporate bodies under
public law may have the powers of organisations within
the meaning of Art.9(3) provided they possess the essential
characteristics which the article requires. The corporate
body must be founded voluntarily, there must not be any
compulsion to join and State supervision must be restricted
to a control of its legality so that it is able to further
the interests of its members quite independently. It
should be noted that Nikisch considers that corporate
bodies under public law, which have the essential
characteristics mentioned above, have the powers of an
organisation like an organisation within the meaning of
Art.9(3), whilst Dietz considers them in fact organisations
39
within the meaning of the article*
The characteristics enumerated above are exhaustive.
More requirements cannot be deraanded, Under certain
circumstances, however, the requirements may be modified.
38. See Dietz, Die Orundrechte IIl/l,pp.438 f.
39, See Dietz-Nikisch comment 50 concerning s.10, and
comment 52, concerning s.ll of the Labour Court Statute.
See also Huber II, p.373
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Sometimes the absence of certain characteristics, or
soiae aspects of these, occurs because there is a law
as a result of which an organisation is deprived of a
certain characteristic or some aspects of it. For
example it follows from Art.33 of the Basic Law that
puulic officials are not allowed to strike and to conclude
collective agreements, nevertheless the public officials
unions are considered organisations within the meaning
of Art.9(3).
Art,18 of the Basic Law provides, among other things,
that wuoever abuses the rights guaranteed in Art.9 in
order to attack the free democratic basic order forfeits
this basic right. The forfeiture and its extent are
40
pronounced by the Federal Constitutional Court, In
19S2 the Federal Constitutional Court held in a decision
that "free democratic basic order" means an order which
prevents the occurrence of any despotism by establishing
a system that limits state power by the rule of law; it-
gives the nation the right to determine its own polity
by the will of the majority of the people. Moreover
41
it means freedom and equality.
It should be noted that different provisions of the
Basic Law apply when a political party is unconstitutional.
40. See ss.36 ff. of the Federal Constitutional Court
Statute.
41. This is not a literal translation. The present
writer hopes that she managed to convey the meaning
of the concept as the court had it in raind. See
BverfUE 2, 1 (Leitsatz 2) 12 f.
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By Art.21(2) of the Basic Law parties which by reason
of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents,
seek to impair or destroy the free democratic basic
order or to endanger the existence of the Federal
Republic of Germany are unconstitutional. The Federal
Constitutional Court decides on the question of
unconstitutionality.
It has been mentioned that organisations in order
to be organisations within the meaning of the article
must have certain characteristics; the aim of the
organisation must be the protection and the improvement
of working and economic conditions. A combination of
persons which has, for example, one of the following
objectives: to commit crimes, to abolish the rule of
law and social order, to establish communist or fascist
state unions, to set aside the law of collective
bargaining or law of arbitration and conciliation which
is at the time in force, clearly is not an organisation
within the meaning of Art.9(3) and thus the article
does not afford protection.
42. This is the view of Nipperdey. See Iiueck-Nipperdey II,
p.95. Of. Mangoldt-Klein comment VI (towards the
end) concerning Art.9.
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Nikisch is of the opinion that freedom to organise
43
is a subdivision of freedom to associate, and therefore
the provisions of Art,9(2) of the Basic Law apply to
freedom to organise as well. Art,9(2) of the Basic Law
44
provides that associations, the objects or activities
of which conflict with the criminal laws or which are
directed against the constitutional order or the concept
of international understanding are prohibited.
Associations which are prohibited under Art,9, subsection 2,
can be dissolved administratively. Nikiseh considers
45
Kipperdey*s solution inadequate in a number of situations.
43, Freedom to associate is guaranteed in Art,9(1) of the
Basic Law, Nikisch sees the protection against private
forces (Privaten iaechten), which obviously is guaranteed
in Art,9(3), as an additional guarantee which applies
to freedom to organise only but otherwise considers it
part and parcel of freedom to associate, Be sees
special significance in the facts that the two freedoms
are embodied in the same article and that Art,18 Basic
Law, which deals with the forfeiture of basie rights
speaks about freedom to associate in general and no
distinction is made between freedom to associate and
freedom to organise. See Nikisch II, pp.21 f. For
the same view see Wernicke, Bonner Komm., comment II 3,
v, Mangoldt-Klein, comment VI, Many eminent scholars
do not share this view. The latter maintain that trade
unions and employers* associations have a special task
namely the protection and improvement of working and
economic conditions and therefore are not associations
within the meaning of Art,9(1), It is known they say
that freedom to organise was put in the same article
because the parliamentary committee had decided not
to have a special part in the Constitution dealing
exclusively with social basic rights. Accordingly
Art,9(2) does not apply to freedom to organise. See
Hueck-Nipperdey II, pp. 54 f., Kaskel-Derseh 5th ed,,
p,2 79j Huber II, p.381; Schuorr, RdA 1955, p.4;
Kastner, Arbur 1953, p,163. It is interesting to note
that in the Convention of Human Rights (of 4th November
1950) the rights are not mentioned separately. See
Art,11 of the Convention.
44. The term includes, according to him, organisations which
are organisations within the meaning of Art,9(3),
45, See ante, p.93.
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For example, there are organisations which have as their
object the protection and improvement of working and
economic conditions but which use illegal means to achieve
the object and their activities are contrary to the
provisions of the criminal law. He maintains that in
such cases 9(2) is not superfluous. He draws attention
to the fact that during the Weimar Republic organisations
which were hostile towards the democratic order and aimed
at its overthrow were recognised as organisations for
collective bargaining purposes if they recognised the law
of collective bargaining and the law of arbitration and
conciliation as binding for a transitional period only.46
46. See Nikisch, II, pp.27 f.
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Chapter 6
Tne iiight to Strike and to boycott. and its Limitations
by Law in the Federal Republic of Germany
The Basic Eight to strike
Art.9(3) of the Basic Law guarantees to the individual
the right to form and to join organisations1 for the
purpose of protecting and improving working and economic
conditions* but the right to engage in economic warfare,
i.e. to strike to boycott and to lockout, is not guaranteed
in the article.
A number of scholars are of the view that freedom
to organise includes freedom to strike and that therefore
it is not specially mentioned in Art.9(3), Dietz is
g
strongly opposed to that view. He maintains that
freedom to strike is not guaranteed by the Constitution
as can be learned from the fact that there was never any
doubt that soldiers, judges and other public officials
are not allowed to strike. Freedom to organise is
guaranteed to all professions, thus if freedom to organise
were to include freedom to strike they would be permitted
to strike. Moreover, it is known that originally the
Parliamentary Committee meant- to insert an article in
1. It- is now generally accepted that Art.9(3) of the
Basic Law also guarantees to the organisation as such
the right "to exist and to function".
2. See yeissinger, deliefbild. pp.186 f. and also the
decisions of the Bavarian Labour Court, Official
Gazette (Amtsblatt) 1953, C 77, 165; 1954 C 101, 153.
3. See Dietz, Die Grundrechte IIl/l, pp.462 f.
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4
the Basic Law guaranteeing freedom to strike, and it
was only later decided not to have freedom to strike
guaranteed by the Basic Law because of the trade unions'
insistence that only such strikes as have the support
5
of the union should be guaranteed.
If freedom to strike was also guaranteed in Art.9(3)
agreements which restrict or seek to hinder this right
would be null and void and measures directed to this end
would be illegal. This would certainly lead to a number
of very undesirable results. For example the relative
0
peace obligation, which every collective agreement has
as an implied condition, would be null and void. Thus
the collective agreement would be deprived of one of its
4. In a number of Laender freedom to strike is guaranteed
by the Constitution but there it is a special basic
right mentioned in a separate article. See the
constitutions of Bremen, Art.51(3): Hesse Art.29(4)
and western Berlin, Art,18(3).
5. The majority of the committee was against the trade
unions enjoying a special legal position and above
all it was found impossible to demarcate the official
strike from the unofficial strike in the concise form
required by a constitutional provision. Of. Jahrbuch
des Oeffentlichen uechts (Year Book of Public Law)
new series, vol.1 concerning Art.9 Basic Law.
6. A relative peace obligation is an undertaking by the
parties not to resort during the currency of the
agreement to strike or lockout for the sake of changing
the terms agreed upon, whereas an absolute peace
obligation is an undertaking by the parties altogether
not to resort to strike or lockout during the currency
of an agreement. An absolute peace obligation must
by express provision be introduced into the agreement.
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essential purposes. The relative peace obligation
enabled to a considerable extent Modern industrial
relations to arrive at their present state. Furthermore,
any counter Measure taken by an employer, or an employers'
association, for inducing a union to end a strike would
7
be illegal. All this seems to indicate that the makers
of the Basic Law could not have possibly meant to protect
the right to strike in the same way as the right to
organise has been protected. It is generally accepted
that the right to strike is not guaranteed by the Basic
@
Law. Accordingly freedom to strike may be restricted
by ordinary law, i.e. by statute.
7. For instance a lockout as a counter measure to a
strike. If such counter measures were prohibited
it would not be an undesirable thing. Most aspects
of economic warfare seem to be regulated by law and
here suddenly a great deal of undesirable freedom is
enjoyed. Bee post, p.106
8, See v. Mangoidt, AoR (Records of Public Law) Vol.75,
p.287 comment 4, section 5, concerning Art.9 Basic Law;
Mangoldt-Klein, comment VII concerning Art.9 Basic Law;
Wernicke, Bonner Kommentar, comment II 3d; Nipperdey,
a legal opinion given in connection with the newspaper
strike. Heft 9 der Schriftenreihe der Bundesvereinigung
tier Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbaende, 1953, (hereinafter
cited as Kipperdey Eechtsgutachten); Forsthoff, a
lefeal opinion; Mbie politischen Streikaktionen ties BOB usw"
Heft 6 der schriftenreihe der Bundesvereinigung der
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbaende, 1952, pp. 10 f;
Huber II, p.393. The Federal Labour Court is of the
same opinion see its decision of the 28th Jan. 1955, S.X,
291 - At Nr.l concerning Art.9 Basic Law. For a
different opinion see the following articles in trade
union periodicals - Buehrig, Mitteilungen des Wirtschaft
Wissenscnaftlichen Institute der Gewerksehaften (1954)




Strikers and trade unions may incur tortious
liability if the strike is "socially inadequate"
(sozialiuadaequat).
S«823(l) of the Civil Code provides that Ma person
injured by a wilful or negligent act by means of which
the right to freedom from violence, the right to health,
and right to liberty, the right to ownership or other
rights existing besides these is infringed is entitled
to compensation from the wrongdoer." It is recognised
tuat only absolute rights are protected by the section.
It is important to note that the section speaks
of "other rights" (sonstiges Recht) besides the specific
rights which are enumerated in the section. Various
rights are consiuered as "other rights" within the
meaning of the section such as patent right and within
very narrow limits the existence of an absolute right in
tne continued existence of an established business.
1. In German the right is stated as "Das Recht auf
ungestoerte Ausuebung eines eingerichteten
Gewerbebetriebs.* The above translation has been
taken from the Manual of German Law. See g. J. Conn,
Civil Law. Manual of German Law, (published by
21..a. Stationery Office]^ Vol.I, p.lol. The translation
is not a literal translation, it is extremely difficult
to translate with precision this legal rule. A
lock-out may be a violation of the employees1 right
to work which is also regarded as an "other right"
within the meaning of s.823(1). "Eight to work" is
not meant here in the American sense but the right of
an employee to keep his job.
2. Of. the decision of the Federal Court in civil matter
3/278, Bfc 1959, p.171.
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As a result of a strike the existence of an
established business is endangered. A business is
affected in many ways if its employees are out on strike
and wnen it lasts over a considerable time. For example
in a factory production comes partially or completely to
a standstill; the employer is not in a position to
deliver goods or material to customers as promised and
thus may lose customers. Accordingly a strike gives
rise to a claim for compensation unless there is
justification or the defendant did not act wilfully or
3)4^
negligently.v' ' A strike is only justified if it is
socially adequate.^
The question arises what is meant by, and when is
a strike deemed to be socially adequate. The following
rules have been laid down regarding the social adequacy
of strikes.
1. Only strikes which are directed against employers
or their organisations for the purpose of settling
working conditions are socially adequate. Moreover
the struck employer or his organisation must be capable
of complying with the demands made by the Union.
3. For the meaning of wilfully or negligently see post, p.111.
4. The doctrine was first fashioned by Prof* Hueck and
Prof. Nipperdey in two separate legal opinions given
in connection with the Newspaper strike in 1952. The
principle underlying the doctrine has been accepted by
the Federal Labour Court and the Laender Labour Courts.
5. See Bulla, KdA 1962, pp.6 ff.
6. however, working conditions in a broad sense. The
term in this context covers many topics.
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Thus a strike which has a political objective is never
socially adequate; the struck employer or his organisation
7
is not in a position to comply with such demands. But
a sympathetic strike which is in support of a socially
adequate strike is considered socially adequate. It is
important to note that, the strike must be in support of
a strike which is socially adequate. Such strikes are
permissible because the secondary employer will be in
most cases in a position to exercise some influence on
the primary eiaployer. It is a labour dispute, and not
a dispute vrhere objectives not directly concerning labour
relations are being sought. However, sympathetic strikes
are unpermissible if they are unethical from a social
point of view,
2, The parties to the dispute must have collective
bargaining capacity. Only where the strike has the
support of a trade union, which has the capacity to
conclude collective agreements and which can be a party
7a
in conciliation procedures, is it socially adequate.
On the employers• side an individual employer, several
employers, an employers* association, or a federation of
employers' associations can be a party to a collective
7. However, where a general strike is called because the
government infringes the Constitution, or the measures
which it employs are unconstitutional the strike may
oe lawful. In such cases the strikers have a right
to strike; it is considered above the law. See
iiueck-Nipperaey, druatiribs des Arbeit-srecht s, 2nd ed,,
p.263,
7a, See the decisions of the Federal Labour Court BAG
At Nr.l and 4 concerning Art.9 Basic Law, economic
Warfare (Arbeitskampf)
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agreement whilst on the etaployees* side a trade union
or a federation of trade unions can be a party to a
g
collective agreement. In order to have collective
bargaining capacity a trade union must be an organisation
9
within the meaning of Art.9(3) and be willing to
conclude collective agreement. There are organisations
which are organisations within the meaning of Art.9(3)
but the law prohibits them to conclude collective
bargaining agreement;*0 naturally such organisations
have no collective bargaining capacity. It is important
to note that a Works* Council has no collective bargaining
capacity. Moreover by s.49(l) of the horks' Council
Statute the works' council is not allowed to call a
strike. This does not mean, however, that the members
of a works' council are not allowed to participate in a
strike called by a union. Strikes of individual
employees or groups of employees are socially inadequate.
In other words this rule outlaws all unofficial strikes.
It should be noted that it is not absolutely
necessary that to begin with the strike has the support
of a union. An unofficial strike becomes socially
adequate once the union agrees to it and is ready to go
8. See s.2 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement Statute.
9. The same applies to employers' associations. For
organisations within the meaning of Art.9(3)
see ante, pp.82 ff.
10. Unions of public officials are prohibited by law to
conclude collective agreements. See ante, p.84.
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on with it.**
3. The objective of the strike must be of such a nature
that it can be a topic for collective bargaining
negotiations. Thus a strike which has for an objective
the conclusion of a collective agreement is socially
adequate. This does not mean that the objective must
be solely confined to matters relating to the contents,
conclusion and termination of the contract of employments;
there are other matters which can be regulated in a
collective agreement. For example a strike which has
for an objective the reinstatement of certain employees
will be in general socially adequate. However, a strike
which has as an objective the paysient of wages above the
collective wage is socially inadequate. It is a matter
which has to be arranged between the parties to the
12
agreement. So will a strike which has for an objective
a closed shop arrangement. In the Federal Republic a
X 3
closed shop clause in a collective agreement is unlawful,
therefore, it cannot possibly be a topic for collective
bargaining negotiations.
11. see the decision of the Federal Labour Court
LAG Ai' hr.3 concerning Art.9 Basic Law, Economic
warfare (Arbeitsicasapf).
12. Moreover in sucu cases the trade union which calls
or supports the strike can be sued for breach of
the peace obligation and the so-called obligation
to implement, the current collective agreement.
See post, p.117.
13. See post, p.175 footnote 25.
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4. Strikes which underline the fundamental principles
of collective labour law are socially inadequate. For
example a strike which has an objective that a collective
14
agreement should not be extended to other undertakings
or that wages should be regulated between each individual
15
employee and the employer and not on a collective basis
is of such a nature that it undermines the funaassental
principles of collective labour law.
5. The strike liust be the "ultima ratio". Where
there is a breach of the ultima ratio rule the strike
is socially inadequate. This provokes the question
what is meant by the ultima ratio rule. A union is
16
only allowed to resort to strike action after all
attempts to reach a peaceful settlement have failed.
This does not merely mean that the parties to the dispute,
on their own, failed to reach a settlement but also that
conciliation proceedings (sehliehtungsverfabren) before
a conciliation board have proved unsuccessful.
Arrangements for bringing disputes before a conciliation
board are usually made by collective agreement or specific
14. For "the extension of a collective agreement" see
an article in English by Th. Rauim entitled Collective
Agreements in Germany in Labour haw in Europe with
Special deference to the Common Market, p.ll, ~
section IV (International and Comparative Law Quarterly,
Supplementary publication No.5, 1962).
15. See the decision of the Federal Labour Court BAG,
AP Nr.2 concerning Art.9, Basic Law. Economic warfare
(Arbeitskampf)•
16. The same applies to other types of economic warfare,
e.g. lock-out.
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conciliation agreements. The state also provides
conciliation boards but it is important to note that in
the Federal Itepublic there is no compulsory conciliation.
In cases where the objective of the strike can be attained
by instituting legal proceedings against the other party
to the dispute the strike is unlawful. In other wor^s
the strike is not the ultima ratio. For example where
a measure was employed by an employer which restricts
employees in the exercise of the right to organise an
17
action has to be lodged before the appropriate court,
and a strike which has as an objective the undoing of
this evil is unlawful,
6. A strike which is conducted in an unfair manner is
socially inadequate. It is obvious where the organisers
of the strike tolerate or employ violence the strike is
socially inadequate. Also where false, misleading or
inciting information is being given the strike becomes
18
unfair and thus socially inadequate. However, in
judging the unfairness of an activity a certain latitude
is allowed ana the strike is only socially inadequate
if it goes too far. Where a great deal of damage is
caused by the strike which stands in no proportion to
the objective which the strikers or organisers seek to
achieve the strike is socially inadequate.
17. It should be noted that in such cases it is the
individual employee who has a cause of action.
See post, pp.167 ff.
18. It Is similar to what in Britain comes under the
heading of unlawful means, but it is not identical
with it. For the law in Britain see ante, p.17.
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Strikes in public utility undertakings such as hospitals
or transport services, if no emergency service has been
provided, are considered socially inadequate.
7. Finally, it is important to note that where the
employer locks out employees and the lock-out is socially
inadequate, a strike ealleo as a counter measure is
socially adequate in spite of the fact that the objective
of the strike is not a topic for collective bargaining
negotiations.
Reinstatement of Strikers
where the strike is unlawful the employer has the
right to dismiss suraraarily the employees who participate
19
in the strike.
Employees who participate in a lawful strike cannot
be dismissed summarily or otherwise for breach of contract
and they have to be reinstated, however, the employer
has a right to lock-out the strikers and those who were
willing to work as well regardless of whether the strike
20
is lawful or not. The reinstatement of employees
who lost their jobs through a lock-out is at the discretion
of the employer unless there is a clause in the collective
agreement in which arrangements have been made for such
eventualities. Thus unions have to be careful to ensure
19, For compensation see post, pp.111 ff.
20, See decisions of the Federal Labour Court B&d AT Nr.1,
6 and 9 concerning Art.9 Basic Law. Economic Warfare
(Arbeitskarapf). » -«
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that an adequate clause is inserted in the agreement*
In a country where the right to strike has been so
restricted it seems harsh and inequitable that strikers
should not have a right of reinstatement where the strike
is lawful. Nowadays there are plenty of jobs available
and the harshness of the rule might not be felt but what
about employees who do not like to change jobs?
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ticketink
In the Federal Republic picketing might take place
in connection with a strike but independent picketing
is unknown.
Picketing is lawful as long as the pickets peacefully
persuade nonstrikiag employees or replacements to abstain
from working. But where pickets by unlawful threats of
violence prevent nonstriking employees or replacements
from entering the picketed plant and such acts are
tolerated or orders given to this effect by the strike
organisers, the whole strike, and this includes the
picketing, becosaes socially inadequate. However, if
these acts are committed without the consent of the strike
organisers the lawfulness of the strike and the picketing
is unaffected. By ss.823(1) and (2) of the Civil Code
the nonstriking eiaployees or replacements have a cause
of action against the pickets who actually have committed
the unlawful acts.
It is unlawful for pickets to prevent the delivery
of goods and raw materials to ana from the place which
is picketed. In such cases the pickets can be sued by
the employer for the resultant damage.1 The same applies
to the union if such acts are tolerated or orders to
that effect are given by it.
1. Cf• decision of the Lanu Labour Court in Hannover,
BB 1956, p.924; Hueck-Nipperdey II, p.654.
™ 1OS ""
Boycott
Nowadays boycotts occur very infrequently and if
they take place it is in support of a strike. As regards
the permissibility of boycotts the Supreme Labour Court
during the Weimar Kepublic in a judgment delivered in
1928 laid down certain rules which still find application.
According to that judgment the boycott in general is not
unlawful provided there is a labour dispute.1 The court
said that a boycott is uniawful in any of the following
instances : (i) where the objective and the means
2
employed are contra bonos mores or contrary to a provision
3
of law, (ii) where the boycott is not. the ultima ratio.
1. The expression "labour dispute" is meant here in the
literal sense.
2. S.826 of the Civil Code provides that "an unlawful
act done wilfully by means of which damage is done
to another in a manner contra bonos mores gives rise
to a claim for compensation.
The damage must have been caused wilfully
(vorsaetzlich). A person acts wilfully if he is
conscious of the illegality of his conduct and its
damaging effect. It is not necessary, however, that
the defendant was conscious of having acted immorally,
nor is knowledge of the kind or the amount of the
probable damage required.
The expression contra bonos mores (gegen die
guten Sitten) is not defined in the Civil Code. The
Eeioh Court and the Belch Labour Court laid down
certain rules when an act or omission is considered
contra bonos mores in labour disputes. See BAG AES 1,
p. 100; BAG AKS 2, p. 217; BAG AES 5, p. 253; BAG AES 7,
p.404; BAG ABS 10, p.100.
It is not easy to succeed in an action under
s.826 and the plaintiff will find it easier to establish
the requirements under s.823(1). For s.823(1) see supra.
See also an article by Schnorr in BdA 1955, p.223,
The rules of social adequacy might be more suitable
where the issue is whether a strike or a boycott is
lawful or not but these rules certainly impose more
restrictions on the right to strike or to boycott than
does s.326 of the Civil Code.
3. For the ultima ratio rule see ante, pp.104 f.
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The employer or the secondary employer has a cause
of action under s. 823(1) of the Civil Code if the right
to the continued existence of its business has been
violated,4 Where the boycott is socially adequate no
5
action lies*
4, For further details about the right see ante, pp.99 f
5, The rules of social adequacy apply to the right to
boycott as well. The rules are discussed on pp.100
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Compensation
By s#823(1) of the Civil Code a person who, wilfully
or negligently, injures unlawfully the life, body, health,
freedom, property or any other right of another person is
1
bound to compensate him for any damage arising therefrom.
One of "the other rights" within the meaning of the section
is the right to the continued existence of an established
2
business. Where there is a strike or a boycott there
may be a violation of this right. The plaintiff must
prove that the defendant has acted wilfully or negligently,
but this task is greatly facilitated by the general rules
of probability and of prima facie evidence. Wilful
(Vorsatz) means that the defendant was conscious of the
illegality of his conduct and its damaging effect whilst
negligence (Fahrlaessigkeit) means that he should have
been conscious of it. Another requirement is that the
injury must have been caused unlawfully. This means
that the injury must not have been rendered lawful by
one of the various grounds which may justify the
defendants act. If the defendant can prove that the
objective of the strike or boycott, or act or omission
which were done in connection with it, are socially
1. The defendant has to compensate the plaintiff for
the whole damage which was caused by his tortious
act. German law does not know exemplary damages.
This is the reason why the term "compensation" and
not "damages" is used here.
2. For further details see ante, pp.99 f.
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3
adequate no action lies. Thus when employees go on
strike or refuse to handle goods it is almost taken for
granted that their acts and the acts of the organisers
of the strike or boycott amount to negligence and it is
up to the union and the employees who are involved to
prove that the strike or boycott was socially adequate.
The question arises whether the union is liable for
the acts of the organisers of the strike or boycott and
for the acts of individual employees who participate in
them#
By s.31 of the Civil Code a body corporate under
private law is liable for torts committed by its board,
a member of the board, or other statutory representatives,
provided that the act or the omission was done in the
exercise of its or his official duties. Most unions
are, however, unincorporated societies. It is now
generally accepted that s.31 finds application to
4
unincorporated societies as well.
It is sometimes difficult to determine who is a
special representative within the meaning of s.30 of the
Civil Code. The prevailing view is that a special
representative is a person who has been empowered, either
3. The rules governing "social adequacy" are discussed
in detail on pp.100 ff.
4. See iSfikiscu, II, p. 188; Denecke BB 1959, p.637
Forsthoff-Mueck, Rechtsgutachten (legal opinion),
Heft 6 der Sehriftenreihe der Bundesvereinigung der
Beutschen Arbeitgeberverbaende, 1952, p.48, and the
decision of the Lana Labour Court in Frankfurt/Main,
RdA 1950, p.427.
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by the board or under its by-laws (satzung), to engage
in certain transactions, provided the manner of performance
of such transactions is at the representative's own
discretion. Not only an incorporated society but also
an unincorporated society is liable for torts committed
by a special representative. The society is liable for
bis act as if it was its own act and cannot escape liability
by proving certain facts as is possible under s.831 of
the Civil Code.0
For other persons the union may be liable under s.831.
S.831 provides that "a person who employs another on any
kind of work must, compensate any third party for damage
unlawfully inflicted upon him by his employee in the course
of his employment, unless he can prove : that he applied
the degree of diligence usual under the circumstances in
the selection of the employee or that the damage
would have arisen notwithstanding the application of the
proper degree of diligence on his part." Thus under this
section the union may escape liability.
The union is, therefore, responsible for the torts
of the organisers of a strike or boycott if they are special
representatives within the meaning of s.30. If they are
not special representatives the union is responsible for
thea under s.831.
Under s.831 the union may be responsible for a person
who has been asked by its board or other statutory
representative to perform a single task, for exaraple, for
pickets who have been asked to distribute literature.
5. For s.831 see below.
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Moreover, besides the union, individual persons who
participate in a strike or a boycott which is socially
iaauequate incur liability provided they have acted
wilfully or negligently#
There may also be a cause of action under s.823(2)
of the Civil Code. This section provides that a person
who violates a statutory provision intended for the
protection of others, is liable to pay compensation for
any damage arising from the violation. Among the laws
for the protection of others are many sections of the
renal Code but there are also other statutory provisions
which are considered laws for the protection of others.
The plaintiff is only entitled to coapensation if the
|
defendant acted wilfully or negligentiyJ even in cases
where the specific statutory provision (intended for the
protection of others) can be violated without this requirement.
Any of t ie following sect ions of the Penal Code is
sometimes contravened in connection with a strike or boycott :
SS.185 ff. defamation and trespass to the person
(Beleidigung)|
s.123 trespass, breaking into a dwelling house
without intent to commit a felony
(uausfriedensbruoh);
s.240 Intimidation, the offence is only commit ted
if the threat is actually carried out
(Noetigung);
s.223 ff. battery, causing grievous bodily harm
(Koerperverletsung);
s.125 breach of the peace (bandfrlodensbruch);
s.3o3 injury to property (saeubescliaedigung) •




if during a strike or a boycott a statutory provision
for the protection of others has been violated and there
is a danger that the unlawful act will be repeated a
preventive prohibitory action (vorbeugende Unterlassungsklage)
against the wrongdoers may be brought by the injured person.
It is not a requirement that the defendant has acted
wilfully or negligently. It should be noted that a
preventive prohibitory action can be brought even if an
7
action for compensation does not lie. It is not necessary,
in an action of this kind, that actual damage has been
caused by the violation; it suffices that damage is
S
imminent if there is a continuance of the unlawful act.
9
On application a court may enjoin the unlawful activity.
Where the strike or boycott is socially inadequate
a prohibitory action (Unterlassungsklage) lies and also
here the injured person can petition the court for
injunctive relief. Also in this type of action there is
no need to prove that the defendant acted wilfully or
negligently.
7. If the defendant acted wilfully or negligently an
action for compensation can be brought but meanwhile
the plaintiff can avail himself of this remedy.
8. Cf. Palandt, Koanaentar zum buergerllchen tiesetabuch.
22nd ed., 1963 (hereinafter cited as Palandt)
Introduction to s.823 of the Civil Code, comment 8 b.
9. The Labour Court which has jurisdiction to deal with
the main action has also jurisdiction to issue an
injunction (Einstweilige Verfuegung). See s.937 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO). However, in urgent
cases the Municipal Court (Amtsgericht) can be
petitioned to enjoin the activity.
10. Cf. Palandt, Introduction to s.823, comraent 8 a.
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Contractual Liability
Employees who participate in a lawful strike without
X
giving proper notice are not guilty of breach of contract.
Thus their employer cannot sue thera for compensation.
However, the employer does not have to pay wages.
Where the strike is unlawful an employee who
participates in the strike is guilty of a breach of duty
arising under his contract of employment. If he acts
wilfully or negligently the employer can sue for specific
performance. But such a judgment cannot be executed since
an employee cannot be forced to perform services. However
the employer in anticipation of such eventuality, namely,
that the employee might not comply with the judgment, can
sue for compensation.
An employee who participates in a strike which is
2
contrary to a statutory provision acts contrary to
contract. If he knew about the illegality of the strike
or should have known about it he has to compensate his
o
employer for the damage caused by his stoppage of work.1'
Where the employer dismisses an employee summarily because
of nonperformance he can still be sued by his employer
for compensation under s.628(2) of the Civil Coae.
1. See the decision of the Feaeral Labour Court LAG AD No,
Economic Warfare (Arbeitskawpf).
2. For example where a works council calls a strike the
strike is contrary to a statutory provision. See s.49
of the Works Council Statute.
3. see ss.276 and 28o of the Civil Code and the decision
of the Federal Labour Court of 17th Dec., 1958.
See also an article by damps!, SdA 1958, p.449.
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The strikers are jointly and severally liable
(Oesamt schuldner) for the whole amount of the damage
caused by their collective action.°
As an implied condition every collective agreement
has a relative peace obligation and an obligation imposed
on the contracting parties tc see to it that the agreement
is implemented, A relative peace obligation is an
undertaking by the parties not to resort during the currency
of the agreement to strike or lockout for the sake of
changing the terms agreed upon. Thus where there is a
current collective agreement and the trade union calls a
strike it commits a breach of contract. Where there is
such breach the employer Is entitled to compensation from
the union.
It is important to note where an act or omission
gives rise to an action in tort and for breach of contract
it is up to the plaintiff to decide which claim he wishes
7
to raise.
4. This is the legal position despite the fact that
they have not a collective contract within the
meaning of s.427 of the Civil Code.
5. The right accrues from ss.830 and 840 of the Civil
Code because they acted jointly,
6. Where the employer is a party to the agreement it
is clear that he has a right to sue for breach of
contract. The question arises what is the position
where the agreement was concluded between an employers1
association and a union. The prevailing, view is that
rights derived from the collective agreement rest not
only in the association but also in its individual
members who, in the event of a violation of the peace
obligation are entitled to claim compensation for
breach of contract,
7. Of. Mi 88/433, 90/408.
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Comparisons and Conclusions
lie latino to Part 1
la the United States and the Federal Republic of
Uermany freedom to organise is guaranteed and protected
by the State. In the Federal Republic the interesting
observation can be made that employer practices to
discourage union membership are outlawed but the unions
are being deprived of the right to deal with these
probieias on their own. After 1959 a somewhat similar
tendency, of course to a much lesser extent, can be
noticed in the United States. On the face of it this
might seem desirable but a closer look may bring about
a change of mind.
It is a commonplace that a statut e or a constitutional
provision is incapable of embracing all situations.
Thus in practice in quite a number of instances the state
does not protect because the specific situation was not
envisaged and tue union cannot deal with it by resorting
to economic weapons, as the law prevents it from doing so.
Since 1959 organisational picketing has been outlawed
in the United States. Organisational picketing is
directed at employees and seeks to persuade them to join
a union. where a union iias been certified by the Board
or where the employer has entered into collective
bargaining negotiations with a union there may be a
justification for outlawing organisational picketing
because it is not any more a question of joining any union
but a certain union. But by outlawing all organisational
picketing the right to organise was restricted.
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There are still many firms where the employer is not
interested that his employees shoula join any union. The
employer has a precise knowledge of the provisions of the
iMIaiA regarding employer unfair labour practices and
therefore does not indulge in any forbidden practices.
But the employees know his attitude towards unions and
are eager to keep their jobs. Thus in a Board election
they vote that they do not want any union. In such cases
the union by picketing the plant could exert some pressure.
But since an election has been held they are not allowed
to do so, and the picketing will be enjoined. The union
is deprived of a means to effect unionisation. In the
United States the question of unionisation is of great
importance as a union can never succeed in an election
if it has not got sufficient members or adherents. If
the majority of the employees of the bargaining unit vote
against union representation no union is certified. This
is an example where the law has not envisaged all situations.
In the Federal Republic of Germany a strike which has
an objective that the employer should conclude a collective
agreement with a union is not unlawful.1 Thus also
picketing which is conducted in connection with it is not
unlawful. However, a strike for the purpose of effecting
unionisation is unlawful. it is not a matter which can
be regulated by a collective agreement; this would be a
i. Tiiis cau be allowed, as union rivalry has disappeared
in the Federal Republic. It is a way of making an
employer enter into collective bargaining negotiations.
There is no law forcing him to do so.
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2
violation of the negative side of freedom to organise.
In the Federal Republic strikes for the purpose of
protesting against measures employed by an employer
which restrict or seek to hinder employees in their right
to organise are unlawful. Such strikes would involve
a breach of the ultima ratio rule which lays down that
where legal redress is obtainable strike action is
prohibited.
In the United States a strike against an employer
unfair labour practice is permissible. Moreover,
employees participating in such strikes are entitled to
reinstatement with back pay. Even a strike in violation
of a no-strike clause in a collective agreement where it
is provoked by an employer unfair labour practice is
lawful and the provisions of the NLEA regarding 60-tiay
notice and cooling-off period do not apply.
Every year quite a number of unfair labour practice
strikes take place in the United States, and one wonders
why they occur. Is the machinery of the Board so slow
and inefficient that there is a need for such strikes
aid/or picketing? However, it was a wise step of Congress
not to outlaw such strikes and not to deprive labour of
its right to protest against prohibited conduct of this kind.
The policy of the Board and the courts to let strikes of
this nature enjoy a privileged position lends support to
the provisions of the KLKA proscribing employer practices
to discourage union membership.
2. For "the negative side of freedom to organise"
see post, pp.171 ff.
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In February 1965 a Royal Commission was appointed
in Great Britain. The terms of reference for the commission
are i "To consider relations between management and
employees and the role of trade unions and employers'
associations in promoting the interests of their members
and in accelerating the social and economic advance of
the nation with particular reference to the law affecting
the activities of these bodies .... "
Among the many problems with which the commission
will have to deal will be presumably the protection of
freedom to organise and to refrain from organising of
individual employees. It is anticipated that legislation
in this respect might be proposed. The present writer
ventures to say that the American example should not be
overlooked. Experience snows that administrative bodies
and law courts, however well they are organised, have not
got the ability to deal with all cases at once, and it is
natural that the parties immediately concerned feel an
urge to react. The law should not prevent them from
doing so. If the machinery dealing with these problems
is efficient strikes and picketing for the purpose of
protesting against employer practices to discourage union
membership will be very infrequent? but the law should
not intervene here. Freedom to organise involves more
than being protected by law.
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Chapter 7
protection of Freedom to Organise in the United States
j[j Protection against Interference, Restraint or Coercion
General Observations
5.8(a)(1) of the NLfiA is a broad general provision
which gives to employees and unions legal protection
against employer anti-union tactics. This section provides
that it shall be an unfair labour practice for an employer
to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in s.7 of the Act.*
Concrete acts which fall within the scope of the
section are espionage, blacklisting, promises to reward
employees who reject unionization, runaway shops, and in
general ail activities designed to obstruct or interfere
with free organisational activities.
It has been held by the Supreme Court that a
violation of section (2), (3), (4) or (5) of s.8(a) is
also a violation of s.8(a)(1).^^ It should be noted
that s.8(a)(l) may also be violated alone. In the first
years after the passage of the NLRA charges under s.8(a)(1)
1. For the provisions of s.7 see ante, p.3?.
2. See N'Li»hi v. Express Publishing Co.. 312 US 426 (1941).
3. 5.8(a)(2) outlaws company unions; see post III,
pp. 160 ff . S.8(a)(3) outlaws discriminatory
treatment of employees for the purpose of encouraging
or discouraging union membership; see post II, pp. 142 ff.
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were rarely eiacie. Only in later years when employers
began carefully to avoid specific acts mentioned in the
other sections the NLkB began to revert to it.
Espionage
Prior to the reforming legllslation of the 1930s
it was quite common for employers to engage labour spies,
who were often hired from detective agencies. These
spies infiltrated labour organisations and reported on
the agitators who were then discharged and blacklisted.
It is obvious that by enacting s.8(a)(1) Congress meant
to outlaw these practices. But apparently if an
employee does the spying no violation takes place. In
4
Florida Builders, lac. the Board held that if an
employer merely instructs a foreiaan to report any rumour




In NbilB v. Wauabee Mills. Inc.' the court through
Magruder J. said i * .... A long experience had shown
that one of the most provocative and effective means by
which employers sought to impede the organisation of
employees was the blacklisting of union men, thereby
denying them opportunities for employment."
4. Ill NihiB 786 (1955).
5. 114 F2d 226, 232 (CAI, 1940).
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fs
It was tie Id in Alaska salmon Industry inc. (1957)
to be unlawful unuer the NLaA to refuse to select an
employee for employment because he had filed a charge with
7
the NEKB. In this case an employers' association
operated a hiring hall. The association refused to
select an employee for employment by any of its members
because he had filed a charge with the NLEB.
Interrogation of Employees
Prior to 1954 the Board held for many years that
the interrogation of employees as to their union activities
is unlawful per se. This rule was, however, modified
8
in Blue Flash Express. Inc. In this case the union
wrote a letter to the company informing them that the
union represented a majority of the company's employees
and that it desired to enter into collective bargaining
negotiations. before replying, the general manager of
the company interrogated employees as to whether they
had joined tne union - stating that it was immaterial
to him whether or not employees were union members.
Each employee denied to the general manager that he had
signed any union card, although a majority had done so.
6. 119 MdiB 612.
7. This is expressly forbidden by s.8(a)(4) of the NLBA.
In many states statutes specially outlaw such practices,
in some states the prohibition is contained in the
state labour relations act and in others there is a
special statute which deals with such practices.
8. 109 NliKB 591 (1954). There the union would have been
better advised to ask the Board for a certification.
A union can ask for a certification by the Board if it
wisaes to be recognised by the employer. See ante, p.63.
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It was held by the Board that the interrogation of
employees as to their union activities is not unlawful
per se, and that the test is whether, under all the
circumstances, such interrogation tends to restrain or
interfere with the employees In the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the Act.
It seems a pity that the rale was modified. This
case clearly indicates that the interrogation of employees
as to their union activities should be forbidden. The
employees must have known that their general manager
was not very eager that his employees should be union
members in spite of the soft and carefully chosen words
uttered by him.
9
In Mid-south Manufacturing Co. where the
interrogation was accompanied by threats of reprisals
and other unfair practices the Board held that the employer
had violated s.8(a)(l).
In s. H. Kress and Co. (1963)^ the Board held
unlawful an employer's systematic interrogation when the
employer was informed by several employees that there was
doubt as to an adequate showing of union interest in
support of a representation petition. The Blue Flash
case was held not conflicting with this case since it
related to systematic interrogation on the question of
a union's claimed majority status asserted in support
of its bargain demand. However, enforcement of the
9. 102 NLEB 230 (1958).
10. 137 NLliB 1244 (1963).
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Board* s oraer was denied on the basis that no restraint
upon or interference with employees was shown.Ai The
court of appeals stated : "The question .... is whether
the purpose .... would appear to the employees to
constitute reasonable grounds for an interrogation. If
so, the fact of interrogation in and of itself would
12
carry no sinister implication to the employees."
Organisational Activities on Employer's Premises
The question arises, if a union begins distributing
literature and soliciting members in a plant, what
restrictions may the employer lawfully place on the
solicitation and distribution? In those cases a great
deal depends on "who", "where" and "when". Who is doing
the soliciting or distribution, employees or non-employees;
where noes the solicitation or distribution take place,
on or off company property, aau when does the soliciting
or distribution take place, within or off working time.
1 3
In the leading case NLKB v. Babcock & vtilcox Co.
the law with respect to the validity of employer rules
against solicitation and distribution of union literature
by non-employee organisers was enunciated. In this case,
the employer refused to permit distribution of union
literature by non-employee union organisers on company-owned
11. 317 F2d 225 (CA9, 1963).
12. See also Bun-hueproductions. Inc. v, NLuB 309 F2d
898 (GA2, 1962).
13. 351 US 105 (1956).
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parking lots. The NLRB found that it was unreasonably
difficult for the union organisers to reach the employees
off company property and held that in refusing the unions
access to parking lots, the employer had unreasonably
impeded its employees' right to self-organisation in
violation of 8.8(a)(1) of the hLnA. The Supreme Court
per Justice heed held that the Board failed to make a
distinction between rules of law applicable to employees
and those applicable to non-employees. The plants were
close to small well-settled communities where a large
percentage of the employees lived. The usual methods
of importing information were available; the various
instruments of publicity were at hand. The Act requires
only that the employer refrain from interference,
discrimination, restraint or coercion in the employees'
exercise of their own rights. It does not require that
the employer permit the use of its facilities for
organisation when other means are readily available.
But what is the position if the solicitation and
distribution of literature on company property is done by
the employer's own employees? It was held in Peyton
14
Packing Co. that the promulgation and enforcement of
the no solicitation rule during working hours does not
constitute a violation of s.8(a)(1) of the Act. Here
one member of the Board said working time is for work.
14. 49 MLEB 823, 843 (1943). This point was discussed




In hepublic Aviation Corp. v. NLkB " it was held that
the promulgation and eniorceraent of such rules during
non-working hours was violative of s.8(a)(1) of tue Act,
unless the employer can show some special circumstances
which make such rules necessary to maintain production
or discipline. Special circumstances were held to exist
16
in department stores. In .Marshall Fielu Co. v. Ninth
it was held that- retail stores may generally ban
solicitation in public areas of the store even during




The Board in Stoddard-juirk Mfg. Go. distinguished
between the principles governing employer rules against
19
solicitation and distribution of literature. After a
thorough review of tiie relevant eases the majority of
the Boaru concluded that to effectuate organisational
rights through the medium of oral solicitation, the right
of employees to solicit on plant premises must be afforded
subject only to the restriction that it be in non-working
time. However, because distribution of literature is a
15. 324 US 793 (1945).
16. 200 F2ti 375 (UA7, 1952).
17. See May Department Stores Co. 316 F2d 797 (CA6, 1963),
post, pp.137 f.
18. 138 NLiib 615 (1962).
19. tor cases where the lavs as regards oral solicitation
was laid down see post, pp.131 ff.
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different technique and poses different problems both
from the point of view of employees and from the point
of view of management, they believe organisational
rights in that regard require only that employees have
access to non-working areas of the plant premises.
Members Fanning and Brown were for a *no littering1 rather
than a * no distribution* prohibition. They said the
right of employees to distribute literature in non-working
time on the plant premises must be afforded subject to
the restriction that no littering takes place. The
dissenting decision seems a very reasonable and fair
solution. The distribution of literature is not entirely
banned and the employer's right to have a clean plant is
taken into consideration.
The question arises how should the handing out and
signing up of union authorisation and membership cards
in work areas during non-working time be classified?
20
The Board in dale products considered whether a clause
in a collective agreement prohibiting; distribution and
solicitation activities by employees infringed upon
statutory rights guaranteed by s.7 of the Act. in this
case several employees formed an independent union and
attempted to distribute membership application cards.
The Board held that the clause in the agreeraent was
invalid insofar as it prohibited any distribution of
20. 142 NLRB 136 (1963).
- 129 -
literature during non-working tiours in non-working areas
and any solicitation daring non-working time on behalf
of a union other than the contracting union. The view
of the Majority of the Board was that the unlimited
contractual prohibition would unduly hamper employees in
exercising their basic rights under the Act. The May
21
Department store case was distinguished.
The court held where an employer applies his rules
in a manner which discriminates against one union as
compared with another union an unfair labour practice
22
has been committed.
The Board has had to deal over and over again with
the question whether the employer has the right to
prohibit the wearing of union buttons and other insignia
by employees on his premises. It was held that the
right of employees to wear such buttons and insignia
comes within the scope of union organisational activities,
23
and only in exceptional cases can be prohibited. For
instance, the employer may properly prohibit the wearing
2 4
of union buttons which read "Don't be a scab".
21. See post, pp.;L37 f.
22. See NLKB v. Stowe Spinning Co. 336 US 226 (1949)
where this principle was enunciated.
23. See Republic Aviation Co, v. NLf-B, supra at note 15.
24. See Kimble Glass Co. v. NLUB. 230 F2d 484 (CA6, 1956)
and Caterpillar Tractor Go. v. NLEB 230 F2d 357
(0A7, 1956). Cf. Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLEB
217 F2d 369 (CA9, 1954).
A scab is a workman wSio refuses to join a union or
strike or takes a striker's place.
- 130 -
The Free Speech Issue
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides
that Congress shail pass no law abridging the right of
free speech. By s.8(a)(1) employers may not interfere
with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in s.7 of the Act. Therefore the
question of free speech exercised by the employer must
be considered in the light of the rights guaranteed to
employees by the NLliA. In the 1940* s employers were
dissatisfied with the rules laid down by the courts and
the Board as regards free speech. In 1947 a new section,
namely s.8(c) was inserted in the NLltA by the Taft-Hartley
amendments. S.8(c) provides that the expressing of any
views, argument or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form,
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if
such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force
25
or promise of benefit.
p
The court of appeals said in NLnB v. Kropp Forge Co.
"The language of s.8(c) seems to us no more than a
restatement of the principles embodied in the First Amendment
25. The literature on this subject is substantial.
See Koretz, Employer Interference with Union
Organisation Versus Employer Free Speech. 29 Geo.Wash.
L•hev. (i960), 399; Unions in Relation to Elections
Before the National Labour Relations Board
12 U.Fla.L.kev.(1959), 423; Aaron. Employer Free Speech:
The Search for a policy in Public Policy and Collective
Bargaining (1962) pp.28 ff.
26. 178 Fed 822 (GA7, 1949) certiorari denied 340 US 810
(1950).
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.... in determining whether such statements and expressions
constitute, or are evidence of unfair labor practice, they
must be considered in connection with the positions of the
parties, with the background and circurastaacos under which
27
they are made, and with the general conduct of the parties."
It was held in decisions by the Board that though
other unfair labour practices are found, an anti-union
statement will not be found to be violative of the Act,
unless it contains a threat of reprisal or promise of
23
benefit as required by s.8(e),'"c
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a
threat of reprisal and a prediction of dire economic
consequences which would, in the employer^ opinion follow
29
from unionisation. In ghicopee Mfg. Co. the Board
enunciatea the principle that a prophecy that uaionisation
aiight ultimately lead to loss of employment is not coercive
where there is no threat that the employer will use its
economic power to make its prophecy come true. In Lux
SO
Clock Manufacturing Co. Inc. the employer faaoe a speech
to his employees at the plant persuading them not to vote
for the union. After the speech an esaployee asked,
"Mr. Lux, is it true that if the union wins the election,
27. Nevertheless after the enactment of s.B(c) many letters
and speeches have been held privileged whicu would have
been regarded as unfair under earlier decisions.
28. See Southwester Co.. 155 NLEB 805 (1955) and B.M.O.
Manufacturing Co.. 113 NLi.B 823 (1955).
29. 107 NLLB 106 (1953).
30. 113 NLIiB 1194 (1955). For "runaway shop"
see post, pp.140 f.
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the factory will shut dcvrn." The employer's reply was,
"Unfortunately if I made a proper answer to that thing -
no 1 am sorry, I cannot make any comments on that
particular question - it is against the law," The Board
held that his speech was privileged. It is quite common
that employers before making an anti-union speech seek
legal advice and are instructed by their lawyer how to
get the point across without breaking the law. This snows
how dangerous a provision like s.8(e) can be.
The board has indicated that an employer may fxeely
predict what third parties may do if the uniGn wins an
31
election. In Soutnwester Co. the employer made certain
remarks to the effect that alien employees if they joined
the Communist Union might be deported by the Immigration
Department. He further said that if the union won the
election they woula control the hiring and would replace
the present employees with persons having greater union
seniority and with allegedly undesirable persons. The
Board held that the employer merely opined concerning the
possible actions of third parties, completely detached
from Saia, should the employees continue their adherence
to the Uuion. The statements contained no threats that
he would take any steps to induce the happening of the
predicted events. Accordingly they found that the above
statements were privileged under 3.8(c) and therefore did
not constitute violations of s.8(a)(l).
31. ill NihiB 805 (1955).
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Before the enactseat of s.S(c) of the Act it was
held that requiring employees to listen to anti-union
speeches in company time was an unfair labour practice,
espite the fact that the same statements if made under
different cireunistances would not have been considered
coercive. But after the Taft-Hartley amendments the
go
Board has reversed its position on this point. ~ In the
3 3
Boawit Teller case the doctrine' 1 reappeared but in a
modified form. Finally a change in Board membership
34
brought about the uecision in Livingston Shirt Corporation.
In the Livingston Sairt case the employer had
promulgated to its employees tae rule that activities for
or against any union must not be carried on during working
hours. Three days before a scheduled Board election the
employer, during working hours, spoke to the assembled
employees. The speech was anti-union but noncoercive.
One hour after the speech some employees requested the
employer that he should grant to the union an opportunity
to reply to the speech under similar circumstances.
32. See Compulsory Audience no Longer an Unfair Labor
Practice Per se 48 Colua.L.fiev. 1098 (1948).
33. The doctrine is commonly referred to as "the captive
audience doctrine". The employees constituted a
"captive audience" as they were forced to listen to
these speeches. For the Bonwit Teller case see below
footnote 35.
34. 107 NLL.B 400 (1953). After the hepublican
Administration took office in 1953 the chairman and
one member of the JiLEB w re replaced by appointees
of the new President. In less than six months the
reconstituted Board repudiated the Bonwit Teller case.
See also Peerless Plywood Co. below footnote 36.
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The answer does not appear on the record but it can be
assumed that the request was denied. The election
resulted in a defeat for the union. The Board held
35
that the llonwit Teller doctrine0 was contrary to the
statute and congressional purpose. The Board pointed
36
out that the peerless plywood rule is much more limited
and, in their view, a more reasonable and practicable
qualification on absolute freedom of speech than Bomvit
Teller. In this case, however, they considered a
departure from the Peerless Plywood rule as both a minor
35. bonwit Teller Inc.. 96 NLKB 608 (1951) 197 F2d 640
(CA2, 1952) cert, denied 945 US 905 1953. The ease
dealt with department store situations. In this case
the court of appeals reasoned as follows: "The Board,
however, has allowed retail department stores the
privilege of prohibiting all solicitation within
selling areas of the store during both working and
non-working hours. Bonwit Teller chose to avail
itself of that privilege and, having done so, was in
our opinion required to abstain from campaigning
against the Union on the same premises to which the
Union was denied access, if it should be otherwise,
the practical advantage to the employer who was
opposed to unionisation would contribute a serious
interference with the rights of his employees to
organise." Cf. May department Stores, post, pp.137 f.
36. Peerless plywood Co.. 107 NLRB 427 (1953). This was
a representation case in which the Board prescribed,
as an election rule, a prohibition against employer
speeches to employees on his premises during working
hours within 24 hours prior to a scheduled Board
election. The Board set the election aside because
the employer had assembled its employees on company
property less than 24 hours before the election. In
this case the Board laid down the following rule:
M
.... employers and unions alike will be prohibited
from making election speeches on company time to
massed assemblies of employees within 24 hours before
the scheduled time for conducting an election." The
Board held that the rule is inapplicable to other
legitimate campaign media, e.g. distribution of
literature, posting of signs in the plant.
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and a necessary one. They quoted Justice holmes who
had said that the life of the law has not been logic but
experience. They ruled that in the absence of either
an unlawful broad no-solicitation rule (prohibiting union
access to company premises on other than working time) or
a privileged no-solicitation rule (broad but not unlawful
because of the character of the business) an employer
does not commit an unfair labour practice if he makes a
pre-election speech on company time and premises to his
employees and denies the union's request for an opportunity
to reply. Member of the Board Murdock dissented from
0»7 OO
that decision in part. * In NLkB v. United Steelworkers
the issue before the Supreme Court was "whether an
employer commits an unfair labour practice if during a
pre-election period it enforces an otherwise valid rule
against employee distribution of literature in the plant,
while, during the same period, itself distributing
non-coercive anti-union literature within the plant in
a context of other unfair labour practices, committed
prior to the election period and thereafter." The
39
Avoadale lills case" involved similar facts.
37. Generally, in manufacturing industries, a
no-solicitation rule which interferes with the right
of employees to solicit on non-working time violates
s.8(a)(l) of the Act. however, department stores
have long been exempted from the application of the
rule because the nature of the business is such that
solicitation, even on non-working time, in selling
areas, would unduly interfere with the retail store
operations. See ante, p. 128.
38. 357 US 357 (1958) generally cited as the huTone case.
39. 115 NLLB 840 (1956), 242 F2d 6G9 (CA5 1957).
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The Supreme Court disposed of the two cases in a single
opinion. The Court per Mr. Justice Frankfurter held;
"
•••• No attempt was made in either of those cases to
make a showing that the no-solicitation rule truly
diminished the ability of the labor organisations involved
to carry their message to the employees. Of course the
rules had the effect of closing off one channel of
communication; but the Taft-Hartley Act does not command
that labor organizations as a matter of abstract law, under
all circumstances, be protected in the use of every possible
means of reaching the minds of individual workers, nor
that they are entitled to use a medium of communication
40
simply because the employer is using it."
41
In Time-O-Matic, Inc. v. NhRB the employer issued
a no-distribution rule, applicable only to union literature.
Tne court of appeals rejected the argument of the employers
that under the NuTone case, the Board must prove that
alternative channels of communication were not reasonably
available to the union.
42
May Department Stores the facts were briefly
as follows: The company owns and operates two department
stores. During the years 1959 and 1960 the Union
campaigned to organise the employees of the company.
During this time the company had in effect enforced a
40. Warren 0, J. concurred and Justices Black and
Douglas dissented.
41. 264 F2d 96 (CA7, 1959).
42. 316 F2d 797 (CA6, 1963).
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broad no-solicitation rule which prohibited inter alia
anion solicitation in the selling areas ol' the store
during the employees* working and non-working time.
Just prior to the election the company made non-eoereive
anti-union speeches to massed assemblies of employees on
company property and thereafter denied the Uniou's request
for equal opportunity and time to address the same
employees. The court of appeals held that under the
principles established in the Nufone case, which they
deem dispositive of the issue in this case, the enforcement
of a valid no-solicitation rule by an employer who is at
the same time engaging in anti-union solicitation may not
constitute an unfair labour practice in the absence of
substantial evidence that, when ail alternative reasonably
available channels of communication are considered, the
ability of the Union to carry its message to the employees
has been truly uiminished.
Economic Coercion and Inducement
Generally economic coercion coineiues with
discrimination; because of that it plays only a minor
role as a separate issue. Employer statements and
publications, containing threats of economic reprisals
and promise of benefit, in order to defeat unionisation,
are unfair labour practices. If the employer actually
puts into effect such reprisals or benefits another unfair
labour practice has been committed.
4.3
In Avilusea Tools and Mac nines, inc. the Board
held that the employer had violated s.8(a)(1) of the Act
43. 112 hLhB 1021 (1955).
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by promising ana granting wage increases and benefits in
order to influence employees to vote against the Union.
AA
In Exchange Parts Co. after the Board had issued
its election order, employees received a letter from the
company which spoke of the empty promises of the Union
and the fact that it is the company that put things in
45their envelope. Accompanying the letter was a detailed
statement of the benefits granted by the company since
1949. Included in the statement of benefits granted by
the company for I960 were "birthday holiday", a new system
for computing overtime during holiday weeks which had the
effect of increasing wages for those weeks, and a new
vacation schedule which enabled employees to extend their
vacations by saudwidling them between two weeks. The
latter was the first general announcement of the changes
to the employees. In the ensuing election the Union lost.
The Supreme Court per Justice Harlan held j " .... The
danger inherent in well-timed increases In benefits is
the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove.
Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the
source of benefits now conferred is also the source from
waich future benefits must flow and whioh may dry up if
it is not obliged. The danger may be diminished, if,
as in this case, the benefits are conferred permanently
and unconditionally. But the absence of conditions or
44. 375 US 405 (1964).
45. "Envelope" means hero, of course, pay-envelope.
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threats pertaining to the particular benefits conferred
would be of controlling significance only if it could be
presumed that no question of additional benefits or
renegotiation of existing benefits would arise in future;
auu, of course, no such presumption is tenable .... We
cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that enforcement
of the Board * s order will have the •ironic* result of
•discouraging benefits for labor*. The beneficence of
an employer is likely to be ephemeral if prompted by a
threat of unionization which is subsequently removed,
insulating the right of collective organisation from
calculated good will of this sort deprives employees of
little that has lasting value."
Thus in this case a comprehensive ruling on economic
inducement was given. it is to be welcomed that the
Supreme Court saw the problem with such clarity.
Moving of a plant or a department to avoid unionization
is an unfair labour practice, just as is the threat thereof.
46
This anti-union tactic is known as the runaway shop.
If the purpose was found to be to avoid unionization the
Beard will declare the removal unlawful. The Board does
not order the employer to move the runaway plant back to
the olh location, but the Board sometimes orders an
employer to re-establish a department which has been
46, See The Kunaway
U nion—Manaxe meat
lant - an Impediment to Peaceful
delations. 34 Temple Law Quarterly,
Winter 1961, 136-145, As regards the closing of a
plant see post, p.158,
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4.7
replaced by "a contracting out system". The Board
has ordered back pay together with reinstatement at
either the old or the new location. But when the
employer's decision to move Is based solely on economic
48
considerations, there is no violation.
In most cases the employer knows very well who are
the real union men in his enterprise and therefore might
approach them individually and promise them wage increases
or other benefits if they will get on the right side of
the fence. This is, of course, also a violation of
s.8(a)(l) of the Act.*y
47. where part of a plant's work is famed out to
another company this is called contracting out.
Such diversion of work for the purpose of avoiding
unionization is an unfair labour practice.
See reunon Food Products Co.. 122 hb ki Mo.163 (1959).
48. For a case where the Board found removal justifiable
see Brown truck & Trailer .df^. Co.. 106 ULUti 999 (1953).
49. See hellance Manufacturing Co.. 28 NLKB 1051 (1941).
See also sterling Cabinet Corp.. 109 NLkB 6 (1954)
where an employee was told tnat he would get a wag©
increase if he got rid of a representation petition.
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11; Protection against Discrimination
General Observations
S.8(a) (3) of the NLiiA provides that it shall be an
unfair labour practice lor an employer : - by discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labour organisation.^ Thus discriminatory
treatment of an employee for the purpose of encouraging
2
or discouraging union Membership is outlawed. It is
also unlawful to refuse to hire an employee because he is
a union member or engaged in union activities. The
purpose of these provisions is not merely to protect
unions in their right to organise but also to protect
individual employees against a certain union. In
practice organisation was and is often obtained via an
employer. Pressure is exercised by a union on an
employer in order that the latter should discriminate
against an employee on account of his membership or
nonmemuership in a union.^
1. A proviso to s.8(a)(3) permits an employer and a
union to agree to a limited form of union shop.
See post, p.148 note 10 . The kailway Labor Act does not
expressly outlaw discrimination, but such conduct is
covered and proscribed by the broad language of s.2,
Fourth.
2. By s.8(a)(4) of the NLHA it is an unfair labour
practice for an employer to discriminate against an
employee because he has fiied charges or given
testimony under the Act.
3. By s.8(b)(2) of the Act also a union saay be guilty
of an unfair labour practice. Bee post, p.148.
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Protection A&iinst Discrimination for Union Activity
3.8(a)(3) proscribes discriminatory discharges, layoffs
and demotions. It is also unlawful diseriainatorily to
withhold employee benefits such as bonuses, insurance
and pension benefits, and wage increases.
The question of discharge because of union activity
was dealt with at great length in Bund. Manufacturing
4
Company v. NLilB. In this case the court per Biggs J.
held : "The amended complaint alleges that in July, 1941,
the petitioner discharged an employee, Walter V.eigaad,
because of his activities on behalf of the union ....
The case of Ualter 1 eigand is extraordinary. If ever a
workman deserved summary discharge it was he, tie was
under the influence of liquor while on duty. He earae
to work when he chose arid he left the plant and his shift
as he pleased Weigand stated that he was carried
on the payroll as a 'rigger*. He was asked what was a
rigger. He replied 'I do not know; I am not a rigger*.
He brought a woman (apparently generally known as the
Duchess) to the rear of the plant yard and introduced
some of the employees to her. He took another employee
to visit her and when this man got too drunk to be able
to go home, punched his time-card for him and put him on
4. 138 F2d 86 (CAS, 1943). The full facts of the case
are given here because it is a good example to show
that although the discharge of an inefficient and/or
insubordinate union member or organiser is lawful,
it becomes discriminatory if other circumstances
reasonably indicate that the union activity weighed
more heavily in the decision to dismiss him than did
the dissatisfaction with his performance.
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tiie table in the representatives1 meeting room in the
plant in order to sleep off his intoxication, »»eigand*s
immediate superiors demanded again and again that he be
discharged but each time higher officials Intervened on
Weigand's behalf because as was naively stated he was
5
'a representative'. In return for not working at the
job for which he was hired, the petitioner gave him full
pay and on five separate occasions raised his wages.
One of these raises was general? that is to say, Weigand
profited by a general wage increase throughout the plant,
but the other four raises were given Weigand at times
when other employees in the plant did not receive wage
increases. The petitioner contends that heigand was
discharged because of euluinative grievances against him.
But about the time of the discharge it was suspected by
some of the representatives that feigaad had joined the
complaining CIO union. One of the representatives taxed
him with this fact and Weigand offered to bet a hundred
dollars that it could not be proved. On July 22, 1941
weigaad did disclose his union membership to the
vice-chairman (Eattigaa) of the Association and to another
representative (Mullen) and apparently tried to persuade
them to support the union .... The following day Vveigand
was discharged An employer aiay discharge an employee
for a good reason, a poor reason or no reason at all so
long as the provisions of the NLEA are not violated.
5, representative means here representative of a union,
i,e. representative of the Association.
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It is, of course, a violation to discharge an employee
because he has engaged in activities on behalf of a
union. Conversely an employer may retain an employee
for a good reason, a bad reason or no reason at all and
the reason is not a concern of the Board, But it is
certainly too great a strain on credulity to assert as
does the petitioner, that Weigand was discharged for
an accumulation of offences. We think that he was
discharged because his work on behalf of the CXO had
become known to the plant manager. That ended his
sinecure at the Budd plant. The Board found that he
was discharged because of his activities on behalf of
the union. The record shows that the Board*s finding
was based on sufficient evidence. The order of the
Board will be enforced."
The problem in the above case was mainly a matter
of proof on a question of fact, namely whether the
employer*s real reason for the discharge was the employee's
union activity or something else. For the most part
cases involving discriminatory action to discourage union
membership or activities have presented questions of fact.
The question of the employer's motive is of vital
iiBportance in cases where discriialnatory action to discourage
or encourage union membership or activities is alleged.
6. Of course this is an extreme case. However, see
Nh: ti v. Dixie Shirt Co.. 176 F2d 969 (CA4, 1949),
NLhii v. Fulton aag & Pot ton axils. 175 F2d 675 (CA5, 1949).
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A leading case wiiere the law as regards motive was laid
7
down is Kadio Officers Union v, NhkB. In this case the
Court per Mr. Justice Reed held s wThe language of
s.8(a)(3) is not ambiguous. The unfair labor practice
is for an employer to encourage or discourage membership
by means of discrimination. Thus the section does not
outlaw all encouragement or discouragement of membership
in labor organisations} only such as is accomplished by
discrimination is prohibited. Nor does this section
outlaw discrimination in employment as such, only such
discrimination as encourages or discourages membership in
a labor organization is proscribed .... That Congress
intended the employer*s purpose in discriminating to be
8
controlling is clear. The Senate Keport on the sVagner Act
said : *0f course nothing in the bill prevents an employer
froia discharging a man for incompetence; from advancing
him for special aptitude; or from demoting him for failure
to perform.1 .... An employer can discriminate without
being guilty of an unfair labor practice so long as ne
does not thereby intend to encourage or discourage union
membership or activity. But it is recognised that proof
of certain types of discrimination is sufficient proof of
intent to encourage or discourage union activity; this ....
is but an application of the common law rule that a man is
held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct .... "
7. 347 US 17 (1954).
8. "Subjective evidence" that the employee was actually
encouraged or discouraged in his attitude toward the
union is not required.
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Discrimination to ancoura&e union Membership
There are many cases where the employer, under pressure
from a union, has discharged employees or otherwise
discriminated against them for some reason connected with
their union or non-union membership* In the Radio Officers*
case the supreme Court held the following to constitute
unlawful encouragement of union membership by discrimination:
(1) reducing a truck driver's seniority standing because
he did not keep up his union dues; (2) causing a ship's
radio officer to be refused employment because he did not
obtain union clearance; (3) granting a retroactive wage
increase to union members and refusing such benefits to
other employees because they were not union members. Of
course there are many other examples.
9
In NLRB v. kichards the court of appeals per
Mclaughlin J. held : "Reduced to simplest concepts the
case Is one of an employer discharging employees in order
to replace them with men favored by the union. The
situation in reverse where union employees are discharged
in favour of men belonging to another or no union is a
well recognised unfair labor practice. NLKB v.
haterman S.S. dorp., 309 US 206 (1940). The only difference
between the two situations is that in the latter the result
is to discourage union activity on the part of the remaining
and new employees, while in the former that activity is
encouraged. Both results are prohibited to the employer
by 8.8(a)(3)."
9. 265 F2d 855 (GA3, 1959).
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The Taft-Hartley amendments by s.8(b)(2) made it a
union unfair labour practice to cause or attempt to cause
an employer to discriminate against an employee on account
of his membership or noniaembership in a union subject to
an exception for valid union shop agreements.11
A union may expel a member for any reasons It considers
sufficient, whether good or bad, but it may not take away
the member's livelihood, or cause discrimination in the
terms and conditions of his employment. The only
exception to that is that when a valid union-shop agreement
exists eiaployees must meet their initiation fees and dues.11
10. The union-security proviso to s.8(a)(3) of the NLEA
permits agreements between unions and employers
requiring as a condition of employment membership in
the contracting union after the expiration of a
specified 30 days* grace period. However, a union
can validly enter into such an agreement only if it
is the bona fide representative of the employees
covered in an appropriate bargaining unit. By s.9(e)
of the Act employees in a unit covered by a valid union
shop agreement may request a deauthorization election.
At least 30 per cent of the employees in the unit
covered by the union-shop agreement must join in the
deauthorization petition. If a majority of the
employees eligible to vote, vote for deauthorization,
the union shop clause is suspended. It should be
noted that a majority of the employees eligible to vote
must east a ballot that they wish to have the clause
suspended. If they do not trouble to vote just a
majority of those who actually have cast a ballot is
not enough. But the Act provides that no
ueauthorization election shall be conducted in any
bargaining unit or any subdivision within which, in
the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election
shall nave been held.
11. S.8(b)(5) makes It an unfair labour practice for a
union to charge employees covered by a valid union
security agreement an initiation fee "in an amount
which the Board finds excessive or discriminatory
under all the circumstances". In Television and
Kadio Broadcasting Studio Employees. Local 804. 315
F2d 398 (CA3, 1963) the court of appeals upheld the
Bourn's finding that a union's increase of its
initiation fee from 50 dollars to 500 dollars was
excessive, discriminatory, ana therefore violative
of the Act.
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When an employee fails to meet this requirement the
union may lawfully demand his discharge.
in General .dotors Corporation. Packard Electric
12
Division the Board overturned its earlier ruling and
held that an employee may lawfully be discharged for
dues delinquency even though he makes a belated tender
of his back dues after the union requested his discharge
and before the actual discharge.
13
fhe agency shop constitutes a permissible form
14
of union security under the NJLRA, Also a maintenance-
15
of-membership provision in a collective agreement is
permissible. It is subject to the same regulations as
the union shop under the MdiA.
It was held in hew fork Times Co.16 that s.8(b)(2)
is violated when the union engages in threats, slowdowns,
and strikes to force an employer to give preference in
hiring to union members over aonaetabors.
12. 134 NLiili 1107 (1961).
13. The agency shop is an arrangement provided for in
a collective agreement, whereby non-union employees
are required to contribute to the financial support
of the union, usually in a sum equal to the union dues.
14. See v. General motors Corporation. 373 US 734 (1963).
15. Under a maintenance-of-membership provision an
employee need not join the union but if he does, or
having been a member fails to resign during the
"escape period", he then voluntary binds himself to
remain a member of the union for the duration of the
agreement as a condition of continued employment.
16. 101 NLkB 153 (1952).
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In the loading case of Local 357. Iateraational
17
Brotherhood of Teaastars v. NLRB the main question
before the Supreme Court was whether a hirlng-hall
18
agree sent, despite the inclusion of a nondiscrimination
clause, is illegal per se. In this ease there was no
evidence of actual disoriminat-ion to encourage union
membership. The Court said that Congress has not outlawed
the hiring hall, though it has outlawed the closed shop
except within the limits prescribed by the provisos to
s.8(a)(3). The Court went on to say that it is the "true
purpose" or "real motive" in hiring or firing that
constitutes the test, and that discrimination cannot be
inferred from the face of the instrument when the
instrument specifically provides that there will be no
discrimination against employees because of the presence
or absence of union membership. In the absence of
provisions calling explicitly for illegal conduct, the
contract cannot be held illegal because it failed
17. 365 US 667 (1961).
18. Hiring-iia.il agreements as used in American Labour
Law means that an employer enters into an agreement
with a union pursuant to which the union operates
in effect, as an employment agency, to furnish the
employer with applicants for jobs. i'he employer
gives notices of vacancies ana accepts men sent to
him by the hiring hall. The hiring hall has been
a common practice in industries in which employment
is casual or intermittent, such as loagshoring,
construction and building. A union hiring hall
is not violative of the law as long as persons are




affirmatively to disclaim all illegal objectives.
The 1959 amendments to the NLiiA established some
special union-security rules for the building and
construction industry. The occasional nature of the
employment relationship makes this industry markedly
different from manufacturing and other types of industry.
It is not an unfair labour practice for an employer
engaged primarily in the building and construction
industry to make an agreement, covering employees engaged
in that industry, with a union of which building and
construction employees are members because : (1) the
majority status of such union has not been established
under the provisions of s.9 of the NLkA prior to the
making of such agreement, or (2) such agreement requires
as a condition of employment membership in such union
after the seventh day foilowing the beginning of such
employment or the effective date of the agreement,
whicnever is later, or (3) such agreersent requires the
employer to notify such union of opportunities of
employment with such employer, or gives such union an
opportunity to refer qualified applicants for such
eaployiaeat, or (4) such agreement specifies minimum
training or experience qualifications for employment or
provides for priority in opportunities for employment
19. This decision overruled Mountain Pacific Chapter
of the Associated General Contractors. 119 tfJLKB
883 (1958). The rule laid down In that case was
that the hiring-hall agreement, despite the inclusion
of a nondiscrimination clause, is illegal, per se.
A hiring-hall arrangement to be lawful must contain
certain protective provisions.
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based upon length of service with such employer, in the
20
industry or in the particular geographical area.
S.l4(b) of the NLHA provides that nothing in this
Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or
application of agreements requiring Membership in a
union as a condition of employment in any State or
Territory in which such execution or application is
21
prohibited by State or Territorial law. At present
19 states have availed themselves of this section and
have enacted what are uisleaeingly known as "right-to-
ii « 22work laws".
03
A 1951 amendment to the Eailway Labor Act"
specifically permits union-shop agreements. It should
be noted that this amendment supersedes ail state laws.
20. For further details see s.S(f) of the NLIiA. See
also Goldberg and Meiklejohn Taft-Hartley Amendments.
with Emphasis on the Legislative History. Nw, U.JL.Hev.
Jan. I960, pp.774-777.
21. In May, 1965, President Johnson asked Congress to
repeal s.14(b) of the NLKA. See The Times, (London)
May 19, 1965, p.10. The issue is certain to divide
Congress sharply.
22. Some states merely rentier any such contractual
provision unenforceable while others speak of such
as illegal or as a combination in restraint of trade
or as an illegal conspiracy. Some state laws
specifically outlaw agreements conditioning
employment on payment of dues or fees to a union,
23. 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 USC §152, amending 44 Stat. 577
(1926). In Uailway iHaployees* Dept. v, Hanson.
351 US 225, (1956), the question before the US Supreme
Court was whether a union shop agreement entered into
by a railroad and a union was violative of the
"right-to-work" provision of the Nebraska Constitution.
The Court held that the 1951 amendment, permitting
union shop agreements, expressly allows those agreements
notwithstanding any law of any state.
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Discrimination is not limited to hiring and
discharge. Many of the cases under s.8(b)(2) involve
agreements or understandings with employers which have
the purpose of securing preferential treatment of the
contracting union's members. For example it has been
held that to cause an employer to lay off an employee
who resigned his union membership is violative of
p £
s.8(b)(2). So is to cause an employer to discriminate
against a non-union employee in re-employment after a
layoff.20 A union was held to have violated s.8(b)(2)
when it required an employer to deny promotion to a
26
non-union employee and grant- it to a union member.
Both the union and the employer may be guilty of
an unfair labour practice, the union for causing or
attempting to cause the discrimination and the employer
for acquiescing. The aggrieved eiaployees amy bring
their charges against either the union or the employer
or both. But the Board can proceed only against the
charged party or parties. Most of the cases dealing
with discrimination to encourage union membership involve
union security matters.
24. See PaeJcinfchouse Workers. Local 267. 114 NLftU
1279 (1955).
25. See Local 170. Teamters. 110 NLKB 850 (1954).
26. See hrousky ana Son. 144 NLRB 819 (1955).
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Reinstatement and Back Fay
when the hnhB finds that the employer has discharged
an employee in violation of s.8(a)(3), it will normally
order reinstatement with back pay. However, where
the employee has engaged in misconduct the Board may,
in the exercise of its discretion, withhold this remedy
on the ground that it would not effectuate the purpose of
the Act.
S.10(c) of the NLRA empowers the Board to issue
orders requiring such affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as
will effectuate the policies of the Act, In Phelps
28
Dodge Corp. v. NLKB the Supreme Court interpreted
the phrase giving the Board power to order "reinstatement
of employees with or without back pay" not to limit,
but merely to illustrate the general grant of power to
award affirmative relief. They held in that case that
the Board couln order back pay without ordering
reinstatement. Reinstatement is not a condition
29
precedent to a back pay award.
27. For example an unfair labour practice strike
which is not conducted peaceably.
28. 313 US 177 (1941). Approved in the Radio
Officers' case, 347 US 17 (1954).
29. xNiii.k.ij v. Internalional Association of Heat and
Frost Insulators and Asbestos Worker. 261 F2d 347
(CA1, 1958).
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As regards back pay it is stated in the 22nd Annual
Report of the NLKB (1958) j "The amount to be paid is
computed on the basis of what the employee would have
normally earned but for the discrimination. From this
amount are deducted the employee's net earnings during
the period involved, i.e. actual earnings from other
employment, or earnings which the discriminatee would




The discriminatee is under a duty to minimise loss.
An employee claiming back pay must have made reasonable
effort to secure other employment, but the employer has
32
the burden of proving lack of such effort by the claimant.
The question arises whether the duty to mitigate requires
a discriminatee to accept less than substantially
33
equivalent employment. In the Southern Silk Mills case
the court of appeals held that, under the circumstances,
work at a somewhat lower rate of pay constituted "desirable
new employment", and that- the discrluinatees• failure to
seek or take such employment constituted to some extent
at least loss of earnings wilfully incurred.
30. See p.75 of the Report. For the details of back pay
proceedings, see Silverberg, How to Take A Case Before
the NLith. pp.266 ff. (1959).
31. in hreat Britain there is a somewhat similar rule,
namely, the common law rule concerning minimisation
of loss in cases of wrongful dismissal.
32. See American Bottling Company. 116 NLKB 1303 (1956)
33. 242 F2d 697 (GA6, 1957) cert, den., 355 US 821 (1957).
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In 1962 the Board decided to discontinue its practice
oi" abstracting the portion of back pay awards from the
date of a Trial Examiner* s report to the date of a Board
order in those cases in which the Examiner found no
violation but the Board later reversed his recoiamendation
and held that a discriminatory discharge had occurred.
34
It was held in AP?v Products Co. that the blameless
employees are not made whole for their monetary loss for
the full period of the discrimination and are to that
extent punished for exercising their statutory rights
under s.7, solely because of the erroneous conclusion
reached by the Examiner.
Also in 1962 the Board commenced the practice of
requiring the payment of six percent interest on back
pay due to discriminatorily discharged employees. In
35
NLkB v. Isis Plumbing & Heating Co. the court of appeals
set aside the Board's order without deciding whether the
Board had the power to require payment of interest upon
back pay awards.
B.lO(c) provides, among other things, that where an
order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may
be required of the employer or labor organisation, as the
case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered
by him. The purpose of congress in enacting this
provision was not to limit the power of the Board to order
34. 137 NJuhB 25 (1962). Members Eodgers and Leedom
dissented.
35. 322 F2d 913 (CA9, 1963).
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back pay without ordering reinstatement but to give the
Board power to remedy union unfair labour practices by
86
employers
In Local 60. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
37
Joiners of America. aFL-CIO v. NLftB the Supreme Court
considered whether the Board is empowered, as a matter
of course, to order reimbursement of dues and fees in
cases where s.8(b)(2) has been violated. The Court held
that the Board had acted beyond its power when it ordered
the union to return all fees collected from members as
it had not been shown that a single employee was coerced
to join the union ranks or to remain a member.
Where both the eiaployer and the union are guilty
of unfair practices and are joined in the complaint, the
38
order will be directed against them jointly. Where
only one party, either the union or the employer, is
named in the complaint, it will be solefc/ liable for the
fail amount. 9
The question arises what happens when an employer
who has committed an unfair labour practice sells or
36. See the Radio Officers' case (1954), supra
37. 365 US 651 (1961).
38. See Union Starch & Refining Co. v. NLRB 186 F2d 1008
(CA7 , 1951). jiach party may be held liable for
the full amount. But, of course, double recovery
will not be allowed.
39. It was held in the Radio officers' case, supra,
that in order to charge a union with a violation of
s.8(b)(2), it is not necessary to bring an action
against the employer under s.8(a)(3). For s.8(b)(2)
see ante, p.148.
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reorganises his business? It was held in Colonial
40
Fashions. Inc. that if an employer closes his plant
and goes out of business, he will not be required to
reinstate employees even though they were discharged
41
diserifflinatorily. However, he can be ordered to
provide back pay from the date of the discrimination to
the date the plant was closed.
42
In Darlington Mfg. Co. the employer was charged
with violation of s.8(a)(3) of the Act by closing its
business in order to avoid bargaining with the union or
to retaliate against employees for their selection of a
bargaining representative. The Supreme Court held j
H
.... To go out of business in toto or to discontinue
it in part permanently at any time, we think was
Darlington*s absolute prerogative .... but the right to
discontinuance .... means an actual unfeigned and permanent
end of operations - not a removal nor subcontract, nor
a change merely in the for.a of the corporate entity,w
The lockout is a traditional employer anti-union
weapon. It is a term somewhat loosely used to refer
to a variety of situations ranging from outright discharges
to temporary layoffs. When used for the purpose of
40. 110 NLKB 1197 (1957).
41. The Board presumably meant here if he opens a new-
business he is under no duty to reinstate, or rather
engage the uiscriminatees.
42. 84 SupCt 1170 (19G3). See also NL.uB v. New England Web.
Inc., 309 F2d 696 (CAl, 1962).
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defeating attempts at union organisation or to avoid
43
bargaining it is clearly an unfair labour practice.
43. Great Falls Employer's Council. 123 NLRB No. 109 1959.
Order was denied enforcement by the court of appeals,
see 277 F2d 772 (GA9, I960). Of. Drown Food Store.
319 F2d 7 (CA10, 1963), anu Dalton Brick & Tile Corp..
Sol F2d 886 (CA5, 1962). In these cases the same
principle was enunciated but on the facts it was




The maintenance of a "company onion" dominated by
toe employer, may be a ready and effective means of
obstructing self-organisation of employees. In the
thirties employers tried over and over again to form the
so-called company unions. Formally the right to organise
was upheld, but by dominating or interfering with the
formation of a union, or assisting a union financially,
they retained complete control over the union.1 Plant
wide bargaining gave a good chance and opening to these
practices.^ Practices of this kind were outlawed by
s.8(a)(2) of the NLRA.
8.8(a)(2) provides that : "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer to dominate or interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor
organisation or contribute financial or other support to
its Provided, that subject to rules and regulations
made and published by the Board pursuant to s.6, an
employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees
to confer with him during working hours without loss of
time or pay."
1. In the National Industrial Eecovery Act 48 Stat.198
(1933); FOA Uncodified Material, p.50$, there were
no prohibitions regarding company unions.
2, An organisation of employees limited to the employees
of a single employer is not banned provided the
employer does not dominate, support financially, or
has interfered with the formation of the union.
- 160 -
Cases in which unions have been found to be
dominated have been few in number in recent years, as
compared with the thriving of such company unions in
the thirties. This is a good sign because it shows
that the law is effective.
Domination of Unions
3
It was held in pacemaker Corp. that domination is
found only where the employer has interfered with the
formation of the organisation and has assisted and
supported its administration to such an extent that it
must be regarded as his own creation and subject to his
control.
One of the leading cases on the subject is NLEB v.
Pennsylvania hreyhound Lines. Inc. (1938)4 In this
case before the enactment of the NLkA, the employer,
whose employees were unorganised, initiated a project
for their organisation under company domination. In
the course of its execution officers or other
representatives of the company were active in promoting
the plan in urging employees to join, in the preparation
of the details of organisation, including the by-laws
in presiding over organisation meetings, and in selecting
employee representatives of the organisation.
3. 260 F2d 880 (Ca7, 1958).
4. 303 US 261 (1938). Full details of the case are
given here because in this case almost everything
which was and still is forbidden was done by the
employer. It is thus a very good illustration in
spite of the fact that it is not a recent case.
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The by-laws and regulations provided that all motorbus
operators, Maintenance sen and clerical employees,
after three months service automatically became members
of the Association, and that only employees were eligible
to act as employee representatives. No provisions
were made for meetings of members, nor was a procedure
established whereby employees night instruct their
representatives, or whereby those representatives might
disseminate information or reports. Grievances were
to be taken up with regional committees with final review
by a Joint Reviewing Committee made up of an equal number
of regional chairmen and of management representatives,
but review in those cases could not be secured unless
there was a joint submission of the controversy by
employee and management representatives. Change of the
by-laws without employer consent was precluded by a
provision that amendment should be only on a two-thirds
vote of the Joint Reviewing Committee, composed of equal
numbers of employer and employee representatives.
Employees paid no dues, all the Association expenses
being borne by the management. Although the Association
was in terms created as a bargaining agency for the purpose
of providing adequate representation for the company*s
employees by securing for them satisfactory adjustment
of ail controversial matters, it functioned only to settle
individual grievances# The Board came to the conclusion
that the company had engaged in unfair labour practices
by active participation in the organisation and
administration of the Employees Association, which they
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dominated throughout its history, and to whose financial
support they had contributed. It ordered that the
company cease each of the specified unfair labour practices.
It further ordered that they withdraw recognition from
the Employees Association as employee representative
authorized to deal with the company concerning grievances,
terms of employment, and labour disputes, and that they
post conspicuous notices in all the places of business
where such employees are engaged, stating that the
"Association is so disestablished and that the company
will refrain from any such recognition thereof," The
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court
of appeals anu upheld the hoard*s order. The Supreme
Court per Mr. Justice Stone held : " .... Vve may assume
that there are situations in which the Board would not
be warranted In concluding that there was any occasion
for withdrawal of employer recognition of an existing
union before an election by employees under s,9(c),5 even
though it had ordered the employer to cease unfair labor
practices. But here respondents, by unfair labor practices,
5. This section has been repealed by the Labor-Manageaent
delations Act, 1947 and has been replaced by a new
section. The old section provided that "whenever a
question affecting commerce arises concerning the
representation of employees, the Board may Investigate
such controversy and certify to the parties, in writing
the name or names of the representatives that have
been designated or selected. In any such investigation,
the Board shall provide for an appropriate hearing
upon due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding
under s.10 or otherwise, and saay take a secret ballot
of employees or utilize any other suitable method to
ascertain such representatives." For the present-
law see ante, pp.62 f.
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have succeeded in establishing a company union so
organised that it is incapable of functioning as a
bargaining representative of employees. With no
procedure for rues tings of members or for instructing
employee representatives, and with no power to bring
grievances before the Joint Reviewing Committee without
employer consent, the Association could not without
amendments of its by-laws be used as a means of collective
bargaining contemplated by s.7; and amendment could
not be had without the employer*s approval .... "
Unlawful support to a union may be financial or
non-financial, or both. Where it is financial the
illegality is measured in terms of its effect upon the
recipient union and the employees and not in terms of
its cost to the employer. The following cases give
an illustration of what is meant by financial support t
In Connor Foundry Co. a gift of 400 dollars and the
right to operate a canteen which made a profit of
50-100 dollars monthly was considered evidence of
7
domination. in Ni.hd v. Jack Smith Beverages the
Board considered it as evidence of domination when the
employer paid membership dues for every employee who joined
8
the union. In Corson Mfg. Co. the support was
non-financial. In this case the absence of any constitution,
6. 199 NLhB 146 (1952).
7. 202 F2d 100 (1953).
8. 112 hLHB 323 (1955).
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by-laws, or membership requirement, other than employment
in the plant, in the employee representation plan was
considered domination*
limployer interference with the formation and
administration of a union or the contribution of financial
or other support which violates s.8(a)(2) but falls short
of actual domination is held to be illegal assistance*
Kemeclies
In cases involving employer's unfair labour practices
that are so extensive as to constitute a domination of the
union the hoard will order disestablishment of the union,
regardless of whether or not it is affiliated with a
9
national or international federation. Moreover where
the parties have concluded a collective bargaining agreement
the Board will order that the agreement be given no effect.
There are those cases in which unfair labour practices
are limited to support and interference that never reach
9. Identical standards must be applied to affiliated and
unaffiliated local unions* In Coppus Engineering
Corporation v. 202 F2d 564 (CAl, 1957)the court
of appeals held that in deciding cases involving unfair
labour practices under s.8(a)(1) or s*8(a)(2) the
Board should apply the same regulations and rules of
decision irrespective of whether or not the union
affected is affiliated with a national or international
union. The court relied in its decision on s.10(c)
which was re-enacted by the Taft-Hartley amendments.
However, cases where an affiliated union has been found
to be dominated by the employer are extremely rare.
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the point of domination.10 In such cases the Board
orders that no recognition toe given to the union until
11
it has been certified by it, again without regard
whether or not the union happens to be affiliated.
10. See NLKB v. Vtemyss. 212 F2d 465 (CA9, 1954) and NuTone
Inc., 112 NLKB 1153 (1955) where the lesser offence
of assistance and support was found.
11. For "certification by the Board" see ante, pp.62 f.
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Chapter 8
Protection of Freedom to Organise in the Federal
Republic of Germany
General Observations;
Art,9(3), limb 2, provides that agreements which
restrict or seek to hinder the right to organise are
null and void and measures directed to this end are
illegal. This part of the article was mainly enacted
to protect freedom to organise against social and economic
forces, for example, the protection of an employee against
his employer or an existing trade union,
Measures are specifically mentioned in the article
to distinguish them froa agreements. Measure in this
context, ooes not only mean a unilateral act,* like the
giving of notice, hut also any act or forbearance which
2
restricts or seeks to hinder the right to organise.
The instances where infringement of this part of the
article may occur are manifold.
1. a unilateral act is an act in the law (kechtsgeschttft)
constituted by the declaration of intention of one
person only. The declaration may either be one which
is not effective unless communicated to another party,
e.g. a notice, or it may be effective without
communication, e.g. a will.
2. See Hueck-Nipperdey, ii, p.97. For the same view
see Bogs, Arbkolattei, Vereinigun&si'reiheit. B ill 3.
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Discrimination to Discourage Union Membership
Discriminatory action by an employer to discourage
union membership or activity is a clear violation of
3
Art.9(3), Also s.51 of the fforks Council Statute
prohibits discriminatory treatment by aa employer of
an employee because of union activity or his views
regarding unionism. Some examples of discriminatory
action by an employer to discourage union membership
are : (1) Transferring an employee to a job with less
pay or to a more difficult job (2) Refusing to hire
a person because of his union membership (3) In general,
any disciplinary action inflicted upon an employee
because of his union membership.
Promises of Benefits and Threats of Economic Reprisals
Threats of economic reprisals or promises of
benefits to induce employees to relinquish their union
membership are illegal under Art.9(3). For example
where an employer threatens an employee that he will
A
stop paying him a wage over and above the collective wage
3. An employer's right to organise is also guaranteed
by Art.9(3), any measure which restricts or seeks
to hinder them in the exercise of this right is
violative of the article. For example if the union
threatens with a strike or actually calls a strike
for the purpose of inducing an employer to leave an
employers' association or to prevent him from joining
a certain employers' association it has violated
Ar t. 9 ( 3).
4. That part of the wage which is in excess of the
collective wage rate can be reduced or terminated
by the employer without resort to collective
negotiation with the union.
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or exclude him from benefits of the voluntary welfare
service if he does not relinquish his union membership
Art.9(3) has been violated. Also promises of benefits
are illegal under Art.9(3) for instance where an employer
promises an employee to transfer him to a better job if
he will relinquish his union membership. It goes without
saying wnere an employer actually puts into effect such
promises or threats Art.9(3) has been violated.
Discharge Because of Union Membership or Activity
A discharge because of union membership or activity
is violative of Art.9(3) even in cases where the employer
6 7
gave proper notice. By s.134 of the Civil Code and
Art.9(3) such discharge is void. The employment
relationship continues. The employer is in "mora
aeeipiendiw (Annahmeverzug) if he does not accept the
performance offered to him by the discharged employee.
5. Voluntary welfare services are quite common in the
Federal liepublio. Usually the services are given
either unilaterally (i.e. by the employer) or by an
agreement between the employer and the feorks Council.
Where they are given unilaterally the employer is
entitled to exclude an employee from benefits. Of
course where the exclusion takes place because of
union membership he has violated Art.9(3).
6. The Federal Labour Court has held that discharges
which merely indirectly restrict freedom to organise
are also void. See decision BAG AF Nr.33 concerning
s.l of the Law for the protection of Notice.
7. S.134 provides, among other things, that any act
expressly prohibited by law is void on the ground of
illegality unless the enactment containing the
prohibition provides otherwise.
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By s.615 of the Civil Code the employer is obliged to
continue to pay wages.
Where the labour court finds that the discharge is
void in accordance with Art.9(3) it does not have to
consider whether the discharge is also socially
unwarranted (sozial ungereohtfertigt); the latter is a
requirement under the Law for the protection of the Eight
to Notice (1951). It is important to note that the
10
period of limitation of action laid down in that statute
does not find application to cases where an employee
alleges that he was discharged because of union membership
11
or activity.
8. The employer is not entitled to claim any subsequent
performance of such unperformed services but has the
right to deduct from the wages the value of any outlay
saved by the employee in consequence of his non-performance
or of any income which he has actually earned or might,
but for his intentional neglect, have earned, by some
other employment of his services. See s.615 of the
Civil Code.
9. Ku&idigungsschutzgesetz (cited as KSchG) of August 10,
1951. The statute provides that a discharge may take
place only where a valid reason exists for such
discharge. By s.l(2) a discharge is socially
unwarranted which is not based on reasons connected
with the person or conduct of the employee, or on
"pressing operational requirements" of the undertaking.
See post, p.181 footnote 2.
10. Under s.3 of the Law for the Protection of the Eight
to Notice an action for a socially unwarranted discharge
must be brought within three weeks from the day the
plaintiff received notice.
11. See Kikiseh, Arbeitsrecht, Yol.I, 2nd ed, p. 267.
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Discrimination to Encourage Union Membership
It is now generally accepted that the right of the
individual to refrain from organising is guaranteed by
the Basic Law. Opinions are, however, divided whether
this right accrues from Art.9(3) or from Art.2(1) of
12
the Basic Law. A number of eminent scholars and
courts hold the view that there was no need for the
legislator to state it expressly in Art.9(3), and that
it is self-evident that the right of the individual to
refrain from organising is part and parcel of freedom
to organise; the former is therefore also guaranteed and
13
protected by that article. " others are of the opinion
that this right is not protected by Art.9(3) but that
Art.2(1), which guarantees to everyone the right to develop
his personality freely (das fieeht auf freie gntfaltung der
Persoenlichkeit), includes freedom of decision as to whether
14
a person wishes to join an organisation or not.
12. Art.2(1) of the Basic Law provides that everyone has
the right to the free development of his personality
insofar as he does not violate the rights of others
or offend against the constitutional order or the
moral code.
13. See Ruber II, pp.383 f; v. Mangoldt-Klein, comment V,
II, concerning Art.9; Gernandt, Zu den Singriffen in
die negative Koalitionsfreiheit, Arbeit'eber 1954,
pp. 154 ff and pp. 194 f; BtStticher Waffengleichheit
uad Gleichbehandlung im kollektiven Arbeitsrecht (1956)
p.15; Nikiseh XI, pp. 28 f; for an interesting treatise
on the subject see FSdisch, Freiheit und Zwanc im
,fielteiiden Koalitlonsrecht« RdA 1955, pp 88 ff. For
court decisions see LAG Muenchen, Amtsblatt Bayer
ArtoMin. 1950, p.349 and LAG Raima, Betrieb 1954, p.1048.
14. See Wernicke, Bonner Kommentar, comment II Id and 3e
concerning Art.9; kewolle, Der Schutz der neeativen
Koalitionsfreiheit Betrieb 1950, p. 594 - this writer,
however, is of the opinion that the right accrues from
Art.9(3) by virtue of Art.2(1).
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Nipperdey is of the opinion that the right of the
individual to refrain from organising is not protected
by Art.9(3) ana that the organisation, to a certain extent,
15
has the right to exercise compulsion. Individual
activities of the organisation are protected by Art.2(1)
of the Basic Law which guarantees to everyone, and this
includes organisations, the right "to do and refrain from
doing as desired (Bandlungsfreiheit)But this is only
a qualified right and is only protected so long as the
rights of others are not violated or the constitutional
order or the moral code is not transgressed. Thus
organisations by compelling membership must be careful
not to violate the rights of others. For example where
an employer, under pressure of a union, refuses to engage
an employee because he is unorganised this is violative
of Art.12(1) of the Basic Law which guarantees to every
16
Uerman the right to a free choice of a place of work.
The unorganised employee, who did not obtain the job
because he is unorganised, certainly has a cause of
action under s.823(1) of the Civil Code against the union.
Under the same section he will also succeed in an action
against the prospective employer unless the latter can
prove that if he had not given way to union pressure his
15. see ilueek-Nipperdey II, pp. 114 ff.
lb. Article 12(1) of the Basic Law provides that all
Germans have the right freely to choose their trade




enterprise would have suffered serious damage.
according to Nipperdey to compel an organised employee
to join another organisation is an infringement on the
ri6ht to organise and therefore violative of Art.9(3).
There are only a few writers who hold the view that
the right of tue individual to refrain from organising is
18
not guaranteed by the Basic haw. Their main legal
argument is that Art.9(3) speaks about "the right to form
associations" and not "freedom to associate".
in the Laenher Hesse and Bremen compulsory unionism
19
is prohibited by their respective constitutions. By
virtue of Art.142 of the Basic Law these provisions remain
in force
If the right to refrain from organising is guaranteed
by Art.9(3) measures which restrict or seek to hinder
21
employees from exercising this right are illegal. Thus
any discriminatory action by an employer to encourage
union membership is illegal. Also threats of economic
17. t'oi furtner discussion of s.823(1) see ante, pp.99 f, 111 f.
18. See gberhard, i dA 1949, p.l26j Herbert Bachmann
Von der Zwangskoalition zum Koalitionszwaag. Munich 1951;
hogs, Ah-Blattei: yereinigungsfreiheit, BIS.
19. see Art.36(2) of the constitution of Hesse and
Art,48 of the constitution of Bremen.
20. For Art.142 see ante, p.78 footnote 2.
21. As for an action for compensation and/or a prohibitory
action in cases where Art.9(3) has been violated,
see post, pp.182 ff.
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reprisals or promising or granting of benefits are illegal.
However, according to Kixisch, wuere organised employees
put pressure on the employer, for example by threatening
with strike action, in order that he should discharge
unorganised employees and the employer to avoid damage
to his enterprise discharges the unorganised employees the
22
employer has not violated Art.9(3). He maintains that
possibly tae duty to look after the welfare of the
employees (ruersorgepflicht) has been violated by the
23
employer. Moreover, as a rule, such discharges are
socially unwarranted under the Law for the protection of
the night to Notice. Only in eases where it can be proved
by the employer that his enterprise would have suffered
very serious damage, e.g. closing down of the business,
24
the discharges might be considered socially warranted.
The employees who induced the employer to discharge the
unorganised employee have violated Art.9(3).
If the right to refrain from organising is
guaranteed by Art.9(3) agreements which restrict or
seek to hinder employees in the exercise of this right
22. See Nikisch II, pp.39 f.
23. The "FuersorgepiiicktM obliges an employer, among
other things, to protect his employees to a
certain extent from unlawful interference with
tueir personal liberty. A violation oi this duty
gives rise to a claim for compensation where the
employer has acted wilfully or negligently. See
Nikisch, Arbeitsrecht. 2nd ed, Vol.I, s.50 II 2.
24. See ilueek-Nipperdey II, p. 124. For the Law for




are null and void.
A study of the various views reveals that, though
the writers base their views on different legal grounds,
the Basic Law guarantees the right of the individual to
26
refrain from organising*
25. The Absolute Organisational Clause, a clause in a
collective agreement which obliges employers who
are members of the contracting employers*
organisation to employ organised employees only, is
null and void. Mipperdey considers such clauses
null and void because they are violative of Art.12(1)
of the Basic Law. See ante,p. 172 note 16. So is
the relative Organisational Clause, a clause ia a
collective agreement which forbids employers who
are members of the contracting employers* organisation
to employ employees who are not members of the
contracting union. This type of clause is an
infringement on Art.9(3) even if the right to refrain
from organising was not guaranteed by that article
as it hinders the employee in his choice which union
to join. See Nikisch II, p.37. Union Shop and
Maintenance of Membership clauses are unknown in the
Federal kepublic of Germany. Null and void is also
the Absolute Exclusion Clause, a clause in a
collective agreement which provides that unorganised
employees are not to enjoy the same working conditions
as employees who are members of the contracting union.
But this does not, of course, mean that the
unorganised employees are entitled to the collective
terms agreed upon in the agreement. Such clause is
merely null and void. It should be noted that
Nipperdey, who is of the opinion that the right to
refrain from organising was not guaranteed by Art.9(3),
does not consider such clauses null and void,
see uueck-Nipperdey, Grundriss des Arbeitsrecht.
2nd ed., pp.168 f. An Agency Shop Clause, a clause
in a collective agreement which obligates employees
wuo do not join the contracting union to pay the
equivalent of union dues and foes, is null and void,
moreover the collective parties lack competence to
agree on special conditions for outsiders.
26. Even Nipperdey's view in practice leads almost to
the same result. He allows so many exceptions to




Tha question 02 interrogation of employees by their
employer about their union membership1 presents special
difficulty. Nowadays it is generally accepted that
interrogation of an employee by his employer about his
union membership is not violative of Art.9(3). ^ven
where an employee undertakes by contract to disclose his
union membership Art.9(3) has not been violated.
in the i'etieral Kepublie interrogation of employees
about their union membership is allowed oeeause the
Collective bargaining Statute has provisions which snake
this necessary. This statute provides that employees
who are not members of the contracting organisations cannot
derive ri0hts and are not bound by the provisions of
3
the collective agreement (tarifgebunden).
1. During the Weimar Republic many scholars were of the
opinion that the employee's duty to disclose his union
membership was incompatible with Art.159 of the Weimar
Constitution.
2. Interrogation in itself is not a "measure" within the
meaning of Ait,9(3), But when the employer upon hearing
about the union membership discriminates against the
employee because of his union membership or refuses to
hire a person because of his union aembersuip the
article has been vioiatea, see Nikisch, 11, p.36,
3. The collective agreement binds the contracting parties
and only employers and employees who are members of the
contracting organisations. The normative part of the
agreement is binding on employers ana employees, who
become members of the contracting organisations after
the collective agreement came into force, from the day
they became members of the organisation. See s«3 of
the Collective Bargaining Statute. The same applies
to the obligatory provisions but this is for different
legal reasons.
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Thus it is understandable that an employer who is bound
by a collective agreement wishes to find out whether his
employee is also bound by the agreement and is entitled
to the collective terms of employment. An employer who
is bound by a collective agreement has to pay collective
wages if he tries to avoid paying those wages by hiring
non-organised or differently organised employees he acts
contrary to the provisions of the agreement. (tarifwidrig).4
There are instances where it is unfair that the
employer should not know about his employees* union
membership. For example where an employee keeps silence
about his membership in the contracting union and accepts
a lower wage than the collective wage, he has not
forfeited his right to the collective wage. The employee
is entitled from then on to the collective wage, and to
the difference between the collective wage and the lower
wage he has been receiving from the day the agreement came
into force. Furthermore where an employee joins the
contracting union after having been employed in an
undertaking and does not disclose his union membership
and is satisfied with a wage which is below the collective
wage, he is entitled from then on to the collective wage
and from the day he joined the union to the difference
between the collective wage and the lower wage he has been
receiving.
4. Every collective agreement has an implied condition
that the contracting organisations will do all in
their power to induce their members to implement the
terms of the agreement. Thus if an employer, who is
bound by an agreement, hires unorganised employees the
provisions of the agreement are not implemented*
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In both cases, mentioned above, the employer has to
pay back-pay even if be learned about the union Taembership
after the lapse of a considerable time and it is immaterial
whether the employee is still in his employment or not.
The plea of "Arglist* (exceptio doli general is) is open
to the employer but this will only be accepted by the
court in cases where the employee has grossly abused the
rights guaranteed to him by statute. Only where there
are special circumstances which should have made the
employee reveal his union membership is the employer apt
to succeed. Whether there was actually an undue exercise
of a right (unzulaessige Eeohtsausuebung) is decided on
the merits of each case.
The question arises, where there is a collective
agreement and an employee who la a member of the contracting
union denies his membership when questioned about it by
his employer, whether the contracting union fails in the
duty to see to it that the terms of the agreement are
implemented?
It is clear that where an employee does not reveal
his union membership when questioned about it by his
5. According to the provision of the civil law the
"exceptlo doll generalis" does not require a plea
(HlnredeJ, in the sense of the civil law, and as a
condition that the defendant's conduct was point-blank
"dolus" (argilstig). It is now settled by case law
and legal doctrine that the principle of "good faith"
(Treu und Glauben) applies to all obligations. Where
it appears from the facts which were brought before
the court that the above principle should find
application, there is no need to rely specially on
s.242 of the Civil Code, the court has to consider it
on its own motion. The proof of "undue exercise of
a right" (unzuiaessige Eechtsausuebung) rests on the
defendant.
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employer because the latter has threatened him with
discriminatory treatment or discharge in ease he should
join the union, this does not involve a failure to
implement the terms of the agreement for which the
contracting union of which the employee is a member is
responsible. It has been held by the Land Labour Court
of Hanover that it Is a typical behaviour for an employee
who is a union member to deny his union membership when
questioned about it by his employer ana that this does
not affect the duty of the union to see to it that the
6
terras of the agreement are implemented*
It follows from the above that it is only equitable
that an employer who is bound by a collective agreement
should be allowed to question his employees about their
union membership. In general an employer who is bound
by a collective agreement will not openly be anti-union
and therefore the disclosure of union membership will not
entail detrimental treatment* But what about employers
who are not bound by a collective agreement? Here there
is a danger that knowledge about union membership might
be abused. It is sometimes difficult to prove that a
certain act or omission amounts to a measure within the
meaning of Art,9(3). nould not it be enough to allow
interrogation only in cases whore the employer is bound
by a collective agreement?
6. See LAu Hanover, AP 52, Nr.8. Many eminent scholars
are of the opinion that in this case the Court went
too far. See also the decision of the Land Labour




In practice it is often very difficult to prove
that a measure which was employed by an employer is
violative of Art.9(3). The illegality of the measure
can only be inferred from the motive or objective of
the employer. For instance the discharge cases
constitute a special difficulty. There may be another
reason or reasons why an employer wishes to discharge
an employee which have nothing to do with union membership,
A well-founded suspicion that the discharge took place
because of union or non-union membership is not enough,
fthere it cannot be proved that the employers motive or
objective was to discourage or encourage union membership
the discharge is not illegal in accordance with Art.9(3).*
1. The same applies to other discriminatory action by
an employer.
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But in such cases the discharge might be socially
unwarranted under s.l of the Law for the Protection of
2
the Eight to Notice.
2. The Law for the Protection of the Right to Notice
provides that a discharge may take place only where a
valid reason exists for such discharge. The statute
applies to employees who are above the age of twenty
and who have been employed in an undertaking for six
months without interrupt ion. The statute applies
only to undertakings which employ sore than five
employees. By s.l(2) of the statute a discharge is
socially unwarranted which is not based on reasons
connected with the person or conduct of the employee,
or on "pressing operational requirements" of the
undertaking. Reasons connected with the "person"
include physical or mental unsuitability for the job,
unreliability ana frequent sickness. Some examples
of reasons connected with the conduct of employees
are: (1) Repeated unpunetuality (2) a well-founded
suspicion that the employee commits a criminal act
(3) disturbing the peace of the undertaking
(4) leading a scandalous life. Some examples of
"pressing operational requirements" are: (1) lack of
orders or decline in sales (2) rationalisation of the
business (3) lack of raw materials (4) difficulty
in obtaining credit (5) failure of machines, electricity
or gas provided they are not just short interruptions,
iuven if there are "pressing operational requireraents"
the discharge is socially unwarranted if the employer,
in his choice between several employees, has not paid
sufficient regard to the social aspect. Exceptions
are allowed if the undertaking is in need of special
services which only certain employees can render.
The employee has to taxe the initiative by filing his
action at the local labour court. The burden of proof
is on the employer that the discharge is socially
warranted. Where the court finds that the discharge
was in fact socially unwarranted the employment
relationship has not been dissolved and the discharge
has no legal effect. Upon the request of either party,
the court may award compensation in lieu of ordering
continuation of the employment relationship.
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Compensation
A measure which is violative of Art.9(3) may give
rise to a claim for compensation. But the illegality
in itself is not enough as the German law of tort does
not incorporate the principle that any wrongful act
(widerrechtlich) whereby damage is caused to someone
entitles to compensation.1
By s.S23(2) of the Civil Code a person injured by
a wrongful and negligent (fahrlaessig) or wilful
(vorsaetzlich) act* by means of which an express provision
of law intended for the protection of others is violated
is entitled to claim compensation from the wrongdoer.
Clearly Art.9(3) is a law for the protection of individual
eaiployers and employees; hence a wilful or negligent act
whereby a provision of that article has been violated
entitles the injured person to claim compensation from
the wrongdoer.
It is doubtful, however, whether compensation can
3
also be claimed under s.823(1). Nowadays aiost eminent
scholars are of the opinion that this subsection also
1. Cf. Snneccerus-Lehraaan, ochuldrecht (Law of Obligations)
loth ed., 1958, s.229 II.
2. For "negligent or wilful act" see ante, p.111.
3. For s.823(1) see ante, pp.99, 111.
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gives rise to a claim for compensation,4
There are cases where the measure in "contra bonos
mores'1. In these cases there is a cause of action
under s.826 of the Civil Code.5
Where a public official employs a measure, In
exercise of a public office entrusted to him, which is
violative of Art,9(3) a right to compensation arises
pursuant to s.839 of the Civil Code and Art.34 of the
BasicLaw.
4. Whether an employee can claim under this subsection
as well is of no practical importance as he has a
cause of action under s.823(2). As regards s.823(1)
this section gives rise to a claim for compensation
for the following reasons. The basic right of
"free development of personality", Art.2(1) Basic Law,
includes freedom to organise. It is provided in
that article that "everyone has the right to the free
development of his personality insofar as he does
not violate the rights of others or offend against
the constitutional order or the moral code". Thus
tue right is not merely guaranteed against governmental
infringement but also against private persons within
the limitations imposed by the proviso. From that
it follows that the "allgeiaeine Persoeniichkeitsreeht"
(i.e. respect, inviolability and freedom of activity
of the individual) is a private right as well. As
it is an absolute right it is a "sonstiges kecht"
(other right) which s.823(i) protects. Bee Nikisch, IX,
pp. 41 f., Mueck-Nipperdey II, p.99. It is nowadays
undisputed that the "allgemeines Persoeniieukeitsreeht"
is guaranteed oy the Basic Law. For an excellent
treatise on the subject see "Allgeaeines Eecht der
persoeniichkeit". Enneccerus-Nipperdey, 5th ed,, s.101.
5. For s.828 see ante, p.109 foot 2.
6. Liability rests in principle on the public authority
or the state etc. which employs hia. In the case of
wilful intent or gross carelessness the right of
recourse is reversed. See s.839 of the Civil Code
and Art.34 of the Basic Law.
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The amount of compensation to be paid is determined
on the merits of each case. As a rule in cases of
discharge because of union membership or activity, or
non-membership, the amount of compensation awarded is
7
not very high. In other cases of discrimination because
of union membership, non-membership or activity, the
amount of compensation to be awarded is determined in
accordance with ss.249 ff. of the Civil Code. German
law embodies the principles of restitution in kind
(Naturalrestitution). Subject to certain exceptions
a person liable to make compensation is bound to restore
the state of things which would have existed if the event
8
creating the liability had not happened. For instance
where an employee because of union membership was
transferred to a more difficult job or to a job with
less pay his original job has to be given back to him.
Moreover in many cases an employee can institute
a preventive prohibitory action (vorbeugende
Unterlassungsklage). For example where by a measure,
employed by an employer, a statutory provision for the
7. As has been mentioned before the discharge is void.
Also all other unilateral acts by an employer to
discourage or encourage union membership are void.
8. see s.249 of the civil Code.
9. This additional remedy has been developed by the
courts} it Is not expressly mentioned in the Civil
Code. For "prohibitory action (unterlassungsklage)tt
see Palandt introduction to s,823 comments 8(a), (b)
and (c)} Enneccerus-Lehmann, Schuldrecht II, s.252 1,
p.976. See also ante, p.115.
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protection of others has been violated and there is a
danger that the unlawful act will be repeated or continued
this type of action lies.10 It is important to note
that such action lies even if the employer has not acted
wilfully or negligently.
10. Art.9(3) is a statutory provision for the protection
of others, see ante, p.182.
185 -
Company unions
Tue social partners1 must be financially and
2
otherwise independent of one another# Financial or
3
non-finaneial support of a union, by an employers'
association, group of employers, or employer, deprives
it of one of the characteristics of an organisation as
required by Art.9(3) of the Basic Law.'* In other words
such a union is not an organisation within the meaning
of Art.9(3) and therefore the rights and protection
guaranteed by that article do not apply to it and its
members.
The law is very strict as regards support} even
indirect support, financial or non-finaneial, has the
effect that the union is not an organisation within the
1. tor "social partners" see ante, p.86 footnote 22.
2. This was also the prevailing view during the Weimar
Republic# see Sinzheimer, Grundzue^e des Arbeitsrecht
(1927) second ed., p.27; Flatow - Kahn-Freund,
KoaitBentar zua BetrnG (Betriebsraetegesetz), 1931,
s.8, comment 5. Nowadays all eminent scholars hold
the same view. See ilueek-Nipperdey II, p.66;
Dietz, BetrVG, s.2, comment 8. This harmonises with
Art.2 of ILO convention No.98 (1949) which was ratified
by the Federal Republic in 1955. See ILO Code 1951,
Vol.1, pp.69 ff. and post, p.208 footnote 25.
3. For example a check-off arrangement is considered
support#





Company unions, the so-called Werkvereine, which
were usually formed and supported by employers in
opposition to the established unions, and which as a
rule excluded the strike as a weapon, had been contemptuously
referred to as "yellow unions"• It Is clear, as yellow
unions are supported by employers they are not organisations
within the meaning of Art.9(3), They were specifically
excluded from the famous union-employers* agreement of
November 15, 1918, (Zentralarbeitsgemeinsehaft) in which
German employers unconditionally recognised the unions
as the spokesmen of German labour and which served as a
pattern for much of the subsequent legislation during the
Weimar Republic. After this agreement yellow unions
disappeared and they did not seriously reappear after 1945.
5. Of course also an employers* association which is
financially or otherwise dependent on a union is not
an organisation within the meaning of Art.9(3). The
question arises what about co-determination?
Co-determination is a practice that puts union members
in the A ui's icht srat (supervisory board) and a union
member in the inner circle of top management namely
in the Vorstand. The question arises whether an
employers* association of which some or all of its
members are employers in whose firm there is
co-determination, is an organisation within the meaning
of Art.9(3). Dietz is of the opinion that such
employers* associations are nevertheless organisations
wituin the meaning of the article. See Dietz,
Die Grundrecht-e. IIl/l,pp.431 f,, Hueck-Nipperdey II,
pp.79 f. The whole argument is hairsplitting; it
is difficult to conceive that these enterprises are
under the domination of unions.
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Ia the Federal Republic uaioas which are financially
or otherwise dependent on the social partner do not
enjoy the protection of Art.9(3) and they have not got
ft
the capacity to enter into collective agreements.
But there is no law which provides that they must be
disestablished or that these practices are unlawful,
however, in practice a union which has not got collective
bargaining capacity cannot be very powerful.
6. See Hueck-Nipperdey, Gruadriss des Arbeitsreehts,
second ed., pp.201 f.
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Chapter 9
Protection of Freedom to Organise In great Britain
general Observations
In Great Uritain freedom to organise is not protected
by law but this does not mean that discriminatory treatment
by employers because of union membership or activity does
not happen. Many of the short strikes eoncern alleged
victimisation of shop stewards or other employee
representatives. As the law does not protect, labour
has to avail itself of such remedies.
Fair r,a.: es Resolution
In 1946 a Fair Wages Resolution was adopted by the
House of Commons.* A Fair Wages resolution in itself
uas no statutory force, it is only the expression of the
will of parliament about the way in which the executive
should safeguard the interests of employees employed by
employers to whom government contracts are given.
Clause 4 of the Resolution provides that "the contractor
snail recognise the freedom of his workpeople to be
o
members of Trade Unions." Clause 3 of the Resolution
provides that "in the event of any question arising as
to whether the requirements of this Resolution are being
1. Fair Wages Resolution of the House of Commons of
14 October 1946, fto.4, 427 Hansard 619 f•
See Crad 7225 p.289.
2. In general local authorities and the corporations
of nationalised industries insert in contracts a
clause based on the Fair Wages Resolution,
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observed, the question shall, if not otherwise disposed
of, be referred by the Minister of Labour to an independent
Tribunal for decision*1. In practice sueh questions are
referred by the Minister of Labour to the Industrial Court,
When called upon the Court decides whether, and to what
extent, the contractor has been in breach of the Resolution
It is then the responsibility of the contracting department
to secure that any breach which the Industrial Court may
have found is remedied. Possibly the Department will be
entitled to an injunction. It is obvious as individual
employees are not parties to the contract they have no
cause of action.4 At any rate failure to observe the
provisions of the Resolution will result in the loss of
government contracts by the employer concerned.
3, The Industrial Court was established under the
Industrial Courts Act. 1919 (9 & 10 Geo.V, c.69).
The word court is here a misnomer; it is in effect
a standing arbitration body. The Court is a permanent
and independent tribunal whose awards are not legally
enforceable. The members of the Court are appointed
by the Minister of Labour and ares independent persons
and persons representing employees and employers. It
sits in divisions, usually composed of an independent
chairman and two other members one of whom is a
representative of employers and the other a
representative of employees. The Act provides where
the members are unable to agree as to the terras of
their award the matter shall be decided by the chairman
The procedure of the Court is governed by the
Industrial Court (procedure) Rules. 1920 (S.R, & 0.
No,'"554 (L.0)}. For further details regarding the
industriai Court see Ministry of Labour, Industrial
elat ions Handbook (ll.M* S.O,196i) pp.137 ff.
4. It might be argued that where the contract is governed
oy Scots law the "jus quaesitu a tertio" rule might
find application, but this seems rather doubtful.
To the knowledge of the present writer no attempt has
been made to invoke the rule in this connection.
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In 1964 the Association of Supervisory Staffs,
Executives anu Technicians (hereinafter referred to as
the Association) complained that M. Wiseman and Company
Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Company) to
which a public contract was awarded had failed to observe
5
clauses 4 and 5 of the Fair Wages Resolution (1946).
The matter was referred by the minister of Labour to the
Industrial Court for decision. The main issue in this
7
case was the re-employment of four union officials.
In support of their claim that the Company was
failing to recognise the right of their foremen to be
members of the Association, the Association relied mainly
on the following points : (1) that when in 1955-56 a
first attempt was made to organise the foremen they were
told they would be dismissed if they joined a union.
Moreover, there had been advice proffered to them on
promotion to the position of foreman that they should
leave their union and become non-unionists. (2) On the
17th December, 1963, it was arranged that a meeting should
take place between the Works Manager and five delegates
5. Clause 5 provides that "the contractor shall at ail
times during the continuance of a contract display,
for the information of his workpeople, in every
factory, workshop or place occupied or used by him
for the execution of the contract a copy of this
Resolution".
6. See (3039) Fair sages -esolution.
7. This case serves as a good example of how breaches
of the Pair ,rages Resolution are dealt with by the
Industrial Court, The main submissions made by the
parties are given here as the Court does not state
in its awards the facts of the case.
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of the foremen, to determine the entitlement of the latter
in respect of sick pay and superannuation. The meeting
case to nothing because they were told that the person
who could decide those matters could see them only two
days later. The foremen's delegates were also told that
a discussion of their grievances with one of the Directors
could not take place until the end of January, 1964,
Believing that the Company was deliberately procrastinating,
the foremen left the factory on the afternoon of the 17th
December to discuss the matter, and were dismissed on
returning to work the next morning. During the period
from 18th December until the 8th day, 1964, the Association
tried every constitutional .jeans to per&uaue the Company
to re-engage the staff they had dismissed. At local
level the other unions at the factory attempted to mediate,
Conciliation Officers of the Ministry of Labour tried to
persuade the Company to discuss with the Association
arrangements for the re-employment of the staff concerned,
anti the local Member of Parliament also intervened, but
ail without success. Finally, however, the General
Secretary of the Scottish Trade Union Congress persuaded
the Company to agree to arrangements whereby all but four
of the dismissed staff would re-start work by 8th May, 1964,
the four to be guaranteed re-employment, within four weeks
of that date. The Company had not kept faith in the
matter; they refused to re-engage the remaining four
foremen and, one of the four having subsequently died,
were still refusing to re-engage the remaining three.
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The Company submitted that the 30 works supervisors
had absented themselves from their afternoon duties on
17th December, That action was calculated and intended
to cause complete dislocation of work at the factory for
the afternoon. It was an act of the utmost irresponsibility
on the part of the supervisory staff who had been given
no provocation whatsoever. Their dismissal was entirely
justified.
As to the Associations contention that they had
tried every constitutional means to persuade the Company
to re-engage the dismissed persons the Company maintained
that between 18th December 1963 and. the 8th May 1964,
Association members had continually picketed the factory,
had threatened some of the ordinary employees when outside
3
the factory and had incited them to sabotage machinery;
they had sent copies of a threatening letter to other
employees^ had obtained publicity through the media of
press ana television in an attempt to discredit the Company;
and had behaved offensively in other ways. As a result
of the behaviour of the former supervisors, who had
expressed an intention to force the factory to close,
feeling in the factory ran high, and on more than one
occasion employees had to be restrained from fighting with
the Association's pickets. At a meeting on 25th February,1964,
S, Statements alleging specific incidents of misconduct
signed by three apprentices on the i6th July, 1964,
were submitted. It is interesting to note that the
statements were by "apprentices",
9, A copy of the letter was placed before the Court.
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the factory shop stewards had confirmed that the
re-instatement of the dismissed persons would cat se a
number of the present employees to leave and might- well
lead to industrial action by other employees at the
factory.
Immediately after the supervisors had absented
themselves on the 17th December, 1963 the Company had
started to re-organise the system of working at the
factory so as to ensure the continuation of its work.
The Company was successful in achieving those objects,
in view of this and of the matters referred to above,
they were reluctant to re-employ any of the dismissed
supervisors. However, 26 supervisors had been re-employed
by 8th May, 1964. The Company denied that they had
uauertaken to re-employ the remaining four supervisors#*0
As regards the first point relied on by the Association
the factory manager in evidence said that he had said
something similar but it did not amount to what the
Association was alleging. Moreover, in 1956 Government
work had not yet started at their factory.
In this case the Court decided that up to the 28th
January, 1964, the Company were in breach of clause 5
in that they did not display at their factory a copy of
the resolution as required by the aforementioned clause
but that it hao not been established that the Company had
at any material time failed to observe the requirements
of clause 4.
10. A letter was placed before the Court in which it was
stated, among other things, that the Company was
prepared to do its utmost to find work for the
remaining 8 people within 4 weeks. Four of the
eight were actually re-employed but the rest were not.
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It is the practice of the Industrial Court to
express its awards without discussion of the merits of
the submissions made by the parties or of the factors on
whicu the awards are based. Occasionally brief
references are made to exceptional features whieh have
been taken into account by the court. This seems a
great drawback, as just by reading the award it is
impossible to tell why and how the court arrived at a
certain decision. Also there is no possibility of
relying on previous decisions where similar facts were
before the court.
Obviously clause 4 of the Fair Wages Resolution
was adopted by the House of Commons to protect esaployees
in their right to organise. But the Court has never given
an interpretation as to what sort of protection the clause
affords. For example from a complaint made by the
National Association of Toolmakers against the Pressed
Steel Company Limited*1 it appears that the Court decided
that the requirements that the contractor shall recognise
the freedom of his workpeople to be members of Trade Unions
means that employees are free to join the union recognised
by the employer, and not other unions if the joining of
other unions might lead to industrial unrest. But this
can only be learned indirectly from the award and it is
not quite certain whether this was the main ground why
the Court arrived at its decision.
li. See (3009) Fair $ages Resolution.
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Tiius a union cannot know what activity by an employer
would be considered an interference with the right to
organise. Moreover, in cases of discharge because of
union membership or activity the court is not empowered
to order reinstatement, and neither has the contracting
Department a legal remedy lyhereby the employer can be
forced to do so.
The Industrial Court awards do not get enough publicity.
Only decisions which relate to a substantial part of
industry are reported in the Ministry of Labour Gazette.
For example the two above mentioned awards were not
published in the Gazette because they do not relate to a
substantial part of industry.
Last but not least the clause applies only to employers
to whom government contracts are given.
Courts of Inquiry
By the Industrial Courts Act, 1919,*^ the Minister
of Labour is empowered to refer any matter appearing to
hlia to be connected with or relevant to a trade dispute,
whether existing or apprehended, to a Court of Inquiry.
In practice sucn courts are appointed only when no
settlement of a dispute seems possible, and it is
reserved for matters of major importance affecting the
public interest. Thus usually only disputes which take
place in big undertakings come before a Court of Inquiry.
The Courts of Inquiry are a means of informing Parliament
and tue public of the facts underlying causes of a dispute.
12. For Industrial Court see ante, p.190 footnote 3.
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The recommendations of the Court are not binding in law.
The consent of the parties to the dispute to refer the
f
matter to a Court of Inquiry is not required.
A number of Courts of Inquiries were appointed to
inquire into disputes which arose over alleged victimisation
of union members.
For example in 1963 a Court of Inquiry was appointed
to inquire into the causes and the circumstances of a
dispute between the Ford Motor Company, Ltd., bagenham
and members of the trade unions represented on the trade
18
union side of the Ford National Joint Negotiating Committee.
The facts were briefly as follows * Arising, from
a redundancy situation the Company refused to re-engage
17 shop stewards. Out of the 17 men two had 17 years
of service with the Company, one had 13 years, one had
11 years, two hau 10 years and two had 9 years. It was
clear that the 17 men who were not to be re-engaged in
any circumstances were taken out of turn, and that the
opportunity was being taken by the Company to dispense
with the services of men who were regarded as trouble¬
makers, A very detailed statement of the offences for
which these men were held responsible was submitted to
the Court, but it did not appear that it was put before
the Union concerned. These misdemeanours had occurred
over a number of years but the Company had taken no
steps when they actually occurred. The Company insisted
13. dee Cmnd 1999 of 1963.
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on their right to dismiss employees who in their judgement
were unsatisfactory and disloyal and the unions adhered
to the principle of "last in, first out" which they
maintained was in accordance with normal industrial
practice where there is redundancy.
The Court was impresses by the similarities between
the submission of the parties in the present case and
those made in 1957, and remarked that the hopes which
15
were raised on that occasion had not been fulfilled.
The Court said that it was important to recognise
the Company1s right to engage and discharge labour as
thought fit, subject always to the proviso that the
exercise of this was seen to be fair and equitable.
14. The redundancy Payments act (1963, e.62) does not
make provisions as to the order in which employees
are to be dismissed where there is redundancy.
By s.8 of the Act in order to be entitled to a
payment an employee must have at least 104 weeks of
continuous service, over the age of eighteen, with
his employer. The amount of a redundancy payment
depends, among other things, on how long the employee
has been employed with his employer. Thus the Act
indirectly enforces the above mentioned rule as an
employer will dismiss the men with shorter service
in order to pay less or nothing at all. In general
an employee dismissed for conduct justifying summary
dismissal has no entitlement to a payment. See ss.2(2)
and 10 of the Aet.
15. in 1957 a Court of Inquiry was appointed to inquire
into the causes and circumstances of a dispute at
Briggs iotor Bodies Ltd., Dagenhara, existing between
the Ford lotor Company Ltd. and members of the trade
unions represented on the Trade Union side of the
Ford National Joint Negotiating Committee. dee
Cmnd 131 of 1957.
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The Court went on to say that there was no reason to
suppose that any one of the 17 men was dismissed on the
ground that he was a shop steward. Where there is a
misdemeanour shop stewards have no claim to privilege.
it is generally accepted, however, that the penalty for
a misdemeanour should be imposed as soon as possible
1 fi
after the misdemeanour had occurred. This might take
the form of suspension in the first instance with the
prospect of dismissal to follow if a misdemeanour were
repeated. As a rule it is not desirable that punitive
action should be taken after a number of misdemeanours
have been allowed to accumulate over a number of years.
The Court recommended that in resolving the present
dispute the Company, without detracting from their
fundamental right to discharge unsatisfactory employees,
suoulu supply the unions concerned with the details which
taey supplied to the Court concerning the records of the
17 men, and they should have regard to any proper
observations which the unions might submit.
The Court remarked that the unions concerned had
not enough authority over their shop stewards.
The Court maae the following proposal j The unions
which are members of the National Joint Negotiating
Committee might appoint a full-time official for work at
Fords with special responsibility for supervising the
16. The term "misdemeanour" is not used here in the
le^al sense.
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shop stewards ana for ensuring that procedure agree .-eats
are properly and fully observed. The salary of this
official and any expenses connected with his work could
be shared between the 21 unions in proportion to their
respective memberships. It would be important that
this official should have the full support of the National
Joint Negotiating Committee. Just as arrangements are
made by the Company for the training of foremen, the
unions, either individually or collectively, but preferably
the latter, should take steps to ensure that shop stewards
received some training for the exercise of their
responsibilities. Arrangements and facilities which
existed to enable shop stewards to get in touch with
their conveners was a problem of organisation which it
should ue possible to resolve with good will on both sides.
It appears from this case that the shop stewards
were not re-engaged, not because of activities on behalf
of their union, but for activities which most probably
had some tiling to do with unionism which, however, were
not authorised by their union. The Court made a proposal
that a full-time union official should be appointed with
special responsibility for supervising the shop stewards.
One wonders if a law in which the right to organise was
guaranteed and protected would not be more effective.
Of course a tribunal and appellate court would be required
in order to interpret the scope of the law. The
"active" of the employer which is vital in such cases
could then be considered by such a tribunal and court.
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There is no need for the employer to be victimised.
Moreover such court and tribunal must be empowered to
give orders which can be legally enforced in cases where
it has been found that the law has been violated. The
17
present state of anarchy gives rise to injustice.
In Great Britain the yellow dog document, a contract
by which an employee agreed that he will not join any
union or continue to be a member of a union during his
tenure of employment, is not illegal. In 1952 a Court
of Inquiry was appointed to inquire into a dispute between
B.C. Thomson and Company Limited (hereinafter referred to
as the Company) and certain workpeople, members of the
National Society of Operative printers and Assistants.
The Company required their employees to sign an undertaking
that they would not join a trade union. Throughout the
dispute the unions asserted that their fundamental object
was the abandonment of the undertaking to which they took
exception. The Court of Inquiry thought that such an
undertaking leads to a number of undesirable results but
18
emphasized that the yellow dog document is perfectly legal.
There was also a legal action. As the document Is
legal no proceedings could be instituted against the
Company so the union sought the aid of other unions and
17. In this study it is stated how cases similar to the
above are dealt with in the United States and in the
Federal Republic of Germany. Despite the fact that
the law in these countries is not entirely satisfactory
it seems a better solution than having no law at all
dealing with these problems.
18. See Cmd 8607 of 1952
- 201 -
a secondary boycott was started* Certain of the
employees of Bowater Ltd, woo supplied the Company with
paper, expressed their unwillingness to handle paper
destined for the Company. As a result Bowater Ltd told
the Company that they would not be able to make deliveries
of paper as they were required to do by contract. The
Company sought an injunction against the union officials
to restrain them from causing or procuring breaches of
contract between Bowater Ltd and the Company. The Court
of Appeal decided as the union offioials had gone to the
servant of Bowater Ltd and not to the company itself,
namely to a director of Bowater Ltd, it was an indirect
inducement only. As in this case no wrongful means were
19
used it was not a tortious act.
The D. C. Thomson caso shows clearly how important
it is, in countries where freedom to organise is not
protected by law, that unions should be allowed to resort
to economic weapons, although obviously this is not a
satisfactory solution. Such contracts should be void.
Thus the unions are fully justified in taking these drastic
steps but there should not be a need for it. Moreover
if employees in small firms are asked to sign such
undertakings very often it does not come out into the
open, and when it does the union might not consider it
wise to declare a boycott because just a few employees
are affected.
19. see It. C. Thomson & Co. Ltd, v. Peak in [1952] Ch.646.
For "indirect inducement of a breach of contract"
see aite, p.12.
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Complaints to the International Labour Organisation
The U.K. has ratified I.L.O. Convention No. 87,
concerning freedom of association and protection of the
right to organise, and i.L.O. Convention Ho. 93,
concerning the application of the principles of the right
to organise and to bargain collectively. But of course
these conventions do not become law simply because they
have been ratified by a.Id. Government. An Act of
Parliament would be needed for that, and so far such an
20
Act has not been passed.
A special procedure has been introduced by arrangement
between taa United Nations and the I.L.O. for the
examination of alleged infringements of trade union rights.
This procedure is not confined to alleged violations of
obligations resulting from the ratification of conventions,
fn 1950 the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on
Freedom of Association was set up. Its chief duty is to
make investigations into complaints submitted to it by
the Governing Body of the I.L.O. where it is alleged that
freedom of association has been violated. i'he only
complaints which are considered by it, apart from those
officially referred to the I.L.O. by the united Nations
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, are those
made by workers' organisations, employers' organisations
or by cGvernioehts. A complaint may be submitted either
to the United Nations or the i.L.Q. The Economic and
20. Member States of the I.L.O. are uaoer an obligation
to ensure that national law and practice comply with
the provisions of the conventions which they ratify.
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Social Council passes on to the I.L.O. any complaints
received uy the United Nations regarding member states
of the x.L.Q. | and the x.L.G. passes on to the Economic
auu social Council any complaints affecting member
countries of the bnitea Nations which are not members of
the 1. L. 0.
If tae complaint is against a member state of the
i.n.G, the complaint is communicated to the government
concerned by the i.L.G. with a request to forward as
soon as possible any observations or comments it may wish
to make. The complaint, together with the government's
observations, if any, are then submitted to the Governing
body for a preliminary examination.
Complaints regarding member states of the I.L.O, are
examined by a special committee of the Governing Body,
namely, tae Committee on Freedom of Association, The
main task of this Committee is to make a thorough
preliminary examination of each complaint and of the
observations made to it, if aay, by the government concerned,
and then to advise the Governing Body whether or not the
matter calls for more exhaustive investigation. If the
Committee on Freedom of Association is of the opinion
that a complaint does not warrant further consideration
it advises the Governing Body not to proceed with the case.
If it considers that the eomplaint deserves further
examination it may advise the Governing Body to refer the
case to the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on
Freedom of Association. however, before the Governing
Body can refer the case to that commission it must first
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seels and obtain the consent of the government concerned.
when the government concerned refuses to allow the ease
to be referred to the Coaaiseioc the Govern in.. Body Is
allowed to publish the complaint and the fact that the
government. concerned has refused to allow the coaplaint
to be referred to the Commission,
In a number of eases where inquiry had shown that
the right to organise was being violated tbo Committee
on Freedom o Association advised the Governing Body,
which accepted the Cowjit tee's reco.i aondatioa, to ask
the governments concerned to amend their law or practice.
Sojo governments have acted on these recommendations.
It is obvious that a complaint to the I.L.o. say
help to bring the matter out into the open but it is
PI
certainly not as effectual as could be desired.
In 1954 the Aeronautical Eagineers' Association
(hereinafter referred to as A.h.A.) rsade a complaint to
the i.L.O, that the Government of the U.K. bad failed to
secure the observance of conventions ratified by it.
The A.G.A. complained that two government owned air
corporations, namely B.O.A.C, and 8.&.A.C. had violated
22
Art.2 of Convent ion ho. 87" and com ait tod acts prohibited
21. For further details see Preedo » of Associat ion and
tue protection of toe hi&ht To Organise ~ A vorkera'
Gducat tonal aaua1: published by the I.L.O. In 1959.
22, Art.2 of Convention No. 37 provides that "workers
and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall
have the right t establish and, subject only to the
rules of the organisation concerned, to join




by Art.1 of Convention No* 98.^ it was claimed that an
agreement made ia the National Joint Council was contrary
to these coaveiitioas. The agreement provided that as and
when the recognised unions claimed 100 per cent membership
in any shop or department of either Corporation, that shop
or department would be debarred to members of the A.m.A.
and the latter would not be allowed to work therein. It
was alleged further, and acre specifically, that J.O.A.C.
by debarring members of the A.m.A. from working in certain
shops and by defying them promotion was prejudicing
employees because of their union laetsfoership, contrary to
Art.l, para 2(b) of Convention No. 98, and by making it
obligatory for thera to relinquish their trade union
membership as an essential preliminary to continued
employment after transfer to a now base, was acting contrary
to Art.l, para 2(a) of that convention. Liorcover, it was
contended that employees of B.ii.A.C. who were members of
23, Art.l of Convention No. 98 provides that? "1. Workers
shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of
anti-union discrimination in respect of their
employment, 2. Such protection shall apply more
particularly in respect of acts calculated to -
(a) make the employment of a worker subject to the
conuition that he shall join a union or shall
relinquish trade union membership (b) cause the
dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by reason
of union membership or because of participation in
union activities outside working hours or, with the
consent of the employer, within working hours."
Ait.3 of convention no. 98 provides that macuinery
appropriate to national conditions shall be established,
where necessary, for the purpose of ensuring respect
for the right to organise as defined in Articles 1 and
2 of this convention.
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A.E.A. were denied protection against acts of discrisination
based oa their union membership, contrary to Art. 1 of
Convention No.98 - e.g. denial of the right to work in
certain departments, denial of opportunities for working
overtime etc. The facts were not disanted.
Tlie Comuittee on Freedom of Association came to the
conclusion that the only evidence of any restriction of
the workers* fundamental right to become a member of a
trade union of their own choice pursuant to Art.2 of
Convention No. 87 was to be found in the allegation that
a worker wishing to join one of the unions recognised by
the employers when he was already a metaber of A.iS.A. must,
under tue rules of the recognised unions, fii'st resign
from the A.N.a. In other words, the A.N.A. itself made
it clear that worsers can exercise the right to join the
A.N.a. or may choose to join one of the recognised unions
subject to the rules of the union concerned. The Committee
considered therefore that the complainant had not offered
sufficient eviaence to show that the fundamental right to
exercise tue freedom to join a trade union of their own
choice guaranteed in Art.2 of Convention No. 87 had been
violated.
Toe Committee aiso came to the conclusion that Art.l
of Convention No. 93 had not been violated. This article
was so drafted as to exclude from its scope any question
of the protection of one union against another. The
Committee stressed that tne article is aimed at prohibiting
acts of discrimination committed in order to embarrass
trade union activities as such.
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The Committee recommended the Governing Body to
24
decide that the ease did not call for further examination.
In Great Britain there is no law dealing with company-
dominated unions. If an employer wishes to establish
such a union and recognise it he is free to do so. There
is no law which provides that a union which is supported
by an employer is incapable of representing employees for
the purpose of negotiating terms and conditions of employment.
in 1962 the National Union of Bank Employees
(hereinafter referred to as the N.U.ii.E.) made a complaint
to the I.L.O. that the Government of the U.K. had failed
to ensure that the provisions of Convention No, 98, and,
in particular, the provisioxis of Art.2, para 2, of that
convention, which it had ratified, were being applied by
OK
certain British banks. In their complaint the N.U.B.E.
alleged that the backing employers were preventing them
from exercising their proper and normal function as a
trade union by supporting and using internal staff associations.
24. See the 18th heport of the Governing Body Committee
onFreedom of Association. Published in the Official
Bulletin of the I.E.G., Vol.iLXXYlI. No.4. dated
3Gth Nov,, 1954.
25. Art.2 provides that "1. Workers' and employers'
organisations snail enjoy adequate protection against
a..y acts of interference by each other or each other's
agents or members in their establishment, functioning
and administration. 2. In particular, acts which
are designed to promote the establishment of workers'
organisations, or to support workers' organisations
by financial or other means, with the object of placing
such organisations under the control of employers or
employers' organisations, shall be deemed to constitute
acts of interference within the meaning of this Article."
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In addition to waking certain observations of a general
character, cealt specifically in its allegations
with the situations in four Banks, namely the District,
Martins, National provincial and Yorkshire Banks.
The U.K. Government forwarded to the I.L.O.
observations on the Complaint by the Mana6e*aent and Staff
Associations of the four Banks particularly concerned.
The Committee on Freedom of Association recommended to
the Governing body of the I.L.O. that the U.K. Government
suould be invited to arrange for an impartial, full and
prompt- inquiry into the facts of the case and to endeavour
to promote an agreed settlement on the basis of such au
inquiry. The Governing Body of the I.L.O. accepted the
recommendations of the Co iiaittee. The Director General
wrote to the Minister of Labour asking whether the U.K.
goveriiaent was in a position to undertake an inquiry on
the lines suggested. In 1963 the Minister of Labour
appointed the honourable Lord Cameron, judge of the Court
of Session of Scotland, to inquire into the complaint
Of\
made by the K.U.B.g. to the I.L.O, and report."
The real issue in this case was recognition. The
N.U.B.L. wished to represent exclusively the interests
of ail baak employees in these four (and all other) banks.
None of the four Banks refused to receive and acknowledge
written representations from the officers of the N.U.B.E.
out they had not been prepared to accept oral representations
26. See Fieport of the Inquiry Cmnd 2202 of 1963, pp. 112-115
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from the same source or from the same person on the
27
saue subject.
Loru Cameron in the Report came to the conclusion
that the Staff Associations were not company dominated
unions. He was of the opinion that the N.U. B.H. had
failed to appreciate the factual independence of the
Staff Associations in their constitutions and functions,
or the significance of the fact that these Associations
command the support of large numbers of their professionai
colleagues, who are as independent-minded and responsible
as the majority of their own members. He stated In the
Report that it may weil be that these representative
organs have different philosophies from those of the
N.U.B.*. as to their functions and the best methods of
representing and furthering the legitimate interests of
their members, but that it must be kept in view that the
Staff Associations had achieved standards of pay and
conditions which do not compare unfavourably with those
achieved by the N.U.B.d. in the cases where it is the
28
recognised negotiating body.
27. Trouble in banking started in 1919 with the arrival
of the Jsi.U.ii.B's predecessor the Guild of Bank
Officers. The staff associations, one to each bank,
were started to prevent employees from joining the
Guild. Membership in the staff associations was
compulsory and officials were paid by the company.
Until today only Lloyds have officers who are not
paid by the bank but membership is no longer coiapulsory.
See Colin McGlashan, Bank Clerks Breaking down Old
Antagonisms. Sunday Observer of 23 May, 1965
28. This is not really a proof that a union is not under
the domination of an employer. It can be learned
from cases in other countries that company-unions
very often succeed in obtaining good working conditions
for the employees of the company. But freedom of
organisation involves more than just being paid well.
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Lord Cameron suggested that the parties might
endeavour with the assistance of officers of the Ministry
of Labour, to explore the extent, manner and method in
which N#U.B„E, representations on matters affecting the
interests of their members could be usefully and
helpfully conveyed to, and considered by and with, the
Managements of the four Banks or their representatives
in oral as well as written exchanges, but without
prejudice to the full recognition presently enjoyed by
their respective Staff Associations. He further
suggested that the employers concerned on the one side
and M.U.B.iS. and the Staff Associations on the other
should agree on a definition on what they would regard
as "national issues" and agree on a method of joint
consultation and discussion with the object of settling
questions arising upon such issues. He added, that if
this suggestion should commend itself it could be open
for consiueration and exploration throughout the industry
29, delations between the parties since the Inquiry
have improved. See an article in The Times (London
of 16 June, 1964, entitled New Attitude to hanks fay
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Comparisons and Conclusions
delating to Part II
In the Federal liepuolic of Germany and the United
States of America freedom to organise is protected by
law. a study of the law in the two countries reveals
that the law varies in certain respects but a common
denominator can clearly be ascertained.
Freedom to organise is a prerequisite to collective
bargaining. As the law of collective bargaining differs
considerably in the two countries this sometimes has
repercussions on certain aspects of the law dealing with
the protection of freedom to organise. Specific rights
which are of importance in one country are not always
of the same importance in the other. Moreover there
are differences because the machinery which deals with
the enforcement of the law has to fit in with the rest
of the judicial system of the country. Procedure and
Interpretation of the law must be in accordance with the
rules of procedure and interpretation of the country in
question. But in spite of all that the underlying
principles are the same, namely to prepare the ground
for collective bargaining, and an appreciation of the
fact that this is a freedom which has to be protected
like tne rest of freedoms which every democratic country
goes to great pains to protect.
In the Federal Bepublic freedom to organise is
protected by a constitutional provision, whilst in the
United States the right is not protected by the U.S.
Constitution but by a federal statute.
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In the United States the federal statute excludes
certain persons from its protection, amongst them employees
of federal, state and local governments and supervisors.
It is to be regretted that after the enactment of the
Taft-Hartley amendments supervisory employees are no
longer protected against acts of discrimination. The
term supervisor as defined in s.2(ll) of the MLkA is by
far too broad and includes employees who certainly
cannot be considered as part of manageraent. * S.2(3) of
tue NiUiA provides in relevant part that the term "employee"
shall not include any individual employed as a supervisor.
That they have the right to join or remain a member of a
o
union is not of much use if the right is not protected.
Also there seems no justification why employees of federal,
state and local governments should not enjoy the protection
afforded by the MLHA as regards the right to organise.1
1. S.2(ll) gives a functional definition of the term
"supervisor". It provides that the term "supervisor"
means any individual having authority, in the interest
of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off,
recall, promote, dischargo, assign, reward, or
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively
to recosuaend such action, if in connection with the
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a
merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the
use of independent judgment.
2. S.l*(a) of the NLkA provides that nothing herein shall
prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from
becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization,
but no employer subject to this Act shall be compelled
to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as
employees for the purpose of any law, either national
or local, relating to collective bargaining.
3. Postal employees enjoy a certain amount of protection.
Under the Lloyd-La Follette Act (37 Stat.55, 5 USC
f652, FGA 5 £652) they are protected from reduction in
rank or removal due to union affiliation if such
affiliation does not impose the obligation to engage in
or support a strike against the United States.
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This seens a hangover from the past for which nowadays
there is no valid reason. As the Act excludes
supervisory staff one can hardly say that those wuo
would be covered by it occupy positions which call for
a special loyalty towards their employer. It is
expressly provided by the Labor-Management delations Act.
1947, that individuals employed by the federal government
A
are not allowed to strike. This could be extended to
employees of state and local governments, though it is
doubtful if there is a need for such a provision at all,
as the Act even without it provides enough safeguards
preventing unions from abusing their rights.
In the Federal republic Art.9(3) of the Basic Law
guarantees and protects freedom to organise to everyone
ana ail professions. No one is excluded; the article
5
applies even to soldiers in the army.1
In tne Federal hepublic freedom to organise is
protected by a broad general provision in the Constitution.
4. see s.305 of the Labor-Management relations Act. 1947
and ante, p.50.
5. From the beginning of August, 1966, soldiers are
permitted not only to join an internal array association
but to join any union of their own choice. Unions
enjoy the same organisational rights as they have in
private enterprises except that union meetings in
barracks are prohibited. The above rights are clearly
guaranteed by the Basic Law. But in fact up to
August, 1966, the Defence Ministry forbad soldiers to
join^unions of their own choice. After a long battle
the ofV (Union of public Service, Transport & Traffic),
watch is affiliated to the top organisation, i.e. the
hhh, succeeded in establishing those rights. See
ocdrift on auf Stube in der S ie^el No. 34/1966 on p.21.
In the United states soldiers are not within the
jurisdiction of the nhlih.
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In the United states, in the NLEA, there is a section
with a general provision which outlaws all activities
designed to obstruct or interfere with free organisational
activities, and there are two sections which prohibit
specific acts. Experience has shown that there is a
need for a general provision as employers began to find
ways to interfere with the right to organise without
indulging in those practices specifically mentioned.
Thus it appears that the right to organise can be
protected mere effectively by a general provision.
A general provision, however, gives to those who
interpret tue law a great cieai of power. In the United
States the Boarc, the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme
Court interpret the scope of the law. hut it is
essentially the board and to some extent the Supreme
Court wiiicn interpret the law to keep pace with current
developments. A great deal seems to depend on the
political views of the members of the Board. For
example the rule that subject to certain exceptions an
employer does not commit an unfair labour practice if
he makes a pre-election speech on company time and
premises to his employees, and denies the union's request
for an opportunity to reply ' was fashioned by members
h. In the United States, of course, propaganda campaigns
before an election are of utmost importance because
if the union succeeds in enlisting or getting the
support of enough employees the Board certifies it,




of the Board whc were appointed by a Republican President. ' '
In the Federal Republic certain actions by employer
which are blatantly discriminatory or interfere with the
right to organise are generally accepted as a violation
of Art.9(3), limb 2. In many instances they involve a
violation of other basic rights guaranteed by the Basic
Law. But specific activities are sometimes included or
excluded in order that the law should harmonize with the
rest of the law of labour relations. For example the
interrogation of employees by their employer about their
union membership Is not a violation of Art.9(3), limb 2,
of the Basic naw because it is considered that an employer
wuo is bound by a collective agreement has a right to find
out which of his employees are entitled to the collective
terms of employment.
7. See Wirtz The New National Labor relations Board:
Herein of "Employer Persuasion", 49 Nw. U.L. Rev.
(1954) pp. 598 f.
8. S«3(a) of the RLliA provides that the Board shall
consist of five members, appointed by the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
They snail be appointed for terms of five years each,
excepting that any individual chosen to fill a vacancy
shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of
the member whom he shall succeed. The president
shall designate one member to serve as Chairman of
the So&ra. Any member of the Board may be removed
by the President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect
of auty or malfeasance in office, but for no other
cause.
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In the Federal Republic it is the Federal Labour
Court, sometimes Land labour courts, and eminent scholars
wSio decide whether specific employer practices are covered
by Art-, 9(3), limb 2. Divisions of local labour courts
and Lane labour courts consist of a presiding judge, who
q
must have qualifications for holding judicial office,
and two lay members one of whom is a representative of
If)
employers and the other a representative of employees.
A panel (Senat) of the Federal Labour Court consists of
three federal judges (Buncesriehter) and two lay members,
one an employer representative and the other an employee
11
representative. Thus in all labour courts there is an
equal number of members from each side of industry. As
has been mentioned before the Federal Labour Court through
its decisions exercises a great influence on the decisions
of the instances below it; in fact in a modified form
the principle of stare decisis finds application.
9. The presiding judge iu a local labour court aust have
qualifications for holding judicial office or at
least five years of practical experience in the field
of labour law. The presiding judge in a Land labour
court must have qualifications for holding judicial
office.
10. There are certain eases where divisions of labour
courts must consist of a presiding judge and four
lay members; two lay saetabers from each side of industry.
See 88.16(2) and 35(2) of the Labour Court Statute.
11. The lay members of the Federal Labour Court must at
least have been for four years members of a labour
court before they qualify as members of the Federal
Labour Court. Thus it is ensured that not only each
side of industry is represented but that those
representing them have experience in the field of
labour law.
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High authority is accorded by the courts to the opinions
of eminent scholars despite the fact that no court is bound
to adopt these views. They are instrumental in. fashioning
new doctrines, and each case which involves important or
disputed questions of law, gives rise to the publication
of numerous articles on the topic, often written even
before the decision is given. Whether the exercise of
such , rent- influence on the interpretation of the scope
of the law by a number of scholars, who are certainly of
the highest academic order, is always desirable is
questionable. The opinions of scholars from trade union
circles are mostly ignored. It is the pure academic who
is presumed to have a neutral approach and oapable of
seeing the picture as a whole.
In the United States any conduct on the part of the
employer which is likely to influence the decisions of
employees to organise is suspect; it may be privileged
but unless a justification is available It is violative
of s.8(a)(l) of the NLRA. In the Federal Republic the
burden of proof lies on the plaintiff that a violation
of Art.9(3), limb 2, has taken place.
In both countries in cases where victimisation because
of union membership or activity or non-membership is
alleged much attention is paid to the motive of the
employer. In the Federal Republic, strictly speaking,
it is enouga to prove that actually a restriction in the
right to organise has taken place. As regards agreeruents
this can be inferred from the agreement itself but in most
cases it is difficult to draw s eh inferences from an act
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or emission* Thus where it is alleged that by a measure
Art.9(3), limb 2, has been violated the motive or the
purpose of the employer is controlling, in the United
States when the Board looks at the evidence it must
decide whether a preponderance of the testimony shows that
the employer^ reai reason was to discourage or encourage
union membership or whether the discriminatory treatment
or discharge was for some other reason.
In the United States the federal law permits union-
shop agreements under certain conditions whilst in the
Federal .Republic the prevailing view is that any type of
union - security agreement is prohibited by the Basic Law.
In both countries if by discriminatory action against
an employee a union or an employer seeks to encourage
union membership as such or in a particular union this
is prohibited by law. In the United States a union-shop
arrangement constitutes an exception to this rule. The
right-to-work laws in the United States seem incompatible
with the spirit of the NLnA. However, it appears that it
will not be long now before s,U(b) of the RLEA is repealed.
It is maintained that in the Federal Republic there
is no need for a union-security clause in a collective
agreement as there is the possibility of extending the
coverage of collective agreements to outsiders. To this
can only be said this is by all means not the same. It
is true that nowadays in the Federal Republic union
rivalism has gone and there is no need to protect a union
against another union. The problem, from the point of
view of the union, are the outsiders, i.e. the non-organised
employees. there a collective agreement is declared
to be generally binding, and this is not possible in all
instances certain conditions must be complied with,
the outsiders reap the fruits of the efforts made by
the union without paying union dues* The declaration
that the agreement is generally binding mainly protects
the unionised enterprise against non-unionised enterprises,
as without the declaration the latter is free to pay
lower wages and consequently in a position to offer goods
and/or services at lower prices.
In the United States and in the Federal Republic,
though technically the law varies, in practice an employee
who has been discriminated against or discharged because
of union activity or membership, or non-membership, or
membership in a particular union, is restored to the
position as if the unlawful event had not happened. In
both countries the legislature refrained from imposing
penalties. The aim of the law is not the punishment of
the employer but rather the undoing of activities which
interfere with the right to organise. In the United
States efforts are made by the Field Examiner to dispose
of charges informally and in the Federal Republic when
an action is brought before the local labour court the
presiding judge makes all efforts that the parties should
reach an amicable settlement, and only after this is
unsuccessful does the hearing of the case start.
In the Federal Republic company-dominated unions do
not enjoy the protection of Art,9(3) and have no
collective bargaining capacity. In this country industry
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wiue bargaining is the common pattern of bargaining.
Industry wide bargaining is a major safeguaru against
the emergence of company unions. Thus the law does not
sake provisions for the disestablishment of such unions.
The position is quite different in the United States
where plant wide bargaining is prevalent. There it is
an unfair labour practice for an employer to dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of a
union or contribute financial or other support to it.
in cases where the Board finds that a union is employer
dominated it orders the disestablishment of the union,
aau if the parties have concluded a collective agreement
it orders that the agreement be given no effect. Where
a union is supported by an employer but not to the point
of domination the Boara orders that no recognition be
given to the union until it has been certified.
Both in the United States and in the Federal Republic
the law regards company unions as undesirable but the
steps taken to make them ineffective vary. It is obvious
that this is so because bargaining practices are not the
same.
In Great Britain freedom to organise is not protected
by law. The present situation is far from satisfactory.
This is a sphere where it would be desirable that the law
should intervene. Of course no law is perfect and
infallible but if the law were to protect employees in
this fundamental right a great deal of unnecessary discontent
and industrial unrest could be avoided.
The American experience s mws that a section in which
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specific practices are listed very often does not solve
the problem. In other words there might be a need for
a general broad provision. An exception to this is the
outlawing of company-dominated unions; this type of
interference with the right to organise requires a more
precise definition by the legislator. As has been pointed
out before a general provision gives to the courts or
tribunal which are faced with concrete cases a great deal
of power - to a great extent they become the makers of
policy. They are the ones which decide which specific
anti-union-tactics by the employer come within the scope
of the provisions of the law and which do not. Therefore
there must be ample opportunity for review, both of facts
and law, from the decision of the first instance.
The practice in the United states of a Field Examiner
first investigating the complaint- is to be recommended
to Great Britain. In Great Britain, where in the sphere
of industrial relations the parties prefer to settle
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